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ABSTRACT 
A modest attempt has been made in the thesis, "Politics in Jammu and 
Kashmir: A Study of National Conference Since 1987", to examine the Role of 
National Conference in Kashmir Politics in its historical and contemporary 
perspective. The present study has been divided into six chapters. The first 
chapter introduces the subject of thesis with its objectives and hypothesis. It 
also consists of a brief review of literature used for the study of this thesis. The 
second chapter covers the history of the region to locate the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. Different dynasties and kings ruled it over a period of tune. But it 
was during the last days of Dogra rule that exploitation and repression was 
resisted. It was in Dogra rule that the Muslim subjects, who formed bulk of the 
population, bore the heaviest brunt of the Dogra autocracy which was highly 
exploitative. The Dogra rule was responsible for disseminating in the minds of 
its subjects, the seeds of resentment against its very existence. Politically 
suppressed and economically exploited, the Muslims of the Jammu and 
Kashmir also suffered educational backwardness. The anti-Muslim attitude of 
the Dogra Raj further added to their miseries. The pleas and representations of 
the Muslim community for their betterment largely went unheeded. 
The basic cause of people's unrest throughout the world has been socio-
economic and political. The natural urge of a human being is freedom. Man 
loves his environment and his own way of life. When this equilibrium is 
disturbed he feels suffocated and it is the logical corollary that he tries to free 
himself from the fetters may be even the imposition of an alien way of life. In 
1931-33 anti-feudal rising broke out in this state. The events in Jammu and 
Kashmir assumed most menacing proportions. A mass movement against the 
colonial rulers and their puppets, the Maharaja, a Dogra by race and Hindu by 
rehgion had been in progress since 1931... The practice of exploitation was at 
its peaks. The largest of exploited were Kashmiris by race and Muslims by 
religion. This movement aims at a definite purpose, i.e., to secure justice for 
downtrodden and subdued humanity. The focus here was towards the point, as 
to how an organized and decisive freedom movement started against an 
autocratic ruler of Jammu and Kashmir under the leadership of Sheikh 
Mohammad Abdullah. It goes to the credit of Muslim population of Ihe state of 
Jammu and Kashmir in general and the father of the Kashmir freedom 
movement, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in particular, that when they realized 
the dividing game of the Dogra ruler, they squeezed out and threw away 
religion and communal touches from the movement and adopted the banner of 
all Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (Blood red with plough in the 
middle) and not the Islamic banner (green with crescent in the centre) under 
which the movement was initially organized. The conversion of Muslim 
Conference into National Conference, a changeover on broader basis 
symbolizing the secularization of politics in Kashmir, became an inevitable 
necessity owing to certain developments within and without the Muslim 
Conference organization. These developments and the appearance of factious 
politics among the leaders, the inimical role played by Hindu communities and 
the Government against the freedom struggle conducted solely by the Muslims 
and the consequent emergence of radical forces and their role in redirecting the 
movement which ultimately threw its doors open to non-Muslims. 
With the transfer of power and partition of the subcontinent, new 
problems cropped up. As all the princely states were supposed either to join the 
Dominion of India or Dominion of Pakistan, the state of Jammu and Kashmir 
being the Muslim populated area and keeping in view the strategic importance 
of the state for Pakistan, Pakistan sent armed infiltrators to get the control of 
the state. The Maharaja feeling helpless to deal with the situation made frantic 
requests to India to help him. And in return of the help from India he signed the 
instrument of Accession. The Viceroy Lord Mountbatten while signing the 
instrument of Accession introduced a provision that the wishes of the people 
should be ascertained after normalcy is restored in the valley. Meamvhile India 
lodged a complaint in the U.N. which also favored a plebiscite in the state. 
Initially India agreed to hold the plebiscite, but nothing concrete emerged and 
the tension between the two countries escalated resulting into two wars and 
Kashmir became a permanent irritant between India and Pakistan. Meanwhile, 
at the initial stage of 1947, a section of Hindus from Jammu region in the event 
of transfer of authority from a feudal order to a democratic system in 1948-49 
mounted a struggle against the National Conference which implemented 
Kashmir Manifesto. The communal parties started agitation against it. This 
movement accentuated communal consciousness and contributed to the 
scenario of ambivalence and confrontationist politics resuhing in anti-India 
movement for plebiscite, self determination and secession. 
The third chapter deals with the brief historical survey of the origin, 
growth and development of party system in Jammu and Kashmir including 
their ideologies, organization and objectives respectively especiall)' the events 
leading towards the emergence of National Conference. Politics in Jammu and 
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Kashmir has been considerably influenced by deep seated historical, socio-
psychological and economic factors. Since independence the main issues in 
Kashmir have revolved around its status, regional conflicts within the state and 
the relationship between the state and the central governments, all of which are 
inseparably interconnected. The contemporary world confronts a variety of 
problems which are related to the socio-economic and politico-cultural aspects 
of life. Among the various social divisions in the contemporary world, regional 
divisions have raised some of the most complicated issues. Moreover, these 
problems arise when there is a combination of factors as geographical isolation, 
independent historical traditions, social, ethnic or religious peculiarities and 
local, economic and class interests. The manifestations have been and are 
varied and evocative of diverse response as the size, nature and demographic 
composition/strength of the different regions and/or regional demands. Plural 
societies contain subsystems that distinct from each other and one may acquire 
an advantage over the other in the period of state and nation building one of the 
most conspicuous paradoxes of today's world is the simultaneous appearance 
of centralization, regional and ethnic tensions suggesting a reaction against that 
very centralization. On the widespread legitimacy of pluralist democracy 
expands opportunities for ethnic and regional expression. Such consciousness 
involves issues like autonomy and administrative decentralization. Regional 
demands for autonomy may be said to assume the existence of regions and 
coherent political units endowed with right to represent the aspirations of their 
constituents and provides the existential basic phenomenon of regional identity. 
So the sense of identity within a region develops regionalism. The application 
of these generalizations to the empirical situations of Jammu and Kashmir, the 
study of political crises of the state in a regional conflict becomes of utmost 
importance in arriving at a rational understanding of longstanding political 
crisis in the state. The party system in the state has been largely influenced by 
local conditions and factors of religion, ethnicity, region, family and 
personality of leaders. There is a clear cut demarcation between political parties 
of Jammu region and Kashmir region as far as their ideologies, aims and 
objectives and support basis are concerned. They channeled the People's 
problems along ethno-communal and regional lines. There is hardly any party 
excluding National Conference, which could be considered as a cohesive body 
based on distinct ideological lines. In fact most of them happen to be 
ideologically amorphous groups. The political parties have no composite 
character; some parties have strong footing in certain areas but no support 
elsewhere. Most of them have remained factionalized and are held together by 
considerations of power patronage. Political parties in Jammu and Kashmir 
have invariably derived their support from considerations of community, caste, 
region etc. and have contributed to the growth of fissiparous tendencies rather 
than promoting the cause of nation-building and social reconstruction. Had the 
state continued the spirit of 1937-47 and adhered to the policy of toleration, the 
situation, perhaps, would have never come to such a sorry pass now. Factors 
such as personalized politics focus on individual rather than on institutions, 
ethno-regional chauvinism, misuse of religion for political gains etc. have 
caused an irreparable loss to this sensitive state where communal amity was a 
traditional hallmark. The development in the state during the last six decades 
have moved it from a secular nationalist orientation to a confrontationist, 
communal, anti-nationalist phase culminating, in the current spate of violence. 
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At the beginning the state was a native state under Dogras and the 
political system was based on the self rule of prince who used to be the centre 
of all powers. But as a result of political agitation which the Kashmiri people 
launched against the autocracy of Dogra rule, Maharaja was compelled to grant 
them the right to platform and to forni associations. Accordingl), the first 
political party, All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was founded by 
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, which made people conscious of their rights by 
the means of imparting to them political education through the instrumentality 
of press, platform and electioneering. This Muslim Conference was converted 
into a secular organization in 1939 viz. National Conference which 
ideologically needed itself with (INC) Indian National Congress. There was 
also a non-Muslim organization, called Yuvak Sabha representing the Kashmiri 
pandits. Some progressive forces like Kissan Sabha, Mazdoor Sabha, Kashmir 
socialist party etc. had also cropped up in the political scene of Kashmir state, 
but all these forums and parties were impotent before National C'onference. 
After independence the brunt of the forming government in the state fell solely 
on National Conference and had credit to rule the state from 1947 to 1965. The 
state was virtually under one-party dominance and rise of any other party was 
intentionally discouraged especially by the central government led by Nehru. 
This is one of the main reasons why the state could not see a free play of party 
politics during Nehru's Prime Minister -ship. Nehru's policy of appeasement 
was reserved by Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The Sheikh's long absence from active 
politics, the resignation of Baksh Ghulam Mohammad, the Indo-Pakistan war 
of 1965 and conditions created by it provided a comfortable excuse to the 
Prime Minister to permit her own party to establish its unit in the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir. From 1965 to 1975 the Congress (I) enjoyed 
unchallenged monopoly of the political power in the state. However the 
entrance of the Congress party into state politics paved the way for other 
national parties to establish their units in the state and also opened opportunity 
for local leadership to enter into the political battlefield of their state. 
Fourth chapter discusses about the role of National Conference in the 
politics of Jammu and Kashmir in its pre-1987 political scenario. The 
achievements especially the agrarian reforms etc. and failures of National 
Conference in Jammu and Kashmir politics are also analyzed in this chapter 
including the events leading to the 1987 elections in which sometime friend 
and sometime adversary both National and Conference and Congress (I) jointly 
fought. National Conference spearheaded the struggle in the state and 
performed an appreciable role in the political life of the state which made 
people conscious of their rights. In 1939 it thrown open its doors to all sections 
of the people of state. The new party ideologically found hself close to the 
Indian National Congress and henceforth, worked in cooperation with it against 
the British imperialism and other feudal forces within and without th(; state. 
Initially, the National Conference benefited from the variety of factors 
such as charismatic leadership, unity of command, secular and progressive 
outlook and sound organizational structure. But when it assumed power, it 
became victim of intense in-fighting, authoritarianism and ethno-regional 
cleavages. The overbearing personality factor had trammeled the democratic 
process and often forced the dissidents to break away from the party resulting 
in the evolution of various splinter groups such as Kashmir Political 
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Conference with a pro-Pakistani line, mainly supported the revival of Muslim 
Conference, which had strong reservations about the move to secularize 
Kashmiri politics and vehemently resisted the attempts to fold the party into 
National Conference. One of the important and significant promises that the 
National Conference committed to the people was the agrarian reforms. These 
reforms in Kashmir have had a very special history in the state. Sheikh 
Abdullah and National Conference first in 1950 and later in 1978 were the 
vanguard for these reforms - this organization alone has a credit to provide a 
legislation whereby land has actually been transferred to tillers. First major and 
revolutionary land reform measure was introduced in 1950 by promulgating the 
Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act (Act No. XVI of 
2007).According to this Act ceiling of land was fixed at 182 kanals uniformly 
for all soils, tracts, irrigated or un-irrigated, single cropped or double cropped 
and expropriated the land owners of their land in excess of this limit without 
any compensation. This Act deprived the owners of their ownership of 45 lakhs 
of acres of land out of which 2.3 lakh acres were given to the tenants thereof in 
ownership free of cost. It may be admitted that this Act caused injustice to and 
dissatisfaction among the landlords hold land exceeding the ceiling limit. In 
order to pacify the grievances of such landlords, the government appointed 
"Wazir Commission" headed by Chief Justice of Jammu and Kashmir in 1953 
and a land commission in 1963. In the year 1972 the Jammu and Kashmir 
Agrarian Reforms Act was enacted to provide for comprehensive legislation 
relation to land reforms in the state and bring about a radical transformation in 
the existing pattern of land ownership. Whatever the magnitude of issues and 
pursuits, the fact remains that the Nafional Conference since it assumption of 
8 
power after the Accord, had to face the problems of varied dimensions. The 
first, the Congress withdrawal of support in the legislature and the second was 
the politics of the regional imbalances by the Ladakh and Jammu. Though the 
regional imbalance claim is old one but its revival was to tease the government 
of National Conference The promises of the National Conference reveal that 
the leadership tried to implement what it had promised in earnest but failed in 
many and touched success in few. It was successful in abolishing the subsidy 
on food in Srinagar and Jammu. It suppressed the unfair means and lawlessness 
in educational institutions and resorted confidence amongst college, University 
and school teachers. It streamlined the administration through single line 
administration trying to remove the imbalances amongst areas at district and 
tehsil levels. The operation and enforcement of the Jammu and Kashmir 
Agrarian Reforms Act is commendable as it changes the agricultural semi-
feudal system in which tiller is superior. The National Conference government 
also partially nationalized transport. The National Highway (Srinagar to 
Jammu) has already been nationalized and forests closed for public. 
The failures of the government are also well known. The Sheikh and his 
government and his party (National Conference) failed in determining the 
relations between the state and the centre though the Sheikh-Indira Accord 
tried to delimit it. Consequently, the crises between the Centre and state have 
been persisting since the National Conference assumed power. 1^ 'urther the 
government failed to absolve the hegemony of the bureaucracy and the 
corruption in the administration. Though the vigilance commissioner's office 
was given a wide rope in eradicating the evil, yet instead of giving a lesson to 
people at higher levels, the petty civil servants have been victims. Education 
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has been rendered a useless trade. There was anarchy in educational institutions 
at all levels. Further, the grave problem remained neglected - the 
unemployment of educated youth. This problem was aggravated on account of 
nepotism and favoritism. The public opinion since 1975 was subjected to hopes 
and illusions. It is difficult for the National Conference to claim that their rule 
was absolutely successful in its political and economic issues and pursuits. 
Politics is determined by the results it contrives. 
The National Conference and politics of Jammu and Kashmir since 
1974-75 was mostly vitiated by Centre-State relations. The politics of state-
centre relations, usually takes the forms of complete merger or fiill integration 
and as against it full autonomy on the part of Kashmir leadership. Praja 
Parishad and mostly non-Muslims population from Jammu have been 
demanding full integration of the state with India. The National Conference has 
emphasized the preservation of Article 370 or internal autonomy. The process 
of integration by Government of India continues, the slogan by Ihe Jammu 
people still persists and the resistance to the complete merger of Jammu and 
Kashmir with India also holds out. This politics, naturally dominates, at least at 
the domestic level by National Conference. But the autonomy proposal is not 
favored by all Kashmiri people. After the death of Sheikh in 1982, the situation 
remained strained due to confrontation between the centre and Sheikh's 
successor, Farooq Abdullah. However this confrontation was lowered with an 
accord between Rajiv Gandhi and Dr. Farooq Abdullah in October 1986. It was 
the third historic accord as far as the relations of Kashmir and Delhi 
Government at that time was concerned. The first two were signed in 1952 and 
1975. All the three accords were signed by two ruling families in Srinagar and 
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Delhi. But the Accord failed to prove as effective as expected. It was 
considered as opportunistic and a sellout of the state to Delhi by the 
fundamentalists. With the result, situation went on sliding down and reached a 
position in the wake of the March 1987 elections which as a matter of fact is 
regarded as the precursor of the current turmoil in the Jammu and Kashmir 
state. This turmoil gave birth to various militant organizations with different 
manifestos. 
Of all the existing political parties in the state, the National ('onference 
occupies the most important place in the politics of Jammu and Kashmir state 
and has remained central to the politics of the state ever since its inception in 
1939. Evolved as a political movement challenging the feudal and autocratic 
rule, it traversed a long period of its political existence taking on various forms. 
After entering the power politics in 1947, it occupied the hegemonic space in 
Jammu & Kashmir. However it resumed its place of dominance after it was 
resurrected in 1975. Having enjoyed a position of pre-eminence for almost a 
quarter of century it however faced a serious crisis of credibility in 1987 
elections. 
Fifth chapter discusses about the electoral politics in Kashmir with 
special reference to 1987 elections and role played by National Conference in 
this election and also the impact of 1987 elections on the post political 
scenario of Kashmir have proved very useful in understanding the dynamic 
relationship between the fast changing socio-economic reality and ihe existing 
democratic processes. Indian society is "severely segmented", in which people 
are encapsulated within the small world of caste, creed, community and region. 
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A vast majority is still below poverty line, illiterate, and socially backward. In 
addition, in the caste and religiously impregnated areas, local groups with deep 
religious roots have established their firm holds on the general masses. By 
making frequent appeals to the parochial feelings of the people, particularly 
during the periodic elections, they further consolidate and tighten their grip on 
the helpless masses. As a matter of fact, most political parties, including those 
claiming to be secular, progressive and nationalist, tend to hasp on the emotive 
ties of people for achieving electoral victories. On occasions, such "cynical 
exploitation" of socio-psychological factors has led to disastrous consequences, 
resulting in the fragmentation and destabilization of the entire socio-political 
life of the country. This reveals that 'elections may also enhance the power of 
disruptive and reactionary social forces and teardown the entire structure of 
public authority as is evident in case of Kashmir. This makes it imperative to 
explore the problems and intricacies of electoral politics in Jammu and 
Kashmir where electoral malpractices are believed to have caused enormous 
harm to the entire political fabric in the state in general and National 
Conference in particular; especially as far as 1987 elections are concerned. 
Kashmir and elections share a tense and confusing history. It is a history 
were some men take to opportunist politics, some are reluctant to participate. 
The Kashmir politics is a peculiar species and what may be seen as a 
democratic value elsewhere does not translate the same way for the people of 
this conflict ridden region. Hence elections universally seen as democracies in 
action do not mean the same in Kashmir. In this situation transparency and 
accountability remain a distant dream. In this quagmire of dubious polity, 
Kashmiri people, no doubt politically aware, are disenchanted with politics. 
12 
The process of election in Kashmir has historically entailed rigging and 
suppression of dissent, which even well known Indians have criticized. Though 
it is true that election rigging is not specific to the state Jammu and Kashmir, it 
has taken place in elections elsewhere in India. It becomes necessary to analyze 
elections in Kashmir, given the fact that the Indian state continues to argue that 
such elections are a substitute for the promised plebiscite. It is notev/orthy that 
Mr. B.K. Nehru, former governor of Jammu and Kashmir has acknowledged 
public that elections in Kashmir have indeed been rigged in the past.'Trom 
1953 to 1975, Chief Ministers of that [state of J & K] had been nominees of 
Delhi. The Appointment to that post was legitimized by holding of farcical and 
totally rigged elections in which Congress party led by Delhi's nominee was 
elected by huge majorities". Prem Nath Bazar a prominent Hindu Kashmiri 
journalist and activist summarized the political process in Jammu and Kashmir 
as follows: After 1947 rulers of Jammu and Kashmir were not the 
representatives chosen by the local people. Whether they were the leaders of 
National Conference (NC) as in the early years (194 7-53) and during 1975-77 
or belonged to Congress as in the intervening period, their source was New 
Delhi. Not even once the elections were fair and free. It was taken for granted 
that so long as the ruling party was in the good books of the Central 
Government, it was sure by hook or by crook to win the majority of the polls; 
most of its candidates were declared elected without contesf. 
The history of elections held in Kashmir from 1951 to 1999 is the 
history of state supported rigging and misuse of power. The Central Congress 
government controlled the ruling parties in the state (NC from 1953 to 1965) 
and Congress party from 1965-1975 with its handpicked nominees running the 
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government. The top opposition stalwarts liice, Mohammad Yusuf Shah and 
Ghulam Abbas had fled to other side of the border in 1947. Their exit 
decimated the rival Muslim groups in the state. The 'Plebiscite Front' which 
represented the increasingly assertive Kashmiri nationalism had boycotted the 
path of elections. The Fronts anti-India stance and demand for self 
determination further helped the (NC) National Conference to perpetuate its 
monopoly over state power. We cannot endorse that elections have signified 
democracy in practice. In fact the ways elections have been held in valley have 
played a critical role in the alienation of Kashmiri people from India. It is a 
reality that elections are not irrelevant to the state and would be once again 
held. The way elections have been held or are being planned, have made it 
irrelevant. The process to defraud the people of Jammu and Kashmir in the 
name of elections began in 1950 when they were asked to elect 75 member 
house of the Constituent Assembly though its prelude had been written in the 
limited type of elections during the autocratic rule of Maharaja. This fraud 
culminated in the elections of 1987. The first fraud was written jointly and 
consciously by the two Prime Ministers - Nehruji and National Conference 
patron Sheikh Abdullah. Its concluding verdict was drawn by their respective 
legal and official successors - Rajiv Gandhi and Farooq Abudllah With this 
result, frequent electoral malpractices have taken place resulting in gradual 
erosion of democrafic process in the state. Even the state's strategic and 
sensitive position has often been used as a cover for such malpractices. 
Moreover frequent suppression of democratic process at the hands of ruling 
elite (through electoral subversions etc.) has not only perverted the entire fabric 
of public life in the state, but also helped the fundamentalist forces and 
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subversive forces to acquire ominous proportions. As a result, the seeds of 
militancy were sown which remained dormant until the state Assembly 
elections of 1987 ... which were allegedly rigged on a massive scale providing 
favourable climate for the seeds of militancy to sprout. It is also true that till the 
Sheikh was the patron of the National Conference, the public opinion was to 
some extent with the party. But after his death Farooq is considered as the 
unsuccessful leaders due to his untoward attitudes and anti-people policies and 
their inability to redress the grievances of the people and their indifferent 
approach of politics and policies made them unpopular among public opinion. 
His political tactics guided by his political insecurity, which he experienced 
right in the beginning of his political career, alienated the people from the 
party. This also had the impact of hallowing the party of its ideological 
contention on the one hand and making it more dependent upon the ])ersonality 
of leader, on the other hand. Driven by contingencies of real politics, Farooq 
Abdullah often took politically inconsistent positions leading to diminution of 
the very ideological stance of the party. That explains as to why the discourse 
of autonomy, though being the most relevant one for Kashmir, did not attract 
much popular attention. However, notwithstanding the ideological decline, the 
NC remains one of the few parties still having an ideological direction of 
politics. The 2002 assembly election that ended the era of hegemonic politics 
of NC has a healthy impact both on the politics of the state as well as that of the 
National Conference. With NC as the single party dominating the political 
scene, politics did not acquire competitive character. This adversely impacted 
on the process of democratization process, especially in the valley where the 
presence of the opposition was almost negligible. In the absence of the 
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democratic channels, the process of articulation expression of discontent was 
blocked and was routed through the only available space of oppositional 
politics. The mainstream politics, meanwhile lost its regional character as the 
National Conference, ensured of its return to power election after election, had 
tended to become complacent about the need for maintaining its linkage with 
its local constituency, the people of Kashmir. Now with the NC facing 
competition from PDP and other political parties, the Kashmiri mainstream 
politics has become more vibrant. Such transformation of politics is 
particularly beneficial for the National Conference as it has been forced by the 
compulsions circumstances to find its bearings, once again, in the local politics. 
That is the reason that the party has been finding means to respond to local 
issues and reflect the sensitivity of the party to local sensibilities. 
Had the democratic norms not been frequently subverted, local administration 
made accountable and responsive and some efficiency achieved, the people's 
alienation would have not reached such a sorry pass. 
Sixth chapter discussed about the Nafional Conference and its policy of 
restoration of Autonomy to Kashmir. 
The idea of autonomy for states in Indian policies came prominently into 
limelight during post-independent era, especially after fourth general elections 
held in 1967. The results of 1967 elections changed the entire picture when in 
nine of the states non-Congress government came into power. For the first 
time, there appeared a vibration in the stagnant oceanic waters of Indian 
politics. The regional parties in the states like Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, 
West Bengal, Tripura and Jammu and Kashmir came to power and became 
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more active in their respective areas. This process led the regional governments 
to demand more and more power for the states, with the result theit relations 
between centre and state could not have a smooth sailing. The desire of the 
people of Jammu and Kashmir for an autonomous state had figured in politics 
of Kashmir long before the state acceded to India in 1947 that is why the 'Hari 
Singh' the then ruler of Kashmir had surrendered only Defence, Foreign 
Affairs and Communications to the Government of India. This accession made 
by Maharaja was in consonance with the desire of the people it was endorsed 
by them through their recognized leadership. Also the ideological marriage of 
Kashmir National Conference (NC) with (INC) Indian National Congress had 
prepared the masses in general and Kashmiris in particular to live in a secular 
and nationalist India on the condition that the state of Jammu and Kashmir 
must have fullest autonomy "so that the Muslim majority in the state may feel 
assured that Hindu dominated India was not going to interfere in th(jir internal 
matters. A new twist was given to the issue of accession. Thus when the 
Kashmir Constituent Assembly ratified the State's accession to India, the 
Government of India declared that the people had exercised their right of self 
determination through their Constituent Assembly, who were to finally 
determine the Constitution of the state and jurisdiction of the Union of India 
over the State. All these promises and declarations made by Government of 
India were a clear cut commitment to the fact that the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir was going to be treated in accordance with the federal principles in its 
relationship with the Government of India. The accession of Kashmir was 
followed by the Delhi Agreement between National Conference (NC) led by 
Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru whereby autonomy was guaranteed to the state by 
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providing that Indian parliament could legislate only on three subjects of 
Defence, Foreign relations and Communications, and vest residuary powers in 
the State, conferred special citizenship rights for the 'state subjects', and 
abolished hereditary ruler ship. But ironically both the instrument of accession 
and Delhi Agreement were fragrantly violated and laws were passed by the 
Union infringing the autonomy of the state. The Article 370 of the Constitution 
has become a dead letter. 
The National Conference which makes autonomy to Kashmir as its life 
line proves otherwise to different sections of Jammu and Kashmir. The 
National Conference was not prepared to concede to Jammu and La^ dakh those 
very rights and privileges which he demanded from Indian state. While 
insisting upon an autonomous status for Kashmir, within its boundaries he 
created a unitary state which is a clear concentration of powers in the valley, 
which is the reason there exists the question of separate statehood for Jammu 
and Ladakh. This had a crucial role to play in ensuring that the problem 
remained unresolved. All the measures taken by National Conference (NC) 
failed to restore the provision of autonomy for Kashmir. Its manipulated 
policies angered the entire citizenry of Jammu and Kashmir. 
The Sheikh Indira Accord (Kashmir Accord) 1975 had no attraction 
except that the further erosion in the special status 'shell' be arrested and the 
erosion already made might, to a great extent, be reserved. But the Accord 
failed to prove its validity in this regard. It did not and could not e^ 'en help to 
the eradication of the issue of "autonomy" from the state politics. People were 
conscious that on borrowed legislative support he could not do much, but the 
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1977 elections, which gave him two third majority created genuine 
expectations that he would annul all post-1953 constitutional amendments 
particularly the most controversial sixth Constitutional Amendment Act of 10 
April 1965. Instead taking a cue from the 42"'' Amendment, of the Indian 
Constitution, through sixteenth Amendment Act, of 17 February 1977, Sheikh 
Abdullah amended section 57 of the Jammu and Kashmir constitution raising 
the life term of Jammu and Kashmir Assembly from 5 to 6 years. The Janata 
party Government greatly did undo the 42" amendment to Indian Constitution, 
but Sheikh or his successor son did not undo the mischief perpetuated under 
16''' Amendment Act. Had National Conference Government taken such a step 
it would have dispelled the common impression that SheikJi Dynasty was 
interested in safeguarding its rule rather than in the restoration of state's special 
status. So after 1975 till his death Sheikh Abdullah did not consider it 
worthwhile even to nominate an expert committee (even on organizational 
level) which could have examined all such constitutional amendments made 
after 1953 under section 147 of the J & K Constitution which could be 
annulled, modified, amended or retained. The election manifesto of the 
National Conference issued for 1996 elections was either just to confiise its 
own cadre or to have a distinctive character against other Indian parties in the 
fray so, it stressed for restoration of autonomy. People had since dismissed this 
political gimmick of Sheikh Dynasty led National Conference as they had been 
disappointed by their duplicity when both of them (son and father) enjoyed two 
third majority, but instead of reversing the process of erosion in internal 
autonomy, accelerated it. However as a Gimmick immediately on his 
reinstallation as Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah appointed two committees to 
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discuss autonomy issue, Regional Autonomy Committee (flAC) and State 
Autonomy Committee (SAC) whose recommendations were bluntly rejected by 
Union government. This politics of centre-state relations proves beyond doubt 
that National Conference is determined to play a game for the retention of 
power. To what extent this organization would be able to retain its power is for 
the fiiture to determine. 
The conclusion tries to highlight a few problems in Kashmir Politics and 
options for the resolution of the Kashmir's political problems. The policy of 
discrimination pursued over decades and lack of timely action to redress the 
grievances of the people had landed the state in the present mess. Suppression 
of rights and exploitation of people over decades, adhocism, political cliches 
and empty promises by central governments and National Conference at 
ground level have done irreparable damage to the state. Lopsided politics and 
politics of convenience and manipulation on the part of New Delhi and 
National Conference towards Kashmir and repeated rigging of elections 
coupled with unprincipled compromise created a dismal mosaic of national and 
secular life in the state. What is therefore required is a sober approach, free 
from political overtones, to the problems. The problems and grievances of the 
people have to be identified. The lapses on part of the (iovemment in 
addressing to these problems ought to be examined in right perspective. 
Mobilization of public opinion in favour of Governmental policies, through 
persuasion rather than coercion will go a long way in building confidence 
among people. 
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A consensus among various political parties and groups on the basic 
problems of the Kashmir is called upon. There should be free play of party 
politics. The old guards have failed miserably to provide the lead. A new 
leadership with a band of sincere and dedicated workers seems to be an 
imperative. 
Kashmir known for its long traditions of religious tolerance and 
pluralism right form the times of Syed Ali Hamdani and Sheikh Noor-ud-din in 
14* century, presents a totally different picture today. Militancy and terrorism 
have made a sizeable population of the valley to abandon their homes. It is 
important for the militant groups and also to state government to bring them 
back to their homeland, for the moral legitimacy of their movement depends on 
pluralism in Kashmir. The problem can be solved only through meaningful 
dialogue. It is often suggested that a change in the demographic profile of the 
state, meaning thereby that more and more Hindus should be persuaded to 
move into the valley to restore back the secular culture. But niuch water has 
been flowed since 1947 and the chasm between the two communities has 
become more and more wide. Only a Herculean task can bring back the pristine 
glory to the valley, which judging form the performance of the government 
seems to be a distant dream. It would be more proper if this move is initiated 
by the Government with the help of prominent Muslim leaders, who still retain 
credibility in the public. Such a step would surely generate an atmosphere of 
peace and goodwill, which is always lacking at the moment. At the local level 
it is now the responsibility of ruling National Conference to review its political 
policies in Kashmir. 
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The 1987 elections, however, marked a clear shift from the earlier 
elections. This became an election which generated an environment which 
ultimately turned up into an anti- India mo, pro-Pakistan or pro-independence 
movement causing a loss of faith among a large section of the populace in the 
democratic and electoral process leading to the birth of various 
militant/separatist organizations indulging into violence. At the same time 
people are fed up with violence and also their anger against the existing 
politico-administrative system continues to persist. Had the democratic norms 
not been subverted, local administration made accountable and responsive the 
people's alienation would have not reached such a sorry pass. The National 
Conference though held responsible for this situation continues to remain a 
dominant political party of the state which has made the restoration of pre-1953 
autonomy as its electoral agenda. It is on this issue that it has played politics in 
the state and gradually getting marginalized due to non-restoration of that 
status to state of Jammu and Kashmir paving way for anti-India forces. But in 
the politics of the state it still has a crucial role to play to resolve the issue of 
autonomy which is in the interest of India. The autonomy has substantial 
appeal to end alienation in Kashmir. Autonomy is essential for healthy Centre-
state relationship and the only possible option to fulfill the aspirations of people 
and only mechanism to resolve the tangle. The autonomy discourse had the 
potential of changing the terms of political discourse in Kashmir alienation in 
Kashmir. At the national level. New Delhi must move towards restoring 
Kashmir's compromised autonomy'. 
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Preface 
The present work "Politics in Jammu and Kashmir: A Study of National 
Conference since 1987" examines the trends of politics of National Conference 
from its inception earlier under the barmer of Muslim Conference in the Jammu 
and Kashmir state. It has been established that dominance of one political party 
under the leadership Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in all its phases- be it the 
freedom struggle launched in 1931 against the Dogra rule, by the National 
Conference, or the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union after independence 
in 1947,coupled with the arrest of sheikh in 1953 and his release from the jail at 
many occasions with the conclusion of Kashmir Accord, 1987 elections, the 
politics of autonomyetc. the politics haspractically been dominated by the 
National Conference at all stages. These are the core issues which are studied 
and analyzed in this work. 
Historically the Jammu and Kashmir state is composedof three main 
cultural units and geographical divisions, namely Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh. 
Thestate of Jammu and Kashmir came into existence as a result of the conquest 
of the Punjab by the Britishers in 1845. The territories of Jammu and Kashmir 
which formed the part of Sikh state were separated from it. The provinces of 
Kashmir and Gilgit were handed over to Gulab Singh, for a cash payment of 
seventy-five lakhs of rupees by the British. Gulab Singh was recognized the 
Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. He laid the foundation ol' Dogra rule in the 
state. Dogras retained the feudal structure of the society. The Muslim subjects 
who formed the bulk of the population bore the heaviest brunt and burden of the 
Dogra autocracy which was restrictive, despotic and exploitative. The freedom 
movement led by National Conference was actually a vigorous struggle against 
the oppressive rule of Dogras. The present study also concentrates on the general 
economic and political conditions of the people and various other forces which 
were directly or indirectly involved in the freedom struggle against Dogras. The 
events which resulted in the birth and emergence of Muslim Conference later 
converted into a secular political party the National Conference and its role in 
the Kashmir politics in general and post 1987 in particular is also studied and 
analysed. 
The thesis also studies the party system, their role, ideologies etc. and 
electoral politics in Kashmir and the role of National Conference as a main 
political party in the 1987 elections, and its impact on Jammu and Kashmir 
politics. The present thesis also takes thorough study on the achievements such 
as agrarian reforms, and failures of National Conference in the Jammu and 
Kashmir state. To give a historical continuity to the subject it has been found 
necessary to analyze the early historical background of the state- the political 
and economic structure in which the people of the state lived. The general 
uprising of Muslims against Dogras in 1931 was the culmination of a number of 
early political struggles and trends towards social and political reforms. The 
movement has also been examined in the larger context of the contemporary 
events in India. The freedom movement in Kashmir from 1931 to 1940 led 
exclusively by the Muslim Conference was never a communal in its character. 
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This movement found a secular-minded leader in the person of Sheikh 
Mohammad Abdullah. His leadership provided the movement both national and 
secular basis. The struggle for responsible Government and the forces and 
factors responsible for shaping the movement on broader principles of secular 
nationalism have been fully treated and thoroughly examined. It was the 
National Conference which preferred to go with Secular and democratic India 
and supported the instrument of accession of the state with the Union of India. 
Since then the issue of autonomy is the main political agenda of its political 
activism and discourse in the state. The politics of autonomy which is the lifeline 
of National Conference ideology is the main concern of the thesis. 
The present study has made use ofthe historical method. Data and facts 
collected have been processed and presented in their proper context. Both 
primary and secondary sources of information including Archival records, 
official reports and publications, constitutional documents, party documents, 
periodicals and newspapers both national and local have been consulted and 
relevantly used. 
The scheme followed in this work is divided into six chapters supported 
with a conclusion. The first chapter consists of preliminary discussion of the 
research, dealing with the importance of the topic, aims of research, and the 
methodology used in the research work. It also throws light on the literature 
review of some key sources used in the present work.Chapter second deals with 
the historical background which includes the founding of the Jammu and 
Kashmir state in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Amritsar. The 
socio-economic and political conditions of the people under Dogra rule, the 
character of its administrative system and its impact on the masses in general 
and the peasantry in particular, reveals the real cause of the political turmoil in 
the state. 
The third chapter deals with the party system in Jammu and Kashmir with 
special reference to the events resulting into the emergence of National 
Conference as a major political party with its nationalistic outlook spearheading 
the freedom struggle against the Dogra rule. The chapter also involves an 
analytical study of different political parties with their ideologies and 
programmes. 
Fourth chapter discusses about the role of National Conference in the 
politics of Jammu and Kashmir in its pre-1987 political scenario. The 
achievements especially the agrarian reforms etc. and failures of National 
Conference in Jammu and Kashmir politics are also analyzed in this chapter 
including the events leading to the 1987 elections in which sometime friend and 
sometime adversary both National and Conference and Congress (I) jointly 
fought. 
fifth chapter deals with the electoral politics in Jammu and Kashmir with 
special reference to the role of National Conference in 1987elections and its 
impact on the post 1987-political scenario of Jammu and Kashmir in general 
and the status of National Conference after 2002 elections in particular. 
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Sixth chapter deals with the role of National Conference in restoring 
autonomous character of the state. The last chapter surmises the thesis in the 
form of conclusions. Though the care has been taken to avoid the mistakes of 
grammar and otherwise but it could not be without some of them for which I am 
solely responsible. In carrying out this study I visited different libraries and 
institutes for the purpose of location and collection of the available literature. I 
pay my thanks to all of them. 






Chapter-2 Jammu and Kashmir: A Historical Overview 
Chapter-3 Political Parties in Jammu and Kashmir: The 
Emergence of National Conference 
Chapter-4 National Conference and the Politics in 





i - i i 





Chapter-5 National Conference: An Analysis of post-1987 
Politics 115-155 
Chapter-6 National Conference and Its Operational 

















The Treat}' of Amritsar, 1846 
Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir State 
The Constitution of India Part - XXI [Temporary, 
Transitional and Special Provisions] Article 370 
The Delhi Agreement, 1952 
Delhi Accord, 1975 
The Recommendations of Srinagar Conclave held on 
October 5. 1983 
Document of PDP (Peoples Democratic Party) 




Jammu and Kashmir is the north-western region of the Indian 
subcontinent. At the time of partition of the subcontinent this territory became 
disputed among India and Pakistan. It consists of the areas that includes the 
Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir, the Pakistani-
administered/occupied Gilgit-Baltistan and the western Jammu and the 
Chinese-administered/in its possession the regions of Aksai Chin and Trans-
Karakoram Tract. Pakistan has about a l/3rd of it. India administers about 2 /3 
of it. The LOC (Line of Control) divides the area administered by India from 
that of Pakistan's administered area. China occupies a part of Laddakh. The 
area which is the subject of this study is one of the states of Indian Union. It is 
officially called as the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
The region of Jammu and Kashmir has been a conflict prone area 
between India and Pakistan. Both of them have fought over tlie issue. Their 
have been different groups and parties from the state both in support of either 
India or Pakistan as well as for independence from both India and Pakistan. 
Plenty of literature exists about Jammu and Kashmir. The problem has been 
approached and studied from different angles and perspective. Majority of 
literature talks about the problem of Jammu and Kashmir in the context of 
India and Pakistan. Few writings cover the role of groups and parties from the 
state in the political discourse of region. National Conference is the political 
group/party which has been very active even before the parthion of the Indian 
sub-continent. It was rather the harbinger of movement against the Dogra rule 
and a close ally to Indian National Congress against the colonialist Britain. In 
the politics of state its role has not only been an important factor but a 
determining one. Form the very beginning this has consistently been a cadre 
based political party having support at grass root level. This study in question 
wishes to analyse the role of National Conference in the Politics of Jammu and 
Kashmir with focus on post-1987 development in the state. 
Objectives of the study 
The objective of the thesis is to examine the mode of Kashmir politics, 
especially the role of National Conference (NC) in Kashmir politics in its 
historical and contemporary perspective and its impact on the foundation of 
Kashmir politics. The present research work explores the role of National 
Conference in and after 1987-election in Jammu and Kashmir and also 
examines and analyse its efforts and progress in the areas like the granting of 
autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir, the maintenance of peace and the 
significance of special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the situation 
in which the accession was made with the Republic of India. It is also to be 
ascertained that how far was this accession beneficial to the people of Jammu 
and Kashmir. It also attempts to situate the NC's concept of autonomy in 
relation to the other available frameworks for the solution of the Kashmir issue. 
It provides a critical analysis of the role of National Conference. 
Hypothesis 
1. In the politics of the state of Jammu and Kashmirit is the national 
Conference- be it the freedom struggle launched in 1931 by the National 
Conference, or the accession of K'ishmir to Indian Union after 
independence in 1947, coupled with the arrest of Sheikh Mohammed 
Abdullah in 1953 and his release and the conclusion of Kashmir Accord, 
the 1987 election,has beena dominant and determining political force at 
all the stages. 
2. The National Conference's long historical past and its secular credentials 
still give it anupper- hand in relation to the other political parties in the 
Jammu and Kashmir state to hold trump cards for dilferent political 
developments and upheavals that occur in the state from time to time. 
3. The Jammu and Kashmir National Conference's political device of 
autonomy is the only framework on which a lot of consensus has been 
generated. 
4. The Jammu and Kashmir National Conference bears pivotal importance 
in any solution offered to the vexed Jammu and Kashmir ])roblem. 
Importance of the Study 
The present study assumes significance in many respects. The fact 
remains that the bag of historical legacy which gave National Conference a 
stature over and above from the other political parties seems to be losing 
ground. In its place a number of political parties have thronged the political 
scene. But the fact remains that the importance of National Conference in 
Jammu and Kashmir politics is sui generis in many respects. The concept of 
autonomy- the main plank of National Conference has been the only 
arrangement on which a lot of consensus can be drawn. This discourse carried 
the value of expediency as it provided both an explanation for the post-1987 
crises as well as solution to the problem within the mainstream politics, as an 
alternate to the separatist discourse of 'azadi'. 
National Conference had a strong ideological base and a cadre located in 
the grass roots. The political record of the party in last two decades reveals, the 
direction of it politics has taken new twist and new turns with the emergence of 
new political entities in the state politics of Jammu and Kashmir especially that 
of Self-Rule of People's Democratic Party (PDP). In the party's history 1987 
stands a turning point. Before and after 1987, the Jammu and Kashmir National 
Conferences' politicalleadership had two different phenomena. It is the 
divergence between the two that has posed the major challenge to the party, be 
it alliance with Indian National Congress inl986 or its association with the 
National Democratic Alliance in 1999. In both the cases, the party, under the 
leadership of Farooq Abdullah, had to suffer serious erosion of its popular base. 
His assumption that the party needed the support of the Centre rather than the 
support of people of Kashmir for its survival in power had serious implications 
for the political fortune of the party. The relevance of the National Conference 
today extends beyond competitive regional politics. Its claim as the initiator of 
the tradition of political movement in Kashmir and its contribution to the 
evolution of Kashmiri identitj' politics, assume importance in the contemporary 
situation of the State. 
The research work also bears significance because, during the worst 
period of turmoil 1990-96, when the political establishment was absent, the 
administration became dyslunctional, institutions and systems got badly 
shaken, and people's confidence lay shattered as they remain alienated due to 
•on-going violence, it was National Conference party at that time which 
remained steadfast, and initiated the era of reconstruction, the efforts for the 
restoration of autonomy, peace and stability and enormous measures to provide 
a better life and pulled the State out of the mists of gloom when it came back to 
power in 1996. However, the most significant challenge before the National 
Conference, from 2002 to 2008, was its role as the leading opposition party of 
the State- a role that can actually help in meeting the challenge of separatism 
by extending the space that the mainstream politics occupies in the Valley. The 
phase of Kashmir politicsl987 till date assumes important because this is the 
period in which state politics had seen ups and downs in its operation. The 
important thing after 2002 is that the democratic politics which had been totally 
delegitimised in the early period of militancy started gaining and a role played 
by National Conference is very important. Also, with the emergence of PDP as 
a rival party to the National Conference has changed the hegemonic character 
of National Conference and brought a competitive power politics in the state 
politics. Therefore the present study looks how the National Conference had 
retained its political space in a given political system as previously it had 
retained its dominant space during tiie leadership of Sheikh Abdullah now had 
to face a challenge to capture same space. In last but not the least, the topic 
assumes importance because the Politics of Jammu and Kashmir has undergone 
a sea change during the last four years. The Amarnath Land Row got new 
concerns with regard to the Jammu and Kashmir Issue. During 2008 a lot of 
options such as, Azadi, Autonomy and revision of alignment were discussed 
with regard to the solution of Kashmir problem. However it was the provision 
of autonomy which got lot of consensus. As autonomy in the context of Jammu 
and Kashmiris the main plank of National Conference's ideology. Thus the 
Jammu and Kashmir National Conference holds a lot of importance in any 
political solution proposed to the Jammu and Kashmir issue. 
Methodology 
Quantitative and qualitative research methodology that aims at an 
observation, collection and formulation of data collection has been harnessed 
for exploring the research work. To make the study multidimensional in 
character and approach both the historical as well as comparative methods has 
been used in this study. 
Sources 
Both primary and secondary sources have been used for this research 
work. The primary sources, which are collected, are in the form of speeches, 
interviews, statements, and documents. These primary sources would give a 
better foundation for constructing the framework in the study. However, 
relying on primary data is not enough to construct a thesis of this kind. A great 
deal of secondary data is very necessary for the completion of the study. The 
secondary sources constitute of books, reports, magazines, journals, articles, 
newspapers and other secondary means of information available in the libraries 
and markets. 
Data Analysis Technique 
The data analysis process in this study is descriptive- qualitative in 
nature. Recognising the scope of study, which is abouta state having a distinct 
character (special status), the analysis in the study will follow the chronological 
political processes occurred. Through this process, a clear picture of the 
phenomena will be available with analysis and interpretation. 
Limitations of the study 
This research is limited to study the role National Conference in the 
politics of Jammu and Kashmir since 1987. This study focuses how the 
National Conference has evolved itself in the political backdrop of Jammu and 
Kashmir. How it maintained its dominant position. How it catered the needs of 
the people of the state. It does not study the conflict of the state- its various 
dimensions, causes and possible solutions. The purpose is to locate the role of 
National Conference in the political discourse of the state in its all dimensions. 
Review of Literature 
A plenty of literature has been written about the Kashmir politics and 
National Conference. There alsoexist a good number of articles published in 
research journals, magazines and newspapers on the issue that cover the 
different aspects of the Kashmir problem. However, these do not touch the 
objectives of my study in a sufficient and systematic manner at the micro-level 
aspects of various dimensions, which are directly or indirectly linked to the role 
of National Conference since 1987.The key sources in this study for 
understanding the role of National Conference in the politics of Kashmir are 
several and some of them are reviewed here under. 
Schofield, Victoria (2004), Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the 
UnendingWar, VivaPublications, New Delhi. 
The British journalist has written a number of books on the region and 
provides acomprehensive account of the genesis and evolution of the Kashmir 
conflict up to 2001-2002. Schofield traces the political developments in 
Kashmir from the 16th centuiyonwards when the Mughal rulers conquered the 
valley in undivided India. It gives abackdrop of the Sikh rule followed by the 
reign of the Dogras before moving into an in-depthaccount of Partition and its 
aftermath.The book examines the delay in accession and the events leading to 
Maharaja HariSingh's signing the Instrument of Accession. It highlights how 
the Indian governmentdeliberately maintained in their official accounts that the 
signing took place before Indiantroops were sent to Kashmir to give legitimacy 
to their intervenfion. 
The book throws light on the internal politics of Kashmir; the decline of 
the Dogras and the rise of Sheikh Abdullah as the 'Lion of Kashmir'. The latter 
grew from being knownfor his socialist ideals and loyalty to India to being 
accused of harbouring pro-independenceambitions and discriminating against 
the non-MusHms in Jammu andKashmir through his reforms. By 1953 Nehru 
and Abdullah had fallen apart and the latterwas dismissed as prime minister 
after five years in office. Schofield argues that his ten-year rule eroded the 
special status with which Kashmir had begun its relationship with India. 
Arguing that the end of the 1950s saw the decline of the UN as the chief 
mediatorbetween India and Pakistan, the author highlights the growing role of 
the US, and thestrategic interests of China and Soviet Union in the region. The 
intricacies of diplomacyare brought out through the 1962-63 talks over the 
ceasefire line between India andPakistan. The book documents the events of 
the next few years that led to escalation ofconflict in 1965, in particular, 
Operation Gibraltar and Operation Grand Slam that onceagain saw the UN 
negotiating a ceasefire. 
The book provides a thorough account of the internal politics in 
Kashmir through the 1970s when Sheikh Abdullah is alleged by Pakistan to 
have sold out to the Indiangovemment by signing the 1975 accord. He was not 
popular in Jammu or Ladakh and neither with the Islamist groups that opposed 
the accord; and his death in 1982 coincidedwith a climate of renewed assertion 
of religious identity and the rise of communalisttendencies. The author argues 
that Farooq Abdullah's alliance with the Congress in acoalition government in 
1986 further worsened the situation and created a politicalvacuum into which 
the extremists stepped. Insurgency and violence marked the end ofthe decade 
of the 1980s and she argues that the grievances of the Kashmiri people due 
tothe erosion of the special status promised to them in 1947 and the neglect of 
the people by their political leaders were India's responsibility.The unbridled 
period of the 1990s began with a surge of anti-India rebellions andmovements 
and the pouring in of Indian security forces. The Narasimha Rao government 
tried starting a political dialogue in 1994 after international concern was 
stepped upfollowing Benazir Bhutto's speech in the (then) UN High 
Commission for Human Rightsthe previous year. The book charts the reactions 
of the Hurriyat conference, National Conference and the Jammu Kashmir 
Liberation Front (JKLF) to the unfolding events andtheir changing nature and 
role over the next few years. 
Even as Schofield discusses the latter half of the 1990s with regard to 
the strainedrelations between India and Pakistan, she argues that the 21st 
century is unlikely to see aresolution of the dispute without a change of heart in 
both countries and without therepresentative participation of the Kashmiri 
people.This book is comprehensive in its attempts at understanding the long 
drawn out conflictin Kashmir and students of conflict analysis and resolution 
are likely to find much clarityin the complexities of the causes of the conflict 
and the intricacies involved in any long term resolution. Probably one of the 
best history books on Kashmir goes into the history of the region starting from 
partition and ending at the year 2000. Is surprisingly fairly balanced—gives the 
perspectives of the Pakistanis, the Indians, and for once, the Kashmiris 
themselves. As this book was published in 2004, it does not discuss about 2002 
elections, and also lacks the information about the developments in the politics 
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of Jammu and Kashmir, that occurred since 2002 to2008. It does not tell 
anything about the National Conference as a first time opposition party in 
Jammu and Kashmir. The present study has tried to fill the gap to make study 
comprehensive. 
KoitharaVerghese,(2004),Cm///«^ Peace in Kashmir Through a Realist 
Lense,^2igt Publications, New Delhi. 
This work objectively, comprehensively and compassionately looks at 
the prospects for peace in the trouble torn province of Jammu & Kashmir. This 
work competently examines the broader dimensions of the India-Pakistan 
conflict.. 
Where the book really scores is in examining other conflicts from 
around the world and drawing lessons from there to J&K. Northern Ireland, Sri 
Lanka and Israeli-Palestine conflicts are examined. Their succinct histories and 
the complex issues involved in each come through very well. Internal conflicts 
are each distinct and different, this is the law of nature and sociology. No two 
situations will ever match and success in dealing with one can never be quite 
accurately replicated elsewhere. Strategies always have to be situation specific; 
else they lead to disaster as proved so often in history. Yet, there are common 
principles and approaches that will apply and must be sought. Lessons must not 
have to be learnt anew every time. This comparative analysis is competently 
done. Pity that South Africa was not considered though as a case study, for it is 
one successful peace effort in recent years which has enormous value. It 
seemed so easy afterwards, but the process had to be crafted painstakingly and 
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pursued relentlessly. The real payoffs come in later chapters from an analysis 
of the case studies and their implications for J&K. Verghese rightly concludes; 
No non-capitulatory peace process has succeeded without the parties 
going through an exercise in strategic re-thinking and coming to the mutual 
conclusion that achieving a settlement is both desirable and feasible. A Peace 
process needs perseverance; it cannot be an on-off process. Protracted conflicts 
have rarely been settled with a few rounds of negotiations. Nor have they been 
settled with negotiations stretching interminably. Finally, without a solution 
zone being jointly identified before public talks begin, success is very unlikely. 
This is where possibilities for peace diminish in Kashmir. There is as yet no 
war weariness on either side and no strong desire for a viable and lasting peace, 
apart from clamours from the victims of violence and from peripheral groups, 
which both states can easily ignore. Verghese calls for crafting a peace 
strategy, but he comes out with nothing entirely new. Nor does he suggest an 
approach that may be realistic and possible. Essentially he recommends 
preserving the status-quo. A situation that India would accept and Pakistan find 
great difficulty in conceding. Verghese had earlier talked of four approaches in 
dealing with conflicts; management, settlement, resolufion and reconciliafion. 
Clearly resolution and reconciliation are still a far cry. What is sought perhaps 
is better management which will provide a semblance of a settlement. Though 
the author touches each and every aspect of Kashmiri politics right from the 
beginning, it doesn't give the details about the policies and role of Nafional 
Conference in the development of Kashmiri politics and also lacks an account 
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about the changes in poHtics of Kashmir and the impact of 2002 elections on 
the status of National Conference in the Kashmiri political scenario. Therefore 
the present study tries to highlight these concerns. 
Wirsing G. Robert (2003), Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional 
Rivalries in a Nuclear Age. M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, London. 
Robert Wirsing here describes how the Indo-Pakistani standoff over the 
territory has played out between the two countries' nuclear bomb tests in 1998 
and early 2002, when India andPakistan appeared to be on the brink of a full-
scale war. Along the way, he gives detailed summaries of negotiations in late 
1998 and early 1999 for a final settlement of Kashmir between then prime 
ministers Atal Behari Vajpayee of India and Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan, as well 
as of the Pakistani incursion into the heights above the Indian-controlled 
district of Kargil, which aborted Vajpayee and Sharif s busdiplomacy and led 
to a limited shooting war that killed at least a thousand soldiers on each side. 
Wirsing strains to avoid nationalist biases in his presentation of these events. 
He bases his narrative on a broad range of academic sources; his own research, 
particularly his interviews with Pakistani opinion leaders; and reports from the 
South Asian and international media. Wirsing does not focus on politics in 
Kashmir itself, yet he does convincingly portray how various the political 
interests are of the disparategroups inhabiting the Indian state of Jammu and 
Kashmir, the adjacent Northern 
Areas of Pakistan and the sliver of territory abutting Jammu that is 
controlled byPakistan and known as Azad (free) Kashmir. Fhe author has 
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compiled this summary in order to ground a specific argument aimed mostly at 
U.S. policymakers. He sees the unambiguousintroduction of nuclear weapons 
into South Asia as a compelling reason for Americansto insert themselves into 
the Kashmir debate, and he sees the gradual increase inlndia's importance in 
world affairs as a reason for the issue to be addressedimmediately, before the 
world simply accepts India's opinions on Kashmir. "The Kashmir dispute", 
Wirsing writes, "is not about Kashmir. . . . The phraselong ago mutated into an 
inclusive metaphor or 'co\er story' for the multifacetedinterstate power 
struggle between India and Pakistan". This credible view ofthe issue as it 
relates to the Indian and Pakistani states is somewhat "disheartening"to the 
author because it means that a resolution of the territorial question,distant 
though that may be, would not mean that Indo-Pakistani tensions wouldwither 
away. At the same time, Wirsing's metaphorical view of the issue allows 
forsolutions that do not require a reparsing of the terrhorial question—indeed, 
he seesa "clash among rival subnational cultural identities" where others seek 
toadjudicate national claims. Differing from the United States-based Kashmir 
StudyGroup, with which he has been associated, Wirsing contends that a 
"solution" to theKashmir dispute does not lie "in altering Kashmir's territorial 
or politicalcircumstances so much as it lies in a fundamentally altered 
relationship between Indiaand Pakistan" (p. 196). He proposes to make 
"permanence of impermanence",which is to say that India and Pakistan should 
be encouraged by outside forces to"leam to live more or less peacefully with 
[the] interim but by now wholly familiararrangemenf embodied in the Line of 
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Control, or ceasefire line that now divides thetwo countries' possessions in 
Kashmir. 
The macro political focus of Wirsing's book and indeed the author's 
cogent skepticism of autonomy as a viable organizing principle in politics 
preclude a closelook at politics within Kashmir. Additionally, the time period 
covered in the bookends before the surprising late 2002 elections in Indian-held 
Kashmir brought forwarda coalition government that seems to favor practical 
moves toward decreasing violence,both from the Indian state and from the 
Kashmiri, Pakistani, and pan-Islamic jihadistswho oppose the Indian state. This 
book also lacks a detailed discussion about most controversial election of 1987 
which is the real cause for the fate of the present political scenario in Kashmir 
and transformed the dynamics of the Kashmir conflict. 
LambAIstair, 'Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1984-90" (1991)Roxford 
Books, Hertfordshire. 
A British historian Alstair Lamb in his book "Kashmir: A Disputed 
Legacy, 1984-90" (1991) argues about the veracity of the Instrument of 
Accession and concludes that it was not signed by Maharaja Hari Singh of 
Kashmir on 26th of October 1947, a day before the Indian troops arrived in the 
Kashmir Valley to defend Kashmir against the raiders from the Northwest 
Province of Pakistan. Lamb argues that not only India's legal claim to the state 
of Jammu and Kashmir is fraudulent but that the accession was the outcome of 
a conspiracy between INC leaders, the Maharaja's government and senior 
Indian army officers including some British. The present study has tried to find 
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the realities about the signing of instrument of accession and also tries to 
analyse those developments which led to signing of Kashmir's accession to 
India. 
Khan.G.H, Freedom Movement in Kashmir 1931-1940,(1980) Light and 
Life Pub. New Delhi. 
This is the most acceptable work about Kashmir and commendable by 
Sheikh Abdullah himself as the most reliable source for understanding the facts 
about freedom struggle led by National Conference, earlier Muslim Conference 
up to 1938. This piece of work discusses each and every aspect of earlier 
political development of Kashmir under the Dogra rule which was considered 
as autocratic. The author gives a detailed account of socio- economic and 
political situation since 1931 to 1940, and the tactics used by National 
Conference earlier Muslim Conference to get emancipation from the Dogra 
rule. This work also discusses the causes which led down trodden people of the 
state to rise against the autocratic rule. This work will ever stand as a base for 
studying Kashmir politics in general and role of National Conference in 
particular. But the time period this work is limited up to 1940, which is the 
starting point as far as the of Kashmir politics under the banner of National 
Conference is concerned. Since then, the entire political scenario has been 
changed. The present research work makes an attempt to study and analyse 
those developments in Kashmir and tries to fill the gap till date. 
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Singh, Tavleen, Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors,{1995) Viking, New Delhi. 
"Tragedy of errors" by Tavleen Singh is a well-documented account of 
Indian occupied Kashmir. She explores the history of India's relations with 
Kashmir, and traces the events which led to the deterioration and damaging of 
Indian image in the eyes of Kashmiris. She boldly accuses Indian politicians 
and specially the Indian press for tarnishing the image of kashmiri people 
before Indian public. She laments the role of media, because they always 
treated kashmiris as traitors and pro Pakistanis. In her opinion the people of 
Kashmir were secular at a larger extent and that there was no fundamentalism 
in Kashmir. Her account of Kashmir at some points seems biased due to her 
personal attachment with Kashmir, but she opens up different avenues of 
thinking for general readers about Kashmir and the people of Kashmir. She 
also ventures into the internal political dynamics of India in the late seventies 
and early eighties. Her's is a balanced account of political manhandling of the 
events in Kashmir by political parties. She also highlights the level of human 
rights abuses in Kashmir committed by Indian Security forces. In conclusion it 
is a good book which covers not only history but also presents in an elaborated 
and well written manner. This book is a valuable addition in already available 
material on Kashmir. 
Jabar, A., Kashmir and National Conference and /*o////c5,(191975-1980), 
1984,Gulshan Publishers, Srinagar. The author examines the trends of 
politics of the National Conference from the assumption of its power in 1975 
up till the controversy over the Resettlement Bill of 1982. The book also 
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examines the National conference as a dominant political party at all stages till 
1982 under the leadership of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, but the author has 
not discussed how transition in leadership, splits and power shifting took place 
in Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. The present study has tried to 
analyse this phenomenon. 
BehraNavnita: State, Identity and Violence: Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh, 
(New Delhi, Manohar Publishers, 2000) 
In a well-knit ten chapters, Behera addresses the core problem of social 
formations in terms of religion, ethnicity, and cultural and linguistic identities 
and their politicization, especially in the context of the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir in India. The first chapter deals with concepts of state and identity as 
far back as the 19th century. Behera purveys a detailed survey of the identity 
issue from pre-colonial India through its national freedom movement to the 
birth of India as an independent state in August 1947. At the end, she concludes 
that "the levers of state power tend to alienate and marginalise the sub regional 
identities." It is a sweeping and simplistic conclusion. 
Behera traces the genesis of the identity problem in the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir from ancient times when "'an individual's loyalty was primarily to 
the tribe, clan or caste group..." Behera tries to explain how the rulers of 
Jammu and Kashmir continued suppressing the voices of workers and peasants. 
She blames the Hindu King Hari Singh for suppressing factory workers who 
had opposed his "oppressive attitude of authorifies". Behera returns to her 
main theme to prove how discriminatory policies practised against the Muslims 
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from the days of the Dogra rulers have contributed to the process of the 
construction of the Kashmiri MusHm identity. After accession of the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union in October 1947, ruling elites of both 
State and Centre failed to address socio economic problems of Kashmiri 
Muslims. As a result of which, as Behera has rightly pointed out, they could 
not "secure the emotional integration of Kashmiris into the Indian 
nation"(p.l34). Also she seems to be correct that the failure of the Centre 
including ruling leaders of the state to address developmental problems of the 
Valley, ultimately resulted in an ever deepening internal unrest, and consequent 
upon Pakistan's direct hand in sponsoring militancy in the Kashmir Valley 
since 1989. In her last chapter, Behera recommends that it is vitally important 
to "remodel state structures and transform the relationship with the sub-national 
identities."But how?It is for readers to find out. Although the book does not 
offer fresh ideas or any innovative approach to deal with the problem of 
identity, it provides an excellent analysis of events in the historical context with 
a rich bibliography and valuable appendices indispensable for scholars and 
informed readership. 
Swami Praveen(2007), India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad, Routledge, 
Oxford. 
This book by a well-known Indian journalist, traces the genesis of the 
armed jihad inKashmir to e\'ents that long preceded Partition in 1947. The 
author argues that theintensity and longevity of the conflict cannot be explained 
through reasons of a failure inthe modem state system or of failed nationhood, 
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but rather that the conflict is the resuk ofthe successes of the modem states of 
India and Pakistan in terms of their geo-strategicand military planning.Even 
though violence and terrorist activities escalated in Kashmir as late as 1989-
1990,Swami argues that a series of covert operations backed by Pakistan 
immediately after 1947 continued till the mid-1960s to destabilize the political 
situation and to organise amass rebellion in the state. Swami argues that till the 
1950s, the informal war beingfought on the soils of Kashmir by Pakistan was 
small-scale and had little in it that wasnew or radical. After the defeat of the 
1965 war, Pakistan turned to Algeria and Palestine for inspiration. It was at this 
time in histor}' that Pakistan realized that the war forKashmir and the war 
against India had to collapse into one and that the warriors of thejihad in 
Jammu and Kashmir would be an integral part of its overall military 
structure.The recruitment policy of 'jihadis' by Pakistan for waging war in 
Kashmir became moreorganised and religion became a strong metaphor ofthe 
ideology behind it.The book not only provides a detailed account of the events 
of the four India-Pakistan wars of 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 but also 
highlights incidents in the periods betweenthe wars that were to shape and were 
in turn influenced by the ideology and role otKashmiri political organisations 
such as the National Conference and the JammuKashmir Liberation Front 
(JKLF), and the Islamists and jihadi groups in Kashmir including the Hizbul 
Mujahideen, Harkatul Mujahideen and Lashkar e Taiba. 
The book looks at how religion was slowly but steadily entering the 
politics of Kashmir.General Zia's leadership in Pakistan in the 1970s placed 
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Islam at the core of thefunctioning of the Pakistani army and its involvement in 
what it deemed Islamist causesbecame an ideological imperative. The Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan and the successof Pakistan's support to anti-Soviet 
elements gave it a further boost that the same methodof warfare could be 
duplicated in Kashmir.The proliferation of jihadi groups in the 1990s coincided 
with the nuclearisation of India and Pakistan. The book provides insight into 
why the jihadi groups launched a wave ofpan-lndia terror attacks following the 
Kargil war of 1999 and its implications for peace.Swami attempts to answer 
whether peace can be foreseeable in the near future andoutlines some of the 
key challenges that could threaten resolution of the conflict if left 
unaddressed.This book is useful for those seeking to understand the Kashmir 
conflict post Partitionand the evolution and ideology of 'jihadi' groups that 
have in recent years expanded theirgeographical scale of operations. Though it 
provides an in-depth description of the eventsbetween 1947 and 2004 that have 
framed many pressing present-day issues arising out ofthe conflict, the reasons 
for the discontent among average Kashmiris are not adequatelyanalysed. 
Bose, Sumantra (2003), Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Vistaar 
Publications, New Delhi. 
This book, by a professor of international and comparative politics at the 
London Schoolof Economics offers an analysis of the roots of the Kashmir 
conflict and suggests ways to make peace. The author brings out the peculiarity 
of the conflict, which he terms asessentially about sovereignty, by uncovering 
the layers of differences in the social andpolitical fabric of the state.Laying 
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particular emphasis on the post-1947 developments, the author argues that 
thecontemporary dispute is related to the discontent of the majority people of 
Indian Jammuand Kashmir with the Indian Union and the transformation of the 
state into a draconianpolice state.The book links the discontent of the Kashmiri 
youth, the trend of martyrdom and thesurge in popularity of separatist political 
organisations in the early 1990s to authoritarianpolitics and repressive central 
control in the preceding decades. Bose shows how counter insurgency 
operations by Indian security forces were ruthless and indiscriminate in 
theirconduct and crackdowns, eyeing with suspicion and hostility the entire 
Kashmiripopulation, and thereby only instigating fear and alienation in the 
latter.The book also provides insight into how this restive period of the early 
1990s gave Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) a window of 
opportunity to create pro-Pakistan guerrilla organisations to challenge the 
separatist outfits. It discusses at length the positions of the India and Pakistan 
over the issue of sovereigntyand weighs the pros and cons of a plebiscitary 
formula for Kashmir by comparing it withthe international experience of 
Bosnia and Northern Ireland. Bose concludes that neither simplistic 
plebiscitary nor partitionist models are likely to yield substantive peace 
dividends and suggests alternative measures. Bose sees much similarity in the 
conflict in Northern Ireland and Kashmir and suggests picking clues from the 
peace process in the former. Due to the differences, however, heargues for 
certain prerequisites such as improving relations between India and Pakistan, 
New Delhi and Srinagar and the establishment of representative and 
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accountable politicalframeworks in Indian Jammu and Kashmir. The book 
argues that inclusive andparticipatory dialogue preceding action is necessary 
for a peace process. 
Najar G R, Kashmir Accord{\915), The book highlights the certain issues in 
Kashmir politics, like the genesis of Kashmir dispute, politics of plebiscite, 
politics of Accord, politics of discord etc. Its drawback is that it discusses the 
political process in Jammu and Kashmir only before 1980 which is not 
sufficient as far as my period of analysis on the topic is concerned.so the 
present research work is going to study and analyse the ups and downs in the 
political process in the state till date. 
Korbel Joseph, Danger in Kashmir. (1951), (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 1951. 
The book is designed to alert the reader, not so much to dangers of 
Indian-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir, as to dangers of Communist infiltration 
and subversion in a strategic territory whose status is still in dispute despite UN 
efforts at settlement. The author having been a member of the United Nations 
Commission during 1948 and until the change of government in 
Czechoslovakia caused his resignation in 1949.He was thus an active 
participant in the early and crucial days of the UN's attempt to settle the 
Kashmir dispute. As a scholar. Dr. Korbel attempts to present the facts behind 
the issues. He does not hesitate to express trenchant criticism of the UN or of 
the Indian and Pakistan governments' actions. For this he will undoubtedly be 
charged with bias by persons whose prejudices may incline them to support one 
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or the other of the disputants or to react adversely to criticism of the UN. It is 
precisely this kind of critical analysis, however, which makes the book 
valuable for the reader who wants to understand a most complex problem of 
international relations. For the student, Dr. Korbel's book offers a case study of 
an international dispute, amply supported by references as a guide to more 
extensive investigation of the many facets of this important problem. Here also, 
within one volume, are the chronology and the data on the principal actors in 
the Kashmir drama. In his attempt to set forth the dangers of communist 
expansion and infiltration into the subcontinent via Kashmir, Dr. Korbel 
overemphasizes the potential Soviet Russian threat as against that of Soviet 
China. His exposition of past Russian policy in terms of a threat to India over 
the Himalayas is not convincing, since from a strategic point of view the area 
of vulnerability in terms of Russian expansion would seem to be Afghanistan 
and the northwest frontier of Pakistan rather than Kashmir itself Author shows 
the relation between Ladakh and Tibet and the potential danger of Chinese 
communist infiltration into an unstable Kashmir; but he fails to relate this 
analysis to similar problems faced in Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. The value of 
this part of the author's work lies primarily in his emphasis on the fact that 
Kashmir is another divided territory, like Korea, Viet Nam, Germany, and 
Austria, full of explosive potential. The serious student of South Asian affairs 
could have wished for considerably more depth in an analysis of the thorny 
Kashmir problem, but at least Dr. Korbel's book provides a beginning and. 
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because of his particular experience, some clear insights and perceptive 
conclusions. 
Want, Gul Mohd. Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospects (1993), Ashish 
Publishing House, New Delhi. 
This book discussed some important issues in Kashmir politics, like, 
Kashmir politics in its historical perspective and gives a detailed analysis of the 
oppressive politics of Dogra rule and the emergence of National Conference 
that started an effective mass movement to change the oppressive Dogra 
regime, genesis of militancy and politics of independent Kashmir. However, 
the author has highlighted these issues in general and not in the National 
Conference perspective and that too only till early 1990's. Thereafter a lot of 
changes and trends in politics in general and National Conference in particular 
had occurred in the state. These things are not covered by the author. Therefore 
the present study will try to asses and analyse these facts and try to make the 
present work multidimensional. 
Chodhary Rekha, (2004), National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir 
from hegemonic to competitive politics, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 
IXXXIX, (April-3-10). 
Author has made a scholastic attempt to reveal certain important 
changes in Kashmir politics and leadership in National Conference. But still 
there are certain important things which she has not covered in this article like 
2008 amamath land row, collapse of PDP government, Shoipayan rape and 
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murder incident, National conference's return to the political scene, and how 
National Conference has set its political space as an opposition party in 
Kashmir after the emergence of PDP. 
Noorani, A.G (2000), 'Questions about the Kashmir Cease/ire', Economic 
and Political Weekly, Vol. 35, No. 45 (November 4-10). 
This article by an eminent Indian lawyer and constitutional expert, 
analyses the ceasefire declaration of the Hizbul Mujahideen in 2000 and the 
implications for a peace processover the Kashmir dispute. Though it was short-
lived, Noorani discusses the handling ofthe situation by the Indian government 
•and the lessons that could be learned from it.The author shows how the 
Government of India preferred a military victory over apolitical settlement and 
denied the demand of tripartite talks by the armed groups. Theunilateral 
ceasefire was declared by the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) on the condition 
thatthe Indian government would initiate talks with the purpose of a political 
settlement ofthe Kashmir dispute. Noorani argues that two points in their 
declaration—participation ofPakistan, and dropping the insistence on 
plebiscite, were big gains for India. Immediatelyafter the declaration, the 
Indian government invited the HM to discuss modalities of talksand the 
security forces on Kashmir were instructed not to take any action that 
wouldjeopardize the peace process. However, the turn around by the then 
principal secretary tothe Prime Minister of India, imposing conditions to the 
dialogue process proved to be itsundoing. By insisting that talks would be held 
within the framework ofthe IndianConstitution, with the exclusion ofPakistan, 
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the HM retracted. Noorani points out that the process could have succeeded 
had a poHtical negotiationinvolving all sides followed the ceasefire. At this 
stage, he envisions the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), would have 
come in; as these talks made some progress,Indo-Pak negotiations would have 
followed, now that India's conditions of "cessation ofcross-border terrorism" 
had been met. The two tracks, Indo-Pak and Indo- Kashmiri, could have 
proceeded in tandem. In the last decisive stage all parties would have 
tocoordinate their positions.The article briefly outlines the talks that were held 
between the Govemmentof India(GOI) and the HM on July 3, 2000 and the 
poor handling of it by the former. The authorargues that the GOI could have 
saved the situation by accepting that eventually Pakistanwould come in but it 
did not, and its stand at the talks confirmed the impression that thesurrender of 
HM was its key goal. The termination of the ceasefire and the subsequent 
blaming of the failure of talks on Pakistan showed the lack of sophisfication of 
the GOI in responding to a possible window of opportunity. Over the next few 
weeks, the HM showed interest in renewing negotiations if Pakistan were 
involved at a later stage but this was not to be. India's stand, the article shows, 
is an impossible one. It refuses to acknowledge fundamental truths. Itrefuses to 
negotiate with Pakistan or the people of Kashmir. It asserts that there exists no 
'dispute'; it is a domestic matter, yet does not resolve the domestic matter 
either. It takes comfort from closer relations with the United States and relies 
on it and the other powers to bring Pakistan to heel and to stop its intercessions 
on Kashmir. This policy, Noorani argues, is doomed to failure. Drawing from 
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this incidence, Noorani contrasts the scenario with the success of the Northern 
Ireland peace process to offer lessons that Indian govemment(s) can learn and 
apply in the case of Kashmir. The article shows just how difficult it is to 
resolve the deadlock over disputes is given the rigid positions of governments. 
It shows how, in the case of Kashmir, India must rethink its strategy and work 
towards tripartite political negotiations for a successful settlement of the 
dispute. 
Khan Ali Nyla, The plutocracy and the plebeians, in her article also highlight 
some of the important issues about the Jammu and Kashmir National 
Conference considering it as a dynastic party, committed to kashmiri identity 
and compromised lot with the ideology of Indian National Congress since 
becoming of Farooq Abdullah as Chief Minister after the Death of Sheikh 
Abdullah. Hence it becomes necessary to review the literature in order to 
explore the nuts and bolts of Kashmir politics and role of National Conference 
since 1987 onwards. Therefore, an effort would be made to fill this vacuum to 
help my endeavours to strike a balance between objectivity and precision. 
This literature review is not exhaustive. The available literature was 
explored at various places particularly at Aligarh, New Delhi and Jammu and 
Kashmir. The possibility remains that all the writings on the subject might not 
have located and covered in this study. Research on such issues is never 
complete in finality. The scope remains for further exploration and study. The 
subject is progressing so it requires studies in future as well. This study makes 
an attempt to analyse theme of the thesis making use of the resources at hand. 
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Chapter Arrangement 
The thesis consists of six chapters supported with a conclusion. 
Chapter 1. It consists of primary discussion of research, dealing with the 
importance of the topic, the aims of research, methodology and a 
brief review of literature used to explore this research work. 
Chapter 2. Chapter second deals with the historical background which 
includes the founding of the Jammu and Kashmir state in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Amritsar. The 
socio-economic and political conditions of the people under 
Dogra rule, the character of its administrative system and its 
impact on the masses in general and the peasantry in particular, 
reveals the real cause of the political turmoil in the state. 
Chapters. The third chapter deals with the party system in Jammu and 
Kashmir with special reference to the events resulting into the 
emergence of National Conference as a major political party. 
Chapter 4. Fourth chapter discusses about the role of National Conference in 
the politics of Jammu and Kashmir in its pre-1987 political 
scenario. 
Chapters. Fifth chapter deals with the electoral politics in Jammu and 
Kashmir with special reference to the role of National Conference 
in 1987elections and its impact on the post 1987-political 
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scenario of Jaramu and Kashmir in general and the status of 
National Conference after 2002 elections in particular. 
Chapter 6. Sixth chapter deals with the role of National Conference in 
restoring autonomous character of the state. 
Conclusion. It surmises the thesis in the form of conclusions. 
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Chapter - 2 
Jammu and'Kjisfimir. 
Ji !HtstoricaC Overview 
Jammu and Kashmir : A Historical Overview 
Jammu and Kashmir is the northwestern region of the Indian 
subcontinent. At the time of partition of the subcontinent this territory became 
disputed among India and Pakistan. It consists of the areas that includes the 
Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir, the Pakistani-
administered/occupied Gilgit-Baltistan and the western Jammu and the 
Chinese-administered/in its possession the regions of Aksai Chin and Trans-
Karakoram Tract. Pakistan has about a l/3rd of it. India administers about 2 /3 
of it. The LOC (Line of Control) divides the area administered by India from 
that of Pakistan's administered area. China occupies a part of Ladakh. 
The area which is the subject of this study is one of the states of Indian 
Union. It is officially called as the state of Jammu and KashmirV 
Geographically it has many barriers and it covers plains, Glaciers, mountains 
and lakes, foot hills and high ranges such as Himalaya's and Korakoram, 
stretching up to K2, the second highest peak in the world. It is home to several 
valleys such as the Kashmir Valley, Tawi Valley, Chenab Valley, Poonch 
Valley, Sind Valley and Lidder Valley. The main Kashmir valley is 100 km 
(62 mi) wide and 15,520.3 km^ (5,992.4 sq mi) in area. The Himalayas divide 
the Kashmir valley from Ladakh while the Pir Panjal range, which encloses the 
valley from the west and the south, separates it from the Great Plains of 
northern India. The region of Kashmir situated at the apex of the Indian 
subcontinent is of great strategic importance owing to the fact that to its east 
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lies Tibet; to the north-east, Sinkiang, a province of China; to the north-west, 
Afghanistan and a few miles from Afghanistan lies Russian Turkestan. This 
makes the area important from strategic and military stand point and that of 
foreign affairs. This actual and potential importance of the region has caused 
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The area of state of Jammu and Kashmir consists of three regions: 
Jammu, the Kashmir valley and Ladakh. It shares border with the other Indian 
states of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab to the south and internationally with the 
People's Republic of China to the north and east and with Pakistan to the west 
and northwest respectively. It is the only state in India which enjoys special 
autonomy under Article 370 of the Constitution of India according to which, no 
32 
law enacted by the Parliament of India, except for those in the field of defence, 
communication and foreign policy, will be extendable in Jammu and Kashmir 
unless it is ratified by the state legislature of Jammu and Kashmir. Jammu and 
Kashmir is also the only Indian state that has its own flag and constitution. 
Designed by the then ruling National Conference, the flag of Jammu and 
Kashmir features a plough on a red background symbolizing labour substituted 
the Maharaja's state flag. The three stripes represent the three distinct 
administrative divisions of the state, namely Jammu, Valley of Kashmir, and 
Ladakh.^  
Jammu and Kashmir has a Muslim majority population. In totality, the 
Muslims constitute 67% of the population, the Hindus about 30%, the 
Buddhists 1%, and the Sikhs 2% of the population. In Jammu, Hindus 
constitute 65% of the population, MusHms 31% and Sikhs, 4%; In Ladakh, 
Buddhists constitute about 46% of the population, the remaining being 
Muslims'*. The people of Ladakh are of Indo-Tibetan origin, while the southern 
area of Jammu includes many communities tracing their ancestry to the nearby 
Indian states of Haryana and Punjab, as well as the city of Delhi. For the 
purpose of study this region needs to be looked upon historically with the focus 
on Dogra period to analyze and understand the role of National Conference in 
the politics of state as its origin has roots in the politics of the said period. 
The history of Kashmir is traceable as far back as 4000 years B.C. 
Kashmir is mentioned in the epic Mahabharata. Kalhana, the first Indian 
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history writer, gives a vivid account of the history of Kashmir before the 10th 
century AD in his writing "Rajatarangini," Local kingdoms both Hindus and 
Buddhist ruled extensively in this region until the 12th century AD when 
Muslims invaded the region. During this long period of history, many dynasties 
came to power one after the other. The quality of every Regime depended on 
the personal traits of Raja. Among them the most famous King of Kashmir was 
one Raja Lalitaditya who ruled from 715-752 A.D, and it was during his rule 
that Kashmir State saw maximum prosperity. 
The greatest Muslim king of early medieval age in Kashmir was Zain-
uJ-Abidin, who ascended the throne in AD 1420 and ruled up to 1470 became 
extremely popular^  among all sections of the people including Hindus, because 
of his tolerance. His long rule contributed extensively to the spread of art, 
culture, music, and every other sphere in the Hfe of Kashmir people. He also 
created a strong army and annexed many regions nearby Kashmir. These were 
the time of golden rule in Kashmir when peace and harmony prevailed. After 
the death of King, a period of destruction came calling to Kashmir and many 
raiders from outside looted the state and made the people and local rulers their 
captive. Islam gradually became the dominant religion in Kashmir. The 
Muslims and Hindus of Kashmir lived in relative harmony, since the Sufi-
Islamic way of life that ordinary Muslims followed in Kashmir complemented 
the Rishi tradition of Kashmiri Pandits. This led to a syncretic culture where 
Hindus and Muslims revered the same local saints and prayed at the same 
shrines. The famous sufi saint Bulbul Shah was able to persuade the king of the 
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time Rinchan Shah from Ladakh to adopt the Islamic way oi' life, and the 
foundation of Sufi ana composite culture was laid when Muslims, Hindus and 
Buddhists were co-existing. 
Emperor Akbar conquered Kashmir in 1586. Governors appointed by 
the Mughal Emperors from time to time governed it. The Mughal rule of the 
State was marked by the prevalence of peace and happiness. But as soon as the 
Mughal Empire started crumbling, after the death of Aurangzeb, conditions 
became unsettled again. In 1752 Ahmed Shah Durrani invaded and conquered 
Kashmir. The State thus passed into the hands of the Afghans, who established 
a brutally oppressive rule over the passive Kashmiri until 1820 .^ The tales of 
religious persecution devastation etc are still engraved in the minds of 
Kashmiris. 
In 1819, the Kashmir valley passed from the control of the Durrani 
Empire of Afghanistan, and four centuries of Muslim rule under the Mughals 
and the Afghans, to the conquering armies of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh of 
Lahore. As the Kashmiris had suffered under the Afghans, they initially 
welcomed the new Sikh rulers. However, the Sikh governors turned out to be 
hard taskmasters, and Sikh rule was generally considered oppressive, protected 
perhaps by the remoteness of Kashmir from the capital of the Sikh empire in 
Lahore, The Sikhs enacted a number of anti-Muslim laws which included 
handing out death sentences for cow slaughter*^  closing down the Jamia Masjid 
in Srinagar and banning the azaan, the public Muslim call to prayer. Kashmir 
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had also now begun to attract European visitors, several of whom wrote of the 
abject poverty of the vast Muslim peasantry and of the exorbitant taxes under 
the Sikhs. High taxes, according to some contemporary accounts, had 
depopulated large tracts of the countryside, allowing only one-sixteenth of the 
cultivable land to be cultivated. However, after a famine in 1832, the Sikhs 
reduced the land tax to half the produce of the land and also began to offer 
interest-free loans to farmers; Kashmir became the second highest revenue 
earner for the Sikh empire. 
In 1845'', the First Anglo-Sikh War broke out. After the defeat of Sikhs 
by British, the Sikhs were ordered to relinquish Kashmir'^. Gulab Singh, a 
warlord of the Dogra family in Jammu, ( After the death of Ranjit Deo, the 
Raja of Jammu, the kingdom of Jammu was captured in 1780 by the Sikhs 
under Ranjit Singh of Lahore and afterwards, until 1846, became a tributary to 
the Sikh power. Ranjit Deo's grandnephew, Gulab Singh, subsequently sought 
service at the court of Ranjit Singh; distinguished himself in later campaigns, 
especially the annexation of the Kashmir valley by the Sikhs army in 1819, 
and, for his services, was created Raja of Jammu in 1820 . With the help of his 
officer, Zorawar Singh, Gulab Singh soon captured Ladakh and Baltistan, 
regions to the east and north-east of Jammu, turned as a useful mediator and the 
trusted advisor of Sir Henry Lawrence. Two treaties were concluded. By the 
first the State of Lahore (i.e. West Punjab) handed over to the British, as 
equivalent for (rupees) one crore of indemnity, the hill countries between Beas 
and Indus; by the second the British made over to Gulab Singh for (Rupees) 75 
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lakhs all the hilly or mountainous country situated to the east of Indus and west 
of Ravi" (i.e. the Vale of Kashmir). In 1846, upon the purchase of the region 
from the British under the Treaty of Amritsar'^ the Dogras—under Gulab 
Singh—became the new rulers. Dogra Rule, under the paramountcy (or 
tutelage) of the British Crown, lasted until 1947, when the former princely state 
became a disputed territory, now administered by three countries: India, 
Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China. The Dogra rule needs to be 
studied in some detail to understand the socio-political environment in which 
the people of the region opposed the Dogra rule and became the cause of many 
political movements. 
The Dogra RuHe: An Appraisal 
In 1846, the state of Jammu and Kashmir, as it exists today, was created 
by the British. After the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh in 1839, the Sikh state 
fell into internecine strife and the British, who had been waiting for an 
opportunity to strike the Sikhs, clutched at the chance and on the pretext that 
Sikhs had crossed Sutlej to occupy the British territory, declared war on the 
Sikh states on 12* December, 1845. Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu and few 
others sided with the British'^  and the Sikh got defeated. The British 
Government imposed humiliating terms on the Sikhs as a result of their victory 
in the war. They demanded from the Sikhs, the surrender of the entire territory 
of Jullandhar Doab between the river Sutlej and river Bias with complete 
control over the two rivers, the reduction by the Sikh army and a war indemnity 
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of one and a half crore of rupees."^ The British Government knew that the Siidi 
Darbar was not in a position to pay so much and was not disposed to enforce 
payment, the object was to weaken the Sikh Darbar which was a constant 
menace and with the result Sikhs agreed to accept the terms laid down by 
British, but expressed their inability to pay the war indemnity and offered to 
cede to British, the Sikh provinces of Jammu, Kashmir, Hazara, with the 
districts of Chamba and the frontier regions of Ladakh and Baltistan. The 
British refused to accept the offer, but entered a deal with the Sikh by virtue of 
which it was agreed that the territories of Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh and the 
small provinces of Hazara would be transferred to Raja Gulab Singh in 
independent possession who would pay rupees one crore to the British in part 
fulfillment of the indemnity the British imposed on the Sikhs.'^ The dubious 
deal was formalized by the treaty of Lahore on 9 March 1846 and a separate 
treaty called as Amritsar treaty was signed on 16 March 1846 by which the 
Sikh territories were transferred to Gulab Singh. The Gulab Singh the ruler of 
the new state of Jammu and Kashmir accepted the British supremacy and found 
himself to the Suzerainty of the British Empire in India.'^ Under the treaty of 
Lahore it was provided that Maharaja Dhuleep Singh of Lahore cedes to 'The 
Honourable Company, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories, and 
rights in the Doab and country, hill or plain, situated between river Beas and 
Sutlej". It was also provided in this treaty that "'in consideration of the services 
rendered by Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu to Lahore State towards procuring the 
restoration of the relations of amity between the Lahore and British 
Government, the Maharaja (Dhuleep Singh) hereby agrees to recognize the 
independent sovereignty of Raja Gulab Singh in such territories and districts in 
the hills as may be made over to the Gulab Singh by separate agreement 
between himself and the British Government. Another treaty was concluded 
between Gulab Singh and the British Government on 16 March 1846 at 
Amritsar. By this treaty of Amritsar - notoriously referred to in the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir as the "Sale deed of Kashmir - the British Government 
made over to Raja Gulab Singh, the state of Jammu and Kashmir. By Article. 1, 
of the treaty, Kashmir was made over "for ever and in independent possession, 
to Maharaja Gulab Singh". Art. Ill of the treaty read: "in consideration of the 
transfer made to him and his heirs by the provisions of the foregoing Articles, 
Maharaja Gulab Singh will pay to the British Government the sum of Rupees 
(Nanukshahee) fifty lakhs to be paid on ratification of this treaty and twenty 
five lakhs on or before the first October of the current year, AD. 1846.'^  At the 
time of sale of Kashmir no consideration was given to the moral effects of the 
deed. Millions of people were sold like sheep and cattle and the whole 
transaction was made behind their backs. The treaty of Amritsar consisting of 
ten Articles made no mention whatsoever, of the rights, interests or the future 
of the people of the state. Thus began the modem history of Kashmir, united 
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with Jammu under the rule of the Dogra dynasty. 
Under such circumstances the State of Jammu and Kashmir was created 
and brought under the control of one ruler. However the state was not unified. 
The mountainous character of the country and the paucity of communications 
prevented the growth of any thing Hke a common sentiment of nationaHty.... 
The different communities continued to live a separate existence till the 
freedom struggle in India inspired the National Conference to unite the 
Kashmiri people. However the credit for opening much of this far flung 
mountainous territory of snow covered peaks, extensive valley and allied 
Himalayan Plateaus to modem civilization and social and political influence 
goes to its Dogra rulers. The Dogra rule which lasted for exactly one hundred 
and one years from Nov. 1846 to 1947 was one of the most progressive periods 
in the long history of the Kashmir valley and other constituent parts of Jammu 
And Kashmir State.Their rule remained unpopular right up to the time that 
Maharaja Hari Singh acceded the state to Indian union in 1947. Dogra rule was 
hated because Muslims, who constituted the majority of the population, were 
discriminated against in every way. Forced and unpaid labor, illiteracy, poverty 
and exploitation of all kinds stalked the lives of the masses. The socio-
economic and political conditions during the Dogra rule are analyzed here 
under separate headings. 
Socio-Economic conditions: 
The freedom movement was actually a struggle against the oppressive 
rule of the Dogras. The general uprising of the Muslims against the Dogra in 
1931 was the culmination of a number of early political struggles and trends 
towards social, political and economic reforms. During the period of the 
Dogras the people of the state suffered miserably. No doubt the British gave the 
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state a semblance of peace and to some extent ameliorated the conditions of the 
people but actually their policies at best helped "the upper classes of the 
Hindus in particular to consolidate and fatten themselves at the expense of the 
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masses. The masses remained in abject poverty. The economic backwardness 
of the masses was due to the very character of the state, its institutions of 
Jagirdari system and the system of revenue, taxation and corrupt 
administration. Jammu and Kashmir was a feudal state with some 
• 2"^ 
variation. Most of the state was divided into a number of jagirs (estates), and 
these estates were granted by the Maharaja to the members of the royal family, 
to their relatives, to the persons who belonged to the same caste and religion as 
professed by the ruler himself, and to those persons who had proved, by 
service, or otherwise, their loyalty to the person of the ruler as well as his 
Throne. 
The people suffered mal-administration, corruption of officials, 
illiteracy, hunger, taxation etc. Jammu and Kashmir being an agricultural state, 
about 85 percent of the total population lived in rural areas, forming as it were, 
the backbone of the entire economic structure of the state. The most majority of 
the peasants suffered miserably due to the chronic, deterioration in agriculture 
and its consequent impact on the life of peasants, the unsound revenue system 
accompanied with corrupt officialdom and the nature of relations among the 
cultivators, the jagirdars or landlords and the state. Under this system there was 
also a class of intermediaries who exploited the labour and the tiller of the land. 
The jagirdari system had rendered the peasant utterly destitute. Under this 
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system the peasants had virtually been reduced to the state of serfs which is 
characteristic of a feudal state. Almost the entire land revenue establishment in 
the province was composed of Pandits which was "a cause and misfortune to 
the Musalmans of the Kashmir."^ "^ The first fifty years of the Dogra in Kashmir 
were responsible for disseminating in the minds of its subjects the seed of 
resentment against it. The reason was the tyranny exercised by a host of 
revenue officials on peasants for the collection of land revenue.^ ^ The 
deteriorating economic conditions had virtually reduced the villagers to 
pauperism. More than 80 percent of the people living in villages were often 
under debt. 
Another curse introduced by Sikhs but taken to its extreme by the 
Dogras, was the system of Begar which has been defined as forced labour' but 
it was something worse than that; it was free forced labour. ^ ^ The main cause of 
beggar was the absence of any special laboring class in Kashmir and the 
demand for beggar fell naturally, on the villagers, All non Muslims stood 
exempted on account of being co-religionists of the ruling family. The system 
assumed extremely dreadful proportions in Kashmir valley under the Dogras 
mainly because of the frontier wars for conquest and the consequent necessity 
of providing the troops on the move as well as the huge military establishments 
in the conquered territories with adequate supplies. Under their system many 
thousand Muslims had been driven off every year to toil as caiTiers of burden 
on the most dangerous and risky Gilgit road. The roads that lead to Gilgit, Leh, 
and Askardu have to pass through lofty mountains, some as high as seventeen 
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thousand feet.^' No care was taken by the authorities of those unfortunate 
wretches "laden with grain toiling along the desert crags, between Austor and 
Gilgit on burning summer's day, urged on by a sepoy guard, is perhaps as 
pitiable as spectacle as any to be seen on the roads of Siberia.'^ ^Begar was so 
harshly enforced that the very word was a constant terror in Kashmir. When 
there was a call for beggar, the villagers would reluctantly leave their homes 
long with the prospect of death from cold or starvation. No mercy was shown 
to those men of burden who were Muslim farmers; harmless subjects of 
Maharaja but were treated worse than convicts and criminals, llie exploitative 
character of beggar also manifested itself when the high officials of the state 
regarded forced labor as an incident of serfdom which entitled them to take 
things like milk, poultry, grain, blankets, ponies, cows and sheep free of cost 
from the villagers. Apart from this, the villagers were required to render to the 
officials their services in building their houses in city or in cuhivating their 
waste land. For such services they were paid no wages. It was at the persistent 
pressure of British Resident Mr. Plowden that the Dogra government abolished 
beggar, though only partially, by a State Council Resolution dated 18.4.1891 
and instead levied an additional tax on the land revenue to meet the cost of 
newly created transport Department.^' 
The condition of the industrial labor which consisted of shawl weavers, 
men working as laborers and artisans in the silk factory, carpet weavers, papier-
mache workers, wood carvers, Gubba makers etc was as well not much 
different. The industry was one of the main sources of income to the state. The 
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labors like peasants were also victims of official tyranny. The most pitiable part 
of a shawl weaver's life was that he could not change his profession for fear on 
the part of the government that "it would reduce the Maharaja's revenue.^ ^ The 
plight of workers in silk industry was equally pitiable. They were low paid, 
mostly under paid. It was for the first time in 1924; the silk factory laborers 
rose against the oppressive behavior of the officials and protested against the 
working conditions of the factory. 
Politically suppressed and economically backward, the Muslims of 
Jammu And Kashmir State were also educationally backward. The spread of 
English Education was another factor which deepened the Muslim distrust 
against the Dogras and the Hindus. The cause of their backwardness on 
education was many folded: 1. Their own ignorance, 2. The conservative 
approach of their religious leaders, 3. Unsympathetic attitude of non-Muslims 
towards the Muslim students in the government schools, 4. Discriminatory 
policies of the Dogra administration. Moreover their share in services of the 
state was also disappointing. 
From the very beginning of their rule, the Dogra rulers had been 
appointing men from outside the state, usually Punjabis, in every branch of 
administration. As a result of these developments, the non-Muslim natives had 
been appointed to various senior and lower grade clerical posts. By the year 
1909 an appreciable number of Kashmiri non-Muslim had entered Government 
services. But the high posts were still held by the outsiders who had been 
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creating great difficulties for the natives to get higher promotions on the basis 
of their work and merit. Thus the Pandits started the struggle for the rights of 
the people living in the state against outsiders.'^ ^ This dominance of the 
outsiders was broken by Hari Singh who ascended the throne in 1925. With his 
pro-dogra policy, the people of Jammu, particularly the Rajputs, got most of 
the big jobs while Pandits were recruited as clerks in offices vacated by 
Punjabis. Need less to say the Muslims were as yet out of the picture. Aside 
from the fact that Muslims were denied their due share in the services of the 
state, the better-qualified among them were placed in inferior positions to 
equally qualified non Muslims. An educated young Muslim had, therefore to 
face three potential rivals, viz, the outsiders, the Dogra Rajputs and the 
Kashmir Pandits, all receiving patronage, influence and encouragement. 
Politically, the people were deprived of all basic rights and civil 
liberties. There existed no public opinion in the state. The right to freedom of 
speech, press and platform and freedom of association were made unlawful. 
Even the holding of a private meeting or religious meeting was prohibited. The 
people were forced to be silent which made them perturbed and restive. Hari 
Singh on the assumption of the Throne announced a number of concessions for 
the Muslims, but the concessions proved of partial advantage to the Muslims 
and mostly benefited the land owners among them.-^ '* In 1930, the Educated 
Muslim young men presented a memorial to the state Government demanding 
reservation of state Services according to their population, relaxation of 
qualifications in favour of Muslim aspirants for state services in view of their 
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general educational and economic backwardness. The grant of Scholarships to 
Muslim students and the appointment of Muslim teachers in the government 
schools to protect the educational interests of the Muslim children. These were 
the genuine demands of the Muslims which were obviously turned down.^ ^ It 
was in 1920s that marked the political awakening among the masses. This 
agitation for increase in wages developed communal overtones and was then 
directed mainly against the Kashmiri Pandit management. This also became a 
platform for presentation of \'arious grievances of Kashmiri Muslims; increase 
in representation in government services, improvement in education, land 
reforms, abolition of forced labor, and protection of Muslim shrines, and 
demand for a legislative assembly with high representation of Muslims etc.^ ^ 
The first tangible evidence was a proclamation in 1927, made in response to the 
protests of a small group of professional and white collar workers, which 
theoretically opened the wa> for the participation of Muslims in government 
military service. 
The valley at this stage was experiencing various agitations against the 
Dogra rule. In 1930 the communal tension rose following the demolishment of 
a mosque in Jammu and discretion of Holy Quran. In this agitation nearly about 
twenty two Muslims were killed by the police firing. To commemorate this 
event, 13 July 1931 was named as Martyrs Day in the valley.^ ^ In early 1930's 
the waves of the non-violence movement were sweeping India, and patriots in 
Kashmir, inspired by this spirit of revolt, renewed their claims for the 
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admission of Muslims to the administrative and military services of country 
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They formed first a "Reading Room Party", seeking to educate them 
politically, then the agitation was carried beyond the "Reading Room" to open 
meetings, until inl931 the Maharaja gave his blessings to the foundation of 
three political parties in Kashmir. These were the Kashmiri Pandits 
Conference, the Hindu Sabha in Jammu, and Sikhs Sharomani Khalsa Darbar. 
This was obviously only a gesture on the part of Maharaja because it included 
political representation only for the non-Muslim groups. As a consequence, the 
overwhelming majority of population remained without any organized political 
party. 
It was in 1931 that the growing dissatisfaction of the Kashmiri people 
burst into flames. So historically the 13 July, 1931 is a landmark in the annals 
of modem Kashmir. It was on that day that open demonstrations against the 
despotic rule of the Maharaja took place. However, there had been 
demonstrations in Kashmir earlier against the Maharajas particularly by the 
shawl weavers, and often by the peasants. But never before had the entire 
Muslim population risen against the Dogra rule. Under this prevailing 
environment and circumstances that the Muslim Conference, later National 
Conference was bom. Its birth, development, aims and objectives are analyzed 
in the second chapter. 
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Chapter - 3 
^oRticaC (Parties in Jammu and 
%fisfimir. ^ Emergence of 
%itionaC Conference 
Political Parties in Jammu and Kashmir: The Emergence of 
National Conference 
Political parties have become a must for any modem democratic state. 
Parties play a crucial role in the political process and they determine the 
operational character of the system. In fact the functioning of the formal 
institutions in a parliamentary democracy becomes clearly understandable only 
through the dynamics of party-system. Like other states of the union of India, 
Jammu and Kashmir has its own party system'. It is essential to have a brief 
historical suirvey of the origin, growth and development of party system in the 
state of Jammu and Kashmir especially of the National Conference. 
The State was from 1846 to 1947 ruled by Dogras. The political system 
of the state was based on the personal rule of the prince who used to enjoy all 
power: Executive, Legislature and Judicial. Under this system question of the 
freedom and civil liberties of the people did not arise. Such rights were denied 
to them. But as a result of the political agitation which the people of Kashmir 
launched against the rule of autocracy and despotism, Dogras were compelled 
to grant them the right to platform and to form associations. Politics in Jammu 
and Kashmir has been considerably influenced by deep seated historical, socio-
psychological and economic factors. It is basically the politics of the Dogra 
times in which the majority of the political parties have their origin. In this 
chapter the origin and the development of the National Conference is 
examined. 
51 
Dogras ruled for about hundred years. During their rule the people of 
Jammu and Kashmir were in abject poverty. The people suffered mal-
administration, corruption, illiteracy, hunger, taxationand what not. The protest 
and agitation began in 1920s. The early agitations were limited in their agenda 
and scope until growing discontent with the Dogras exploded in massive 
Muslim agitations in 1931. It proved to be a turning point in sharpening the 
external boundaries of the Kashmiri Muslim community in relation to the 
Dogra Hindus and Kashmiri Pandits, who supported the Dogras. To address the 
issue Dogra ruler, Hari Singh appointed commissions to look for the resolution 
of the problem. TheGlancy Commission^ appointed at the behest of the British 
Government, the report of which evoked sharp reaction from the Hindus in the 
state. They viewed its recommendations as an attempt to strangulate them 
politically and economically. They launched a virulent agitation and be known 
as Bread agitation and was led by Kashmiri PanditsYuvakSabha which was 
founded in 1928 in Srinagar^ThePandit communit)' felt that its 
recommendations were not favorable to it and ousted PremNathBazaz from the 
President ship of SanatanDharamYouvakSabha; JialalKilam was new 
President, who along with KashyapBandhu and others guided and supervised 
the agitation"^ . The Hindu organizations in collaboration with the erstwhile 
Dogra rulers not only took to maligning the movement but also encouraged 
communal pandering of the Hindus. As a result, communal politics reigned 
supreme both among the Muslims and non-Muslim communities.^  the Muslim 
and Hindu groups had taken contradictory stands on major issues. When the 
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Muslim organizations demanded a responsible government their Hindu 
counterparts apprehended that it was an effort to replace the Hindu Raj by the 
Muslim rule. Some Kashmiri Pandits even went to the extent of suggesting to 
all minority groups in the state to unite and organize under an "All Jammu and 
Kashmir Hindu Conference" for fighting their political and other demands 
separately.'' Moreover Sheildi Abdullah's insistence on the iroplementation of 
the recommendations of the 'Glancy Commission' was taken as a challenge by 
the Kashmiri pundits to their privileged position in state services. It is pertinent 
to note that some Hindu leaders like Bhai Parmanand, Dr. Moonje (Hindu 
Maha Sabha) and Sardar Sant Singh (a Sikh leader) viewed the freedom 
movement in Kashmir as a part of the "Pan Islamic Movement" in India. In the 
name of Indian nationalism a resolution was also passed by the Hindu Maha 
Sabha in its Akola session of 15* August 1931 which stated: "the Hindu Maha 
Sabha looks upon with fear at the fiery propaganda carried on against the 
Maharaja of Kashmir.'' 
It was in the above mentioned conditions that Kashmiri Muslims were 
organized under the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, founded in 
October 16.1932^ to spearhead an organized struggle against the Jammu based 
Dogra ruler. This Conference enjoyed the support of the Muslim Intelligentsia, 
clergy, trades people, industrial Laborers, artisans and peasant. Despite the 
Prima facie unity the Muslims failed to consolidate themselves into an 
organized and well knit group. The mutual rivalries among them resuhed in the 
breakup of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference with Mirwaiz 
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Moulvi Yousuf Shah as setting up of the other group called Azad Muslim 
Conference. The formation of the Muslim Conference in the state was 
particularly gratifying to the oppressed Kashmiri Muslims. Though the people 
were not officially members of the conference, they supported it. From the 
beginning, it grew and spread throughout the state, carrying the message of 
freedom to people from the Dogra autocracy. 
In the beginning, the people regarded the Muslim Conference as Sheik 
Abdullah's party and it was this personal ascendancy which inspired Sheikh to 
seek help of the other communities. 
MUSLIM CONFERENCE OBJECTIVES: 
The Muslim Conference committed itself to the following matters. 
1. To organize the Muslims of the state and secure for them their rights. 
2. To struggle for the improvement of their economic and cultural lot. 
3. To emancipate them from disabilities they labored under. 
The party through its resolutions in an open session at Father Masjid, 
envisaged: 
a) Property not is confiscated on account of conversion of a person from one 
religion to another, which was a practice during Dogra regime. 
b) The recruitment to the administrative posts to be made in proportion to the 
various communities of the population. 
c) Reduction of land revenue. 
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d) Recruitment to the state Army should be thrown open to all c.onmitinit-ies. 
e) Freedom of speech and expression to be guaranteed. 
f) Release of all political prisoners unconditionally.^  
Thus Muslim conference entered the arena of politics of state, 
determining its future course, without going to examine its nature, emerged, to 
secure the socio-economic betterment of the people. In their quest for support 
forni Indian Muslims, Kashmiri Muslim leaders received a fevorable response 
from Punjabi Muslims, the Ahrars and Ahmadiyas.'° This trend was abetted by 
the formation of several local political organizations with a secular nationalist 
outlook and socialist objectives - such as the Kashmir Youth League, 
established in 1936 founded by Prem Nath Bazaz and Ghulam Mohammad 
Sadiq. This organization pledged its support to the unity of all people and the 
institution of responsible government in the state. "The youth league leaders 
had the patronage of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and other radical leaders in 
the Muslim conference. The league unequivocally pledged its support for the 
liberation of Indian people from the British rule. 
The labor movement was another important development along secular 
lines, spearheaded by unions such as Kissan Sabha (Farmers union), peasants 
union. Students federation, government sericulture and silk labour Union, 
Telegraph Employees Union and Turpentine labor Union, along with other 
unions including Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. Such progressive and liberal 
movements helped political leaders especially the popular Sheikh Abdullah to 
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see the conflict in different way, no longer focusing on its religious roots but 
rather on the exploitative nature of state's political and economic structures. 
The Muslim support from outside state had come unstuck ov/ing to increase 
cleavages (between Ahrars, Ahmadiyas and Punjabi Muslims), as well as 
sectarian differences (between Shias and Sunnis and between Sunnis and 
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Wahabis). Thus these differences among them deepened. Needing a new ally 
Kashmir's Muslim Conference turned to the Indian National Congress, which 
was also spearheading a freedom movement against Britishers. With its secular 
and nationalist leadership, however the Congress leadership could not support a 
communally oriented political movement and instead urged to build a United 
Front and convert the Muslim Conference into a national organization. 
The Muslim Conference and the later National Conference had come to 
determine politics but the Ibrmer in its inception had to grapple with a twofold 
problem. One was that non-Muslims were to be assured that the freedom 
struggle was common between them and Muslims. Second, which emanated 
from the first, was the problem of those of workers, who would not like to 
convert a communal into a secular type of political organization.''* 
Consequently, the logistics of party politics demanded the removal of 
those members who either believed in Two Nation Theory' or in sabotaging 
the party (Muslim Conference) for personal ends. Whether there was any 
substantive difference between different sections of the people or not, the 
leadership of the Muslim conference made it to appear so much acute that those 
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who dissented to the ideology of the National Conference were weeded out of 
the organization. Thus the conflict of these groups resulted into the hurling of 
nicknames or damaging the reputation of leaders. The Sheikh Abdullah was 
blamed as a believer of Ahmadia sect, and others were divided on ideological 
acrimony. 
The cleavages were jnanifest through Yuvak Sabha, representing the 
Kashmiri Pandits, Unjuman-i-Islahi Rasoom of Molyi Mohammad Syeed 
Masoodi, Unjuman Ithadul Muslimeen and Dogra Sabha of Jammu, 
Youngmen's Muslim Association'^ However, these cleavages did not thwart 
the course of revolutionary action against the despotic Maharaja. Actually in its 
operative part, the Muslim conference determined the actions of Maharaja. It 
decided the course of political history of Kashmir right from 1937 to 1947. 
Muslim Conference - Advocacy for Secularism: 
The history of Muslim Conference is the record of the struggle of the 
middle and upper class Muslims for achievement of their class rights. ^ The 
leadership of the party realized that Muslim conference could not appeal to all 
sections of masses in a country with a multi-religious and multilingual society. 
They decided to retool politics against the forces that stood in their way. On the 
basis of these grounds there was a clarion call to all people of the state to 
cooperate in the struggle for freedom. The leadership had visualized that the 
Maharaja and other forces of reaction could exploit the situation against 
Muslim Conference. A few young Muslim leaders including Sheikh Abdullah 
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began to think of reorientation of Muslim politics on broader healthier and non-
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communal lines. The leadership of the Muslim Conference started 
negotiations with the other communities in the state. In this connection the 
Sixth Session of Muslim Conference marked a desire of retooling the politics 
of the state on secular basis. In the Presidential address of Muslim conference 
on 26* March 1938, Sheikh Abdullah observed: 
"Like us the large majority of Hindus and Sikhs in the state have 
immensely suffered at the hands of the irresponsible government. They are also 
steeped in deep ignorance and are in debt and starving. Establishment of 
responsible government is much necessity for them as for us. Sooner or later 
these people are bound to join our ranks. No amount of propaganda can help to 
keep them away from us". The main problem therefore noM' before us is to 
organize joint action and a united front against the forces that comes in our way 
for the achievement of our goals. This will require re-christening our 
organization as a non-communal political body and introducing certain 
amendments in its constitution and rules.'^ These were the convic ions of the 
leadership of the Muslim Conference and consequential upon it the 
organization was converted to the National Conference on 11 June 1939. The 
conversion of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference into National 
Conference, a changeover on broader basis symbolizing the secularization of 
Kashmiri politics, became a necessity owing to certain developments within 
and without the Muslim Conference organization. These developments were 
the appearance of factional politics among the leaders, the inimical role played 
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by Hindu communities and the government against the freedom struggle 
conducted solely by the Muslims and the consequent emergence of radical 
forces and their role in redirecting the movement which ultimately threw its 
doors open to the non-Muslims. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was the pivotal 
figure amidst these developments and it was he who played the most notable 
role in providing a broader based secular and nationalistic base to the 
movement. 
The All .lammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference under the leadership of 
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah molded very cautiously and with measured steps 
to change the mass opinion of Muslims in favour of nationalism and 
secularism. The unity meetings, the revolutionary and secular role of the leftist 
forces within the Muslim Conference and the factional politics among the 
Muslims were contributory i'actors which led the leaders of the Conference to 
reshape the movement on national and secular lines. The first step in this 
direction was taken in March 1933 when the working committee of the 
conference constituted a subcommittee to find out ways and means of uniting 
all communities belonging to all religions, but due to political disturbances, it 
was however here that the idea of joint acfion in politics had taken birth. 
In November 1934 immediately after the third annual session of Muslim 
Conference was over, Sheikh went on a tour to Punjab. The outcome of this 
tour was the implementation of the programme of introducing nafionalism into 
Kashmiri politics. The first movement in this respect was the publication of a 
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weekly journal entitled The Hamdard. The inauguration of Hamdard, a joint 
venture of 'Sheikh Abdullah' and 'Premnath Bazaz,' was performed by a well-
known Congress leader, Dr. Saif-ud-Din Kitchlooat Hazuribagh Srinagar on 
August 3, 1935. This inauguration of the paper secured two purposes: 
(a) The congress was introduced to people through the personal presence of 
Dr. Kitchloo whose mission was to introduce the policy and programme 
of Indian National Congress in Kashmir politics. 
(b) The Hamdard was made the mouthpiece of this policy. In his inaugural 
address Dr. Kitchloo acquainted the people with underlying idea of the 
movement in light of C'ongress ideological content. 
Main theme was that people should fight for economic freedom which 
included the establishment of industries, development of trade and commerce 
and construction of means of communications. He ridiculed those who mixed 
politics with religion by laying emphasis on Hindu-Muslim unity. According to 
him the freedom struggle in Kashmir should be conducted against the British 
who were the main enemies of the people. These ideas inspired the Muslim 
Conference and the emerging progressive forces. With regard to the majority 
and minority relations over political issues - Kitchloo made it clear that "it was 
the duty of the Muslims being in majority in the state to win the confidence of 
minorities for the conduct of a successful movement. So far as the formal 
"Hamdard was concerned' its policy was based on secular ideology and helped 
in laying the foundations of progressive nationalism in Kashmir.The paper 
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played a vital role in the development of democratic consciousness among the 
people and fought courageously against entire orthodoxy in whatever form it 
existed in the state and more important, it prepared the people for achieving the 
right of responsible government in the State.^ " 
Muslim Conference- Advocacy of Responsible Government: 
This policy as the political goal was adopted in 1934. As the Mian Ahmad 
Yar Khan said that by implication and establishment of a democratic political 
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system is the only solution to the troubles. 
The Muslim Conference started a vigorous campaign of political 
propaganda in favour of responsible Government preparing the public opinion 
for its acceptance. It had invited the non-Muslims also to join the movement 
but there was a scanty response from them. Choudhary Ghularn Abbas assured 
them about the aim of the movement. ... the struggle for the achievement of 
rights of the Muslims had not been started with this aim that the Hindus would 
be deprived of their true and legitimate rights. The struggle for freedom was 
started to support and protect the rights of all the subjects of the state. As a 
resuh of this struggle, not only Muslims but also all other communities have 
equally been benefited. The reduction in water tax and grazing tax and the 
proprietary rights in land have equally been advantageous for the Muslim 
peasants as well as the non-Muslims. Similarly the fruits of the establishment 
of a Legislative Assembly in the State and the freedom of press and platform, 
in whatever degree, are equally reaped by both communities. It is true that in 
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achievement of these rights the MusHm community alone has suffered troubles 
and afflictions and the non-Muslims have only caused impediments in their 
way. But ignoring the bitter past, the Sheikh Abdullah, on behalf of Muslims, 
appealed to Hindu countrymen that they should cooperate with us. I assure 
them that Muslims do not want to usurp the legitimate rights of any 
community. Let us, therefore join hands together and struggle for the 
emancipation of our country. 
Muslim Conference- Advocacy for Nationalism: 
From 1936, the Muslim conference staunchly advocated nationalism and 
secularism, when a responsible Government Day was observed on May, 8, 
1936 in the entire valley and a call given to non-Muslims to join the 
celebrations was not generally responded by them on the ground that they still 
doubted the character of the movement led by the Muslim Conference.The 
official organ of the Hindu Yuvak Sabha, 'the Daily Martand', termed the 
Muslim conference "an organization of communalist Muslim which has come 
into existence for the protection of Muslim rights. 
This organization has been established with the idea of crushing the 
Hindus... it is therefore not expected of its members that they will allow this 
organization to work, like the Indian National Congress, with tolerance and for 
the common cause of both the Hindus and Muslims. It is impossible to expect 
the members of the Muslim Conference to conduct a joint action until they 
sever connections from the Muslim Conference and establish a national body in 
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its place. The Rajput Gazette wanted the question of responsible Government 
to be decided by the Maharaja because 'in this lies our salvation and 
betterment^ "*. It was evident that the official policy of the Yuvak Sabha which 
commanded the majority of the pandits, and other non-Muslims, was not in 
favour of nationalism and that its members had a soft comer for the 
Government which, as the non-Muslims always believed, would protect their 
communal interests. 
In spite of all this very character of non-Muslim communities, a small 
number of intellectually advanced non-Muslims who had by now grasped the 
direction of the political wake responded to the appeal of the Muslim 
Conference to join the movement for responsible government, which was of a 
great importance and contribution to the growth and development of national 
politics at this stage. The growing awareness of this need made it necessary that 
the Muslim Conference be transformed into a national body, and this 
presupposed that the concept and ideological content of nationalism be made 
known to the Muslim masses and that the movement be based purely on the 
economic content and the democratic outlook. The movement was to be 
brought to the level of Indian National Congress, both ideologically and 
politically. This task became henceforth the main political activity of Sheikh 
Mohammad Abdullah and the leftist forces among the ranks of the Conference. 
"According to him, sooner or later all other communities are to join our ranks, 
no amount of propaganda can keep them away from us".The movement could 
not be put on national lines, argued Sheikh Abdullah, because "some sad 
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happenings took place in the beginning of the movement in 1931 which, in 
turn, gave rise to certain misunderstandings between the Muslim and Hindus.^ ^ 
The main cause of this was the doubt nourished by the non-Muslims that the 
movement led by the Muslims was communal one. By 1936 the leaders of the 
Conference removed this fear from the minds of the non-Muslims by preaching 
openly politics of nationalism. With the result the progressive minded Hindus 
actively take part in the movement by which new emerging forces and trends 
took their birth in the Kashmir politics. With the result the communal lines of 
the Kashmir politics were removed by a secular organization namely Jammu 
and Kashmir National Conference.The .lammu and Kashmir National 
Conference (JKNC) is one of the major political parties in the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir, headed by Sheikh Abdullah in 1947 at the time of Indian 
independence. The earlier name of this party was All Jammu and Kashmir 
Muslim Conference, founded by (Sheri Kashmir) Sheikh Abdullah in October 
1937. Later on June 11, 1939, it was renamed as All Jammu and Kashmir 
National Conference. 
Evolved as a political movement challenging the feudal and autocratic 
rule, the National Conference traversed a long period of its political existence 
taking on various forms. Of all the existing political parties in the state, the 
National Conference occupied the most important place in the politics of the 
state. Its commitment to the interest of common Kashmiris was woven around 
its ideological formulation based on its political programme adopted in 1944 in 
the form of New Kashmir Manifesto. This manifesto emphasizing on the 
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reorganization of the economic and political structure was to catch the 
imagination of the Kashmiri people as it provided them a conception for a new 
Kashmir - a Kashmir purged of its miserable past reminiscent of its political 
subjugation, economic oppression and social backwardness^ .^ 
National Conference-Organization: 
National conference is a closely organized party which has its units in 
every comer of the state, particularly in the Muslim majority areas of the state. 
According to changes made in the organizational setup of the party in 
1975, the party has now Block Committees in place Tehsil Committees and 
each block functions under Block President. The organization consists of Basic 
Committees, Halqa Committees, Provincial Committees and the General 
Council. 
A basic committee is constituted of primary members and the basic 
members of a particular village or Mohalla and functions under an elected 
president. 
A Halqa Committee consists of only basic members of a Halqa with 
10,000 to 15,000 urban populations or 7000 to 10,000 rural populations and 
each Halqa committee works under an elected President. 
The General body of a Block Committee consists of elected delegates of 
a particular block. These delegates elect the Block president. The president 
nominates his working committee of 15-25 members out of the general body of 
the Block Committees. The working committee elects other office bearers of 
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the Block Committee lie the Vice-President, the Secretary, Joint Secretary and 
the Treasurer. 
The General body of the District Committee consists of the elected 
delegates of a particular district. They elect the district President. The President 
nominates the members of his working committee. 
There are three provincial committees for the three provinces of Jammu, 
Kashmir, and Ladakh. Each provincial committee has a general body, 
consisting of 'delegates' of the whole province. The delegates elect the 
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provincial president. The elected President nominates a working committee of 
31-51 members out of the general body. The Vice President, the Secretary and 
the Treasurer are elected by the members of the committee. 
The Central General Council is at the top of the pyramid. Its members 
are elected by the delegates of the 'District Committee, the number of the 
members from each district depends upon the number of delegates in each 
district. I/IO'*' of the delegates of a district are elected for the Central General 
Council. The General Council elects the President of the organization who 
functions as the president of the Council as well. The General Council is 
elected for a term of 3 years and its quorum is 1/3'^ '' of its membership. 
"The members of the State legislative Assembly and the state legislative 
Council belonging to the National Conference are considered to be the ex-
officio members of the respective working committees the 'Block 
Committees', 'District Committees' and 'Provincial Committees' of the Party". 
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The Working Committee of the party as nominated by the president of 
the party out of the members of the General Council and the number of its 
members is fixed by the constitution of the party to be 25-31. The Working 
Committee is the most important and the most powerful organ of the party 
though it is a tool in the hands of the President. "It is the executive organ of 
National Conference and is responsible for implementing the programs and 
policies of the party. It can formulate rules and regulations for the enforcement 
of the Aini-Isasi (Constitution) of the party.^ I^t can also interfere with the 
working of all Subordinate Committees of the party, whenever need arises". 
The Constitution of the Party (Aini-Isaasi) provides for the 'Central 
Election Board' whose members are nominated by the President of the party 
and the number of its members varies from 7 to 11. The Election Board 
conducts the elections of the organization and its convener is the General 
Secretary of the party. 
Article 24 of the Constitution of the National Conference (Aini-Isaasi) 
provides for the Constitution of 'credentials committee' comprising of at least 
five members of the working committee to look into all types of complaints 
against the members of the party. It submits its recommendations to the 
working committee. 
The party has a President, Vice-President and a Secretary General and a 
Treasure at the state level - elected for a term of three years. These office 
bearers, particularly the president are the life and soul of the party. Since 1975 
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till his death Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah has been the President of National 
Conference. It is he whom the party owns its existence whose dynamic 
leadership has organized the party so well that it appears to be a closely well-
known organization. 
National Conference-Membership: 
Article 3 of the Constitution of the party, there are three types of 
members of the National Conference. 
1. Ibtidai (primary members) members 
2. The Members 
3. The Basic Members 
The Ibtidai Members are the new entrants to the party and have right to 
vote in the basic committees but cannot contest for any office. 
Members are the persons who have been the members of the party for 
two years continuously provided they understand the programmes and policies 
of the party. They can contest for any office in Basic Committees. 
Basic Members are the persons who have been members of the party 
continuously for three years, besides possessing other qualifications. The basic 
members can contest for any office in the party, subject to other provisions of 
the constitution of the party. 
National Conference-Ideology and Programme: 
Ideology may be defined as "any systematic and all-embracing political 
doctrine, which claims to give a complete and universally applicable theory of 
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man and society and to derive there from a programme of political action. In 
other words, ideology means an explicitly definite philosophy which forms the 
basis of a social, economic and political system and for the realization of which 
a commitment is made, a programme formulated and a collective action taken. 
The National Conference has always cherished and practiced the ideals of 
secularism, nationalism, socialism and democracy. In fact the very foundation 
of the party was laid on secular ideology. The party at the time of its formation 
in 1939, was thrown open to any person on the condition that he would take 
oath, declaring that he "will maintain the unity among different classes of the 
people and offer every possible sacrifice for the attainment of liberty and 
responsible government in the state". The change over from Muslim 
Conference to National Conference was vindication of non-communal outlook 
of the party. The party decides to yield to pressures of the 'two-nation theory' 
of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The secular outlook of the part}' is also manifest 
from its famous slogan: Sher-i-Kashmir Ka Keya Irshad - Hindu-MusHm Sikh 
Itihad. 
The National conference has always declared that the socialism, 
secularism and democracy are the corner-stones of its policies and 
programmes. 'Naya Kashmir' which is the bible of the National Conference, is 
nothing but an embodiment of democratic, socialistic and secular principles. 
The programme Naya Kashmir was prepared in 1944, with some amendments 
in its contents on August 25, 1976 by the central Executive of the Party, under 
the chairmanship of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. The amendments were 
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affected "to bring it up to date and in conformity with the all-round 
requirements of a welfare state". 
Article2 of the 'Naya Kashmir' mentions that "complete freedom of 
faith, conscience, worship and expression shall be guaranteed to every resident 
of the state". 
Article 3 reads "the people of the state shall be guaranteed the rights to: 
(a) Freedom of speech. 
(b) Freedom of press. 
(c) Freedom of assembly 
(d) Freedom of association and organization. 
Article 23 mentions that the state economy shall be planned with a view 
to ensuring rapid economic growth and social justice. The manifesto issued by 
the party on the eve of elections also confinns that the ideology of the party to 
the principles of socialism, secularism and democracy. A firm believer in 
liberal democracy the party has been championing the cause of such human 
rights as are essential for the establishment of an egalitarian society based on 
the principles of equality and justice. In short, the party's commitment to, 
secular, national and socialistic ideology has become an article of faith with it 
and the party has unabatedly been espousing the cause of secular democracy, 
Hindu-Muslim unity and national integration. 
Besides the National Conference there are many other organizations 
which were established in state of Jammu and Kashmir or operated as the 
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extension of the national parties. A brief overview of them is needed here to 
understand the various facets and dimensions of political discourse in the state 
of Jammu and Kashmir. 
All Jammu and Kashmir Praja Parishad/ BJP: 
The political movement headed by Sheikh Abdullah that originated in 
Kashmir in 1931 remained to some extent unsuccessful to gain the support of 
Jammu especially the Hindu dominated areas. Its genesis, growth and 
ideological mornings made it a suspect in the eyes of the Dogra Nationalists of 
Jammu who looked upon it as something alien and unacceptable. The Praja 
Parishad which later merged into the Jana SanghParty '^ of Jammu and Kashmir 
in mid-50 and represented the aspirations and interests of the relatively better 
off Hindus (landed class and the beneficiaries of the erstwhile feudal system 
etc.) came into being in Jammu in the late 40s (1947) mainly as a protest 
movement against the anti-Dogra policies and Quit Kashmir movement of 
1946, which the Dogras of the Jammu viewed as an attempt to eliminate their 
influence from Kashmir. 
The existence of Praja Parishad as a protest movement opposed the 
government's major policy planks such as abolition of land-lordism, anti-Dogra 
Maharaja drive, attempts at framing a separate constitution for the Jammu and 
Kashmir state and a separate flag, emblem etc. The Parishad supported the full 
integration of the Jammu and Kashmir state with the Indian Union and 
demanded abrogation of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Owing to its 
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being a Hindu-based organization, it has no influence in Muslim dominated 
areas. This movement to a certain degree synchronized the conflicting 
aspirations of Dogra Nationalism vs. Kashmiri Muslim identity. The Praja 
Parishad had received support from Hindu Maha Sabha, RSS, for its 
formation. The first President of the party was Hari Wazir and the General 
Secretary was Balraj Madhok. The party in the meantime gained strength with 
the adhesion of such stalwarts as Prem Nath Dogra and others and became the 
Principal opposition party of Jammu. It was in close touch with Hindu 
Mahasabha, Ram Rajya Parishad and Jana Sangh. 
The main task to which Praja Parishad was committed was the full 
integration of Jammu and Kashmir State with the Indian union, like other 
acceding states and safeguards the legitimate democratic rights of the people of 
Jammu from the anti Dogra stance of Sheikh Abdullah government. This party 
considered the state of Jammu and Kashmir an inseparable and indivisible part 
of India. The party articulated Jammu's discontent in the emotive slogan of 
"Full accession" of the state to Indian Union and abrogation of Article 370 of 
the Indian Constitution that guaranteed it a special status. The party stressed the 
deletion of Articles70 and described this as its first and foremost duty. The 
party tirelessly tried to unite the people of Jammu with a view to foiling the 
attempts of those who either favored special status or tried to separate the state 
from Indian Union. Business class concentrated in the city of Jammu and 
townships of Kathua, Udhampur and Reasi generated a lot of support for the 
party. Many Rajputs among the Hindus also extended support to Praja Parishad 
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because they regarded the National Conference leadership as the destroyer of 
Rajput dynasty from the station. By 1951 the Party had become a power to 
reckon in the areas of Jammu and the only one which was in any real sense the 
opposition party to the one in power All Jammu and Kashmir National 
Conference. 
As one of the important rightist parties of Jammu and Kashmir, Praja 
Parishad always opposed the setting up of a separate Constituent Assembly for 
the state. It favored the application of Indian Constitution to Kashmir.'^ '^ Inspite 
of this stand a special session of the party held on May 8, 1951 decided to 
contest the elections to the constituent Assembly of the State. '^  Because of the 
large scale rejection of nomination papers of its candidates, party decided to 
boycott the elections and blamed the government for having used unfair means. 
The party in spite of its strong support base failed to enter the state assembly. 
Later on the national scene with the efforts of Jaya Prakash Narayan to 
establish a two party system in India as an alternative to Congress Party, 
several other parties including Bharatiya Jan Sangh merged together to form 
Janata Party in 1977.The Jammu and Kashmir wing of Praja Parishad was later 
on converted into Jana Sang Party which also became a part of Janata Party. In 
1979 with the fall of Janta government a number of new political parties 
emerged out of it ^^ . On April 6, 1980 Mr.L.K. Advani constituted a new party 
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namely Bharatiya Janata Party with Atal Bihari Vajpayee as its president . The 
party adopted a separate constitution, flag and separate electoral 
symbol .Consequent upon the formation of BJP out of the rain of Janata Party, 
the erstwhile cadre of Jana Sangh in Jammu and Kashmir also joined the party. 
The BJP's stand on Jammu and Kashmir is same as was the ideology of Praja 
Parishad. 
The Jamaat-e-Islami: 
The pro-Pakistani fundamentalist organization was established in 1942 
at Shopian by Maulvi Ghulam Ahmad Ahrar in collaboration with Syed 
Shahabud-Dm and other likeminded persons. Since there was no organization 
worth the name in existence in the state to serve Islam, the need for organizing 
the Jamat was duly brought into being with a view to promote Islam as an ideal 
of life for the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir. It is a well-knit well 
organized and extremely disciplined politico-religious organization. It draws its 
followers mainly from the middle class strata of its co-religionists. It also 
draws its followers from government officials and academic circles. It however 
found favour with the educated young Muslims who are the mainstay of the 
party. The leaders of the party are of the opinion that the illiterate masses do 
not come close to it because they are easily misled and exploited by the selfish 
Mullahs and by unscrupulous communists and taken in by the deceitful 
gestures of other polifical parties whereas Jamat-e-Islami abhors all such 
methods and means. According to them, it is the revolutionary message and 
programme of the party which antagonizes all other political elements working 
in the state who find it difficult to reconcile with the revolutionary programmes 
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of the party. It is slogan of Allah-hu-Akbar, which is raised for estabhshing the 
sovereignty of Allah that has annoyed all those who have been ruling over and 
exploiting the common people of the state. They have been beating the drums 
of their own greatness as against the greatness of Allah. They have been doing 
it on various pretexts like nationalism, economic prosperity, political 
superiority and racial superiority. 
The Jamat-e-Islami is an ideological party and not merely a political 
party or a religious or social reform organization. The fundamental conviction 
the party holds is that "there is no deity but Allah and Muhammad (peace be 
upon him) is his prophet". According to this conviction, Allah (God) is 
absolute "the only creator, disposer of all affairs and the only law-giver in the 
voluntary and involuntary aspects of life. The conviction in simple terms means 
that God is the only ruler, possessing the real power. If man wants to be really 
free, he should then surrender his free-will and autonomy to God. For the 
achievement of any goals and objectives, it is necessary for the mankind to take 
the path of Allah, which would enable man to get rid of all kinds of personal, 
racial, parochial or prejudices which are usually the source of attachment and, 
therefore root cause of all disputes and conflicts among mankind on this earth. 
Such attachments should not, therefore, stand in the way of his love and 
devotion to the message of Allah and his Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon 
him). Man should apply the criterion supplied by God to distinguish between 
good and bad, right and wrong, just and unjust. Such a Nizam or socio-
economic and political system can be established only by peaceful and non-
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violent or non-forcible means. That is the basic reason why the Jamat does not 
subscribe to armed revolution. It has declared its belief in democratic and 
constitutional method for bringing about any kind of revolution. 
The party favours parliamentary democracy as a form of Government. 
Since this form of Government is, more or less, in consonance with the 
accepted principles of Islamic democracy, the party has agreed to work it for 
the achievement of its political, social and economic programme in the state. 
The party is of the opinion that Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed state. The 
accession of the state to India is temporary and, as such, subject to the 
ratification by the people. This condition has, the Jamaat holds, been 
recognized by the United Nations also. On this basis the Jamaat-e-Islami 
maintains that the people of Kashmir still retain the right to determine the 
state's issue of accession, hence the right to self-determination. To determine 
the issue of accession by the people themselves is a right which the 
Government of India should concede to them so that Kashmir issue is resolved 
once for all. 
Indian National Congress: 
The history of the Indian National Congress in the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir goes back to thirties of the 20th century when the party "began to 
figure openly in Kashmir politics in 1935. The State People'sConference, a 
strong wing of the Indian National Congress, was instrumental in shaping the 
future course of the state politics in Kashmir. It has, in fact, persuaded a major 
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wing of the Muslim Conference under the leadership of Sheikh Mohammad 
Abdullah to convert the Mushm Conference into a secular organization so that 
the other non-Muslims could join the freedom struggle in the state and could 
fight shoulder to shoulder with their Muslim brethren against the rule of 
despotism and autocracy. This desire of the Indian National Congress was 
translated into reality in June 1939 when the name of Muslim Conference was 
changed into National Conference. The major contribution of the Indian 
National Congress to Kashmir politics was that it gave secular and nationalistic 
character to it. Moreover it was successful in winning over the Sheikh 
Abdullah and his close associates to its side which ultimately had far-reaching 
consequences in the political life of Kashmir. It was this association which 
helped the state's accession to India and later on confirmed it. It was in this 
way that Indian National Congress became important political force. However 
the party in the state was not looked with favour especially by Kashmiri people. 
As a firm believer in the power of the common masses, the party has always 
stood against all those forces and elements in the state of Jammu and Kashmir 
who are either hostile to very framework of parliamentary democracy or are 
supposed to be actively engaged inciting parochial and sectarian sentiments of 
one section of the people or other. 
The Communist Party of India (C.P.I.): 
The history of communist movement in Kashmir goes as far back as 
1929 but the actual history of the party in the state starts from 1937 when the 
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Communist Party of India turned its attention towards Kashmir in order to fish 
in its troubled waters as the state was facing economic and political turmoil. It 
was in 1937 that two prominent Moscow-trained workers from Lahore 
Professor Abdullah Safdar and Fazal Illahi Qurban visited the valley and 
contacted some leaders of the then Muslim conference. Both of them actively 
worked in Srinagar but could not achieve any appreciable success. It was B.P.L 
.Bedi in 1942, which proved successful to win over the sympathies of Sheikh 
Mohammad Abdullah and Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq to the communist faith"^ " 
The C.P.I, claims to uphold Marxism as its ideology and the methods 
used by its workers are true to the nature of its ideology and in consonance 
with the practices of the communists of the rest of the world. The profile of the 
party (Kashmir unit) will be incomplete without mentioning its most 
remarkable feature and that is communalism within its ranks. Hindu 
communists differ drastically from the Muslim communists whose number is 
far less than that of the former. They look upon each other with suspicion. The 
Hindu-faction in the heart of hearts would like to favour India and the Muslim 
faction favours Pakistan whenever an issue is discussed to which Pakistan and 
India are parties. Commenting on the character of Kashmir communists, P.N. 
Bazar says, "Most of the members of communist group in the state are Hindus. 
Despite their Marxism the>' have not forsaken their communal prejudices and 
they want Kashmir to accede to India if it must elect to join either of the 
countries. The Indian communists sided with Hindu faction. But the Party as 
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such was not able to achieve the kind of support to make considerable 
influence in the politics of the state. 
Muslim United Front (MUF): 
In the year 1986 a new religio-political organization called Muslim 
United Front (MUF) was formed in which the dominant position was enjoyed 
by the Jamati-Islami. In the beginning it was a conglomeration of fourteen 
parties and groups. AH of them were bound together by their single common 
claim that they are dedicated to the cause of Muslims.'*' But most of these 
partners had hardly ever figured in the politics of the state. In fact they were for 
the most part unknown faces in the public life. Soon after its formation, there 
had occurred differences and disagreements amongst its constituent parts over 
important issue such as the issue of accession of the state to India etc. As a 
result some of its partners, like the People's conference, Indian Muslim league, 
National Conference (K) etc. left it in its early formative period. The MUF as it 
stands at present has been reduced to a mixture of Jamaat-e-lslami, Immat-e-
Muslimin (founded by Dr. Qazi Nisar of Anantnag), a small faction of Shiite 
Muslims led by Maulana Mohammad Abbas Ansari, Jamaat-e-Ahli Hadith and 
a few religious organizations of Muslim, such as Itihad-i-Muslimeen, 
Tuhafzur-ul-Islam etc. It also draws its membership from prominent Muslim 
intellectual, lawyers, academicians and modern youth. 
The important factors for the creation of the MUF were the Governor's 
rule in the state in 1985 which was seen as interference in the internal affairs of 
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the state, the alliance between National Conference (F) and Congress (I) and 
the communal riots in Anantnag in February 1986. The MUF was brought into 
being for the achievement of that very objective "to fight for rights of Muslims, 
and resist repression on Muslims". It was also declared by the MUF that "it 
was not formed with a view to harass non-Muslims."*" The major aims and 
objectives of the MUF cantered around the issues such as promotion and 
protection of Islamic solidarity, adherence to the principles of Islam, 
maintaining precious heritage and traditions, promoting cooperation among 
Muslims. This organization after the creation became an influential force in the 
politics of Jammu and Kashmir in 1987 electoral politics. Gradually it waned 
out with no effective political support base. 
The Awami Action Committee: 
Holy relic, the hair of Prophet Mohammad (SAW), was brought to 
Kashmir in 1700 A.D. by a person Medanish - this relic was kept in the 
Hazratbal Mosque which is very sacred and highly respected by the Kashmiri 
Muslims. This relic was stolen on December 27, 1963 which caused 
widespread dismay and anger among the people.'''^ To protest, anti-government 
demonstrations were held all over the valley paralyzing the administration. 
Maulana Masoodi, then organized an All Party Action Committee dedicated to 
the investigation of the cause of loss of Holy Relic and to bring its recovery. 
This Action Committee became soon a "coalition of opposition parties'*'* by 
containing elements of Plebiscite front and followers of Mirwaiz Maulvi 
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Farooq and political conference headed by Ghulam Mohi-ud-Din Karra also 
lent support to the party. On June 20, 1964, there was a split in the Action 
Committee. Maulvi Farooq founded a new political party, "the Awami Action 
Committee Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq for a couple of years followed the pro-
Pakistani line and anti-India stance and called himself a citizen of Kashmir, not 
India. The rise of this party divided the area of influence among two major 
centrifugal opposition parties; the plebiscite front and the Pro-Mirwaiz group. 
Ideologically the Awami Action Committee was the pro-Pakistani group. It 
declared Sheikh Abdullah for having committed a blunder by linking the fate of 
Kashmir with India. Its constitution lays stress on the right of self-
determination of the people of Kashmir. The rank and file of Awami Action 
Committee believes that they have been denied the opportunity to come in the 
Indian mainstream and the People of Kashmir are suspects in the eyes of the 
Indian leadership.'*^ 
The Panthers Party: 
This party was founded in 1982 and is closely identified with the 
personality of Bhim Singh. Initially he was elected as Congress MLA in 1977 
and also served as a functionary in the youth Congress. In 1983 he contested as 
a nominee of Panthers party and he successfully barged his assembly seat. The 
influence of Panthers party is confined only to a few Hindu constituencies with 
sizeable votes of the Rajput community. This party hardly subscribes to any 
consistent ideology. Bhim Singh has been a vocal supporter of the regional 
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interests of the Jammu region. Panthers Party has often agitated against the 
dominant Kashmiri Muslim leaders. 
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP): 
One of the several State Parties of Jammu and Kashmir that are active in 
the state political scenario, the Jammu and Kashmir People's Democratic Party 
holds a prominent position. The party was founded in the year 1999. Ex Union 
Home Minister of India - Mr. Mufti Mohammad Sayeed was among the 
leading founder members of the Jammu and Kashmir People's Democratic 
Party. 
The high point of the party came in 2002, when it won the State 
Assembly Elections and formed the state government. Mufti Mohammad 
Sayeed became the chief minister of the state and remained in the chair till 
2005. When it won the state elections, the Jammu and Kashmir People's 
Democratic Party was a part of the coalition of United Progressive Alliance. It 
is based on the ideology of self-rule (see appendix-vii), within Indian 
constitution. The party is the main opposition in the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir. 
Democratic Janata Dal: 
The Democratic Janta Dal (Jammu and Kashmir) is one of the state 
parties in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The party coalesced with the 
Jammu & Kashmir National Conference in the year 1998. But this alliance was 
to last only for a year. On 3rd February 1999 Democratic Janta Dal emerged as 
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a separate and independent party. It pursues no specific agenda and ideology. It 
prefers to seek alliances v^ith different parties at different times. At its best it 
tries to ensure political stability and harmony in Jammu and Kashmir. 
All Jammu and Kashmir Patriotic Peoples Front 
Jammu and Kashmir is an Indian state that has been at the forefront of 
political activity since time immemorial. Ever since India's heart wrenching 
following independence, India and Pakistan have been at war trying to establish 
control over the state. The All Jammu and Kashmir People's Patriotic Peoples 
Front is an eminent state party of Jammu and Kashmir that is striving to keep 
the political unrest at check. 
All Jammu & Kashmir Patriotic Peoples Front is a pro-Indian 
paramilitary camarilla whose sole objective is to counter the insurgency 
operations of the militants. The Islamic guerrilla group, the Muslim Mujahedin 
had stopped their terrorist operations and had thereby joined hands with the 
state government in the year 1995. Looking back at the history of the Muslim 
Mujahedin, it is evident that they were a faction of the Hizb-ul-Mujahedin who 
organized themselves into the Patriotic Peoples Front to contest the elections. 
The Patriotic People's Front played a key role during the 1997 elections. They 
actively buttressed the Jammu & Kashmir National Conference and helped the 
then Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah to come to power. 
OTHER KASHMIRI ORGANISATIONS: 
There are a number of political parties functioning in the State. But 
JKLF is the only organization that functions in all the three regions of Jammu 
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and Kashmir under the same name, constitution, leadership, organizational 
structure, flag and policy. In Indian administered part the JKLF is divided into 
two groups. One group is headed by Yasin Malik. The other is Jammu and 
Kashmir People League which stands for unfettered right of self- determination 
of Kashmiri people. Among other Kashmiri organizations, some of whom had 
previously contested election under Indian constitutional suzerainty but now 
demand implementation of UN resolutions on Kashmir, have formed an 
alliance named All Parties Hurriet Conference (APHC) which is considered as 
a pro-Pakistan organization. Prominent among APHC members are Jamaat-e-
Islami, Peoples Conference, Awami Action Committee, Muslim Conference, 
Ittehadul Muslimeen and a renegade group of JKLF led by M. Yasin Malik. 
There are some other organizations. An alliance of a number of these 
organizations called JK Liberation Alliance (JKLA) stands for unfettered right 
of self- determination but is not very active. 
This analysis shows that there arediverse and different political parties 
operating in the state of Jammu and Kashmir pursuing different agendas and 
objectives ranging from independence to integration with India. These parties 
at different times have influenced the political discourse oi" the state having 
repercussion which continues to affect the political scenario. Of these National 
Conference is the one which is one of the oldest parties in existence and which 
has played a significant role in the politics of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
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Chapter - 4 
HiationaC Conference and the (PoCitics 
in Jammu and%ashmir: J?n Overview 
of(Pre-1987 (Bac^rouncf 
National Conference and the Politics in Jammu and Kashmir: An 
Overview of Pre-1987 Background 
The AH Jammu and Kashmir Mushm Conference, the predecessor of the 
National Conference, spearheaded the struggle in the state and performed an 
appreciable role in the political life of the state which made people conscious 
of their rights .In 1939 it thrown open its doors to all sections of the people of 
state. The new party ideologically found itself close to the Indian National 
Congress and henceforth, worked in cooperation with it against the British 
imperialism and other feudal forces within and without the stated 
Initially, the National Conference benefited from the variety of factors 
such as charismatic leadership, unity of command, secular and progressive 
outlook and sound organizational structure. But when it assumed power, it 
became victim of intense in-fighting, authoritarianism and ethno-regional 
cleavages. The overbearing personality factor had trammeled the democratic 
process and often forced the dissidents to break away from the party resulting 
in the evolution of various splinter groups such as Kashmir Political 
Conference with apro-Pakistani line, mainly supported the revival of Muslim 
Conference, which had strong reservations about the move to secularize 
Kashmiri politics and vehemently resisted the attempts to fold the party into 
National Conference.^  The process of factionalism also continued during the 
regime of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. Bakshi made efforts to create a power 
structure conducive to his continuance in power through personalization, 
nepotism, intimidation and manipulation. He rebuilt the cadres of the party 
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with his loya] supports and raised a private militia known as the 'Peace 
Brigade' to be used against his adversaries/ The formation of any effective 
opposition was discouraged. Even the National leaders in New Delhi including 
Pandit Nehru and Jai Prakash Narain also disfavored the formation of 
opposition groups in Jammu and Kashmir in view of the state's special 
character. Nehru also accused the Balraj Puri's Kashmir Socialist Party joining 
hands with the enemies of the country^ 
Of the political developments in the state since 1947, the major events 
which dominated the state politics and faced by the National Conference and its 
leadership were: ^ 
(i) The prolonged Satyagrah in Jammu in late 1952 and early 1953. 
(ii) The dismissal of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in August 1953. 
(iii) Founding of the Plebiscite Front in 1956. 
(iv) The split in the National Conference in 1957. 
(v) The developments following the state-wide agitation in 1964 after the 
loss of a sacred relic from the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, and release 
of Sheikh Abdullah. 
The Satyagraha was launched by the Praja Parishad against the National 
Conference party on following charges: 
(i) Sheikh Abdullah had tried to Muslimise the state in the name of 
secularism. 
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(ii) There had been totaUtarianism in the name of democracy. 
(iii) Civil liberties had been attacked by the ruling party. 
(iv) Steps had been taken towards the creation of Independent Kashmir. 
(v) Delhi Agreement was a betrayal. 
(vi) It was leading to a victory of the communist.^  
This agitation was one of the reasons for the fall of Sheikh in 
1953.Sheikh Abdullah was arrested and was put behind the bars along with 
thousands of his followers, including Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beig. The 
National Conference legislature party elected Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad as 
its leader and he assumed office as Prime Minister of Kashmir. The arrest of 
the Sheikh instead of solving the relations between the state and the Indian 
Union aggravated the situation promoting the conflict in the region. The whole 
political landscape underwent change deteriorating the state-Union relations. 
The next political development in the state in 1956 was the rift in the 
National Conference led by Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad and the formation of 
the Democratic National Conference in 1957. The rift was caused on account 
of the omissions of G.L. Dogra, CM. Sadiq, D.P. Dhar and Mir Qasim as 
Ministers in the Council of Ministers after the elections of 1957^ However, 
when they were offered the minister ship later, the new party decided to merge 
again into National Conference in 1960. The removal of Bakhshi Gulam 
Muhammad from the powerand the election of Shamsuddin as the state Prime 
Minister was regarded by many a device to keep the major political opponents 
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out of the government. According to Sisir Gupta "the stability that Bakhshi 
Ghulam Mohammad achieved was also not based on any great amount of the 
popular sanction behind his methods of administering the state. There were 
stories of nepotism and corruption at the highest levels, of serious procedural 
lapses. Of high handedness and disregard for the established codes of conduct 
in public life. The establishment of the 'Plebiscite Front' in August 1955 by 
Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beig which was fully supported by the Sheikh was 
also one of the importantinci dents which made a difference in the politics of the 
state. The Front became extremely popular in Kashmir as it reflected the 
aspirations of the people of the state. It was the Plebiscite Front which both at 
the domestic level in the state and at the international level played a very 
important role. It determined the course of its politics and dominated the scene 
for years until it got converted into National Conference again as a resuk of 
Kashmir Accord of 1975.However it was not until December 1963 that the 
magnitude of the unpopularity of the state government became evident.^  
The agitation in response to the theft of the sacred relic resulted in the 
fall of Shamsuddin Ministry and the election of Mr. G.M. Sadiq as the new 
Prime Minister of the state. This agitation became pro-Sheikh anti India and 
anti-state government which convinced the Government of India and 
Government of Kashmir to rethink about the Sheikh and the outcome was 
withdrawal of the cases against him. Sadiq in power, Sheikh in the political 
arena of the state and of the Centre, his visit to Pakistan, Nehru's death and 
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1965 Indo-Pak war were the events which became the source of irritation for 
the Government of India resulting intothe re-arrest of Sheikh Abdullah. 
The rise of Mrs. Indira Gandhi on Indian political scene and the victory 
of India in 1971 conflict with Pakistan did not lessen the importance of Sheikh 
Abdullah in the politics of the state. Consequently, there was a dialogue 
between Mrs. Gandhi and the Sheikh resulting into the 'Accord' determining 
the Centre-state relations'^ .The determination of state's relations with the 
Centre was the first concern of the Sheikh and his party. Sheikh Abdullah in 
finalizing the 'Accord' was motivated by the desire of maintaining the 
nationalistic outlook and at the same time demarking the line where he stood in 
the Kashmir nationalism he follows: 
"Nationalism in Kashmir, however, spring from its incredible poverty, 
squalor, misery and under nourishment which are the lot of the exploited 
masses. Nationalism in Kashmir is no more middle class enthusiasm. It is 
firmly based on the bed rock of Stark economic realities and the urge for 
political freedom. The idea of nationalism in Kashmir cannot be comprehended 
unless it is viewed against the political and economic programme put forward 
in "New Kashmir", which presents the broad contours of a democratic state 
based upon radical economic programme. Its expression of the long felt desire 
to bring together the various sections of the oppressed people in the state on the 
basis of their common economic sufferings. 
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Accordingly, the Sheikh thought of providing the people a democratic 
government with a radical economic programme as envisaged by the National 
Conference in 1944. Sheikh believed that the people of Kashmir were denied 
the political freedoms. The Accord according to him was reiteration of faith in 
the Centre and to perpetuate the mutual faith he took over power on 25* 
February, 1975.Once the issue of Centre-state relations was settled the National 
Conference had other issues to confront. The National Conference immediately 
after assumption of power faced a political problem - Congress majority in the 
legislature with a Cabinet of minority nature. The Pradesh Congress response 
was the withdrawal of support to the Sheikh Ministry in February 1977. The 
result was fresh elections in June 1977.During two years of power, before 
elections of 1977, the National Conference tried to devote itself to the cause of 
economic development. In the outset it pointed out the following questions: 
(i) How to eradicate corruption or corrupt practices both in and outside the 
administration? 
(ii) How to provide to the state clean and effective administration? 
(iii) How to renew and reorganize the programmes for the economic welfare 
and promotion of living standards? 
(iv) How to achieve self-sufficiency and economic progress based on social 
justice, within a short period? 
(v) How to speed up the works of economic reconstructions? 
(vi) How to restore peaceful atmosphere in the educational institutions and 
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how to bring prospects for the future of unemployed youth? 
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To streamline these objectives the National Conference government 
issued the orders with regard to the following: 
(a) The widows and women without support were provided with canters 
which trained them and paid them stipends. A sum of Rs. 60/- were paid 
to them, half of it was deposited in a cooperative society as a 
membership. Thus cottage industries were to be encouraged. 
(b) The work on Nallah Mar project in Srinagar was speeded and water 
supply was made available. 
(c) In Jammu on Tawi and in Srinagar on the Jheluni, bridges were 
constructed. 
(d) In cities sanitation, new constructions were cared for, many graduates 
were paid Rs. 120/- as a stipend. 
Whatever little the National Conference, in economic field, could 
accomplish during the years of unpredictable Congress majority in legislature, 
it did not bring any dividends for it, the reason being that schemes of economic 
nature do not bring immediate results. However, with the change of power at 
the Centre, the situation in the state also brought in new dimensions to politics. 
Morarji Desai was not interested in the politics of the state as the earlier 
Governments were. The National Conference fought the elections and got a 
stable majority to form the government. The commitment of the National 
Conference was manifested in its Party manifesto published in May, 23, 1977. 
It provided for the people, the problems and promises made by the National 
Conference. The Manifesto starts with assertion: 
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"My, Sheikh Abdullah's, goal is to free my mother country from 
slavery. Let us rise above the petty communal contradictions and unite to fight 
for freedom and share the responsibility to uphold the welfare of the people. I 
request my Hindu brethren to shun off the harassment and fear and not to be 
vitiated by doubts. We assure them that in case they cooperate with Muslims, 
we shall protect their rights as we shall protect ours". 
Commenting on the Naya Kashmir'"* and its implementation the 
manifesto reads, "The 'Naya Kashmir' and its contents have relevance even 
today as they were in 1944 when it was adopted. The National Conference 
wants to make the 'Naya Kashmir' operative in its true essence. Its basis is 
democracy and it is to function from grass-root panchayat to the National 
Assembly. There shall be independence of judiciary and administration shall be 
responsible to it. In the field of economic life, we accept the principle of planed 
economy because it is the spirit behind economic freedom". 
The programme of 'Naya Kashmir' was well oriented plan whose aim 
was to base the state structure on a strongly buih plinth of democracy, 
secularism, nationalism and socialism. ^ 
While reminding the past commitments made by National Conference, 
the manifesto says that the intention of reminding them is not to create 
misunderstanding but emphasis the relevance of these commitments to the 
forthcoming elections. It asserts that the Kashmiri is placed in a new situation 
especially at a time when Congress had lost its thirty years of old rule. 
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According to it, after the independence the National Conference had interpreted 
the Centre-state relations within the lines of those limitations which had given 
to the Centre only three subjects namely, Defence, Foreign Affairs and the 
Communications. Consequently the special status of the state had been 
established in accordance with the provisions of the Article 370 of the Indian 
constitution. To fiirther define it the Delhi Agreement had been instituted.'^  
The National Conference defended the Article until under a conspiracy 
the Sheikh government was dismissed in 1953. Later, the Sheikh and his party 
had to undergo trials for a long time, reaffimis the manifesto.'^ The manifesto 
reminds the people to note that the National conference as a great political 
party had abolished hereditary monarchy in the state, jagidari system and above 
all the sums that villagers owed to 'Sahukars' or government institutions. It 
claimed the establishment of the Constituent Assembly after independence. It 
was the National conference which had initiated the position that people are the 
real source of power and planned economy is the solution for all economic ills. 
Consequently, it asserts that it is the National Conference, which has enough of 
evidence to prove that it had solved many problems and settled many issues 
and fulfilled the promises from time to fime. The most important two issues 
which became convincing arguments for elections were the internal autonomy 
by defending Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and restoration of honor 
and respect for the people of the state, Kashmiris in particular. 
The National Conference promised to provide social security plan so 
that the old age pensions and pensions for invalids and handicapped persons is 
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assured. The National Conference consequently promised attention towards the 
fast-growing orchard's economy which is considered as the backbone of 
Kashmir economy and it also encouraged tourism sector. The manifesto further 
visualized improvement in transportation. 
The National Conference assumed the responsibility, in the manifesto of 
assessment in debts of tenants and small traders. It promised the appointment 
of state subjects to all posts, gazetted or non-gazetted. It asserted to enforce all 
the relevant articles of the Constitution which could ensure a socialist society. 
It emphasized the role of the public sector and visualized to create a sense of 
cooperation in economic and industrial fields.'^ 
The National Conference further envisaged the restoration of 
Fundamental Rights for the people of the state. However, it is to be mentioned 
here that special constitutional provisions pertaining to the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir envisage a partial application of the Constitution of India to the 
state.''^ The operation of the provisions regarding Fundamental Rights 
enumerated in the Constitution of India were extended to the state by the 
Constitution (Application to J & K) order, of 1954. When the Constitution of 
the State was promulgated in 1957, provisions were also included in it, 
stipulating and confirming the availability of the Fundamental Rights provided 
for the Constitution oflndia to the people of the state. However, it wasalleged 
by the National Conference that these rights were provided for the people only 
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in name and hence they promised their adherence to them. 
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One of the important and significant promises that the National 
Conference committed to the people was the agrarian reforms. These reforms 
in Kashmir have had a very special histor)'- in the state. Let us examine how the 
Sheikh and National Conference first in 1950 and later in 1978 were the 
vanguard for these reforms - this organization alone has a credit to provide a 
legislation whereby land has actually been transferred to tillers. First major and 
revolutionary land reform measure was introduced in 1950 by promulgating the 
Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estates Abolition Act (Act No. XVI of 
2007).According to this Act ceiling of land was fixed at 182 kanals uniformly 
for all soils, tracts, irrigated or un~irrigated, single cropped or double cropped 
and expropriated the land owners of their land in excess of this limit without 
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any compensation. This Act deprived the owners of their ownership of 45 
lakhs of acres of land out of which 2.3 lakh acres were given to the tenants 
thereof in ownership free of cost.It may be admitted that this Act caused 
injustice to and dissatisfaction among the landlords hold land exceeding the 
ceiling limit. In order to pacify the grievances of such landlords, the 
government appointed "Wazir Commission" headed by Chief Justice of Jammu 
and Kashmir in 1953 and a land commission in 1963. In the year 1972 the 
Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act was enacted to provide for 
comprehensive legislation relation to land reforms in the state and bring about a 
radical transformation in the existing pattern of land ownership. Justice Mufti 
while commenting upon the Act held: 
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"The objects of the land reforms contemplated by the new Act mainly 
appear to be: (a) to abolish the system of absentee landlordism including the 
allied forms of intermediaries; (b) to make the tiller of the owner; (c) to get a 
ceiling on landlordings".^ ^ 
This Act unfortunately gave rise to unnecessary litigation and created 
chaos and caused hardships to both landlords as well as tenants. The main 
reason behind it was the defective drafting. In order to remove these defects 
and to review it with a view to provide for more equitable distribution and 
better utilization of land suited to the circumstances of the state so as to sub 
serve the common good, this Act was kept in suspension from 25 '^' March, 
1975 by the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms (Suspension Operation) 
Act, 1975 (Act III of 1975) and a special Committee was appointed to look into 
the matter and scrutinize the Act thoroughly. Suspension operation of the Act 
was promulgated by National Conference immediately after a month of the 
assumption of their power in February 1975. When the Act was amended and 
properly drafted it was again passed and operated under the National 
Conference government. 
In accordance with the promises made by the National Conference in the 
manifesto before election the government of the Sheikh Abdullah implemented 
and enforced the Act and many of the landless people received land. By and 
large the problems with regard to possession of land were solved. There may 
still be need to reform the agricultural holdings but the credit goes to the 
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National Conference both between 1947-53 and in post 1975 that it had 
capacity to settle its problems and induct the agrarian reforms. 
Whatever the magnitude of issues and pursuits, the fact remains that the 
National Conference since it assumption of power after the Accord, had to face 
the problems of varied dimensions. The first, the Congress withdrawal of 
support in the legislature and the second was the politics of the regional 
imbalances by the ladakh and Jammu. Though the regional imbalance claim is 
old one but its revival was to tease the government of National Conference.For 
the purpose various commissions were appointed to look into the matter. A 
commission under the chairmanship of P.G. Gajendragadkar was appointed in 
1967. It probed a little deeper into the problem and found no such imbalances. 
However in 1978 the same slogan created a grave situation in Poonch. This 
agitation was launched against the selection of teachers and some other 
employees by recruitment board of that area. The slogan, speeches of leaders, 
schemes and strategies of the agitation pointed clearly to an organized 
campaign against what they called the rule of Kashmiri muslims. But in this 
agitation no one was gainer. The agitation was foiled after the appointment of a 
commission under Justice S.M. Sikri, a retired judge of the Supreme Court of 
India assisted by Dr. Malcom S. Adiseshait, a member of the Rajya Sabha and 
Dr. A.R. Kidwai.^ '^The commission found no imbalances apait from imbalance 
in individual items at the level of the regions or the district administrative units 
within the region to lead it to recommend "constitutional measures" as referred 
to in its terms of reference. 
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The Commission has found imbalances in financial expenditure and in 
development programmes at the regional level in the IV Plan period and early 
years of the V plan which are now corrected, and serious imbalance in some of 
the district administrative units within each region. To meet these problems the 
commission proposes the creation of a state Development Board comprising 
the Chief Minister as chairman, and such members of the legislature as the J & 
K legislature may appoint in accordance with its procedure. Thus the agitation 
in Jammu could not bring anything for either the Jammu People nor could it 
bring any credit to the government. It however had a catharsis for the 
psychological problem of Jammu and Ladakh people. Just as Gajendragadkar 
commission appeased the Kashmiri pandits in 1967, so did Sikri commission in 
1979. This however, no doubt created gulf between different regions of the 
state. 
Immediately after the Accord, the Congress (I) and the National 
Conference could not go together. Consequently Congress withdrew support 
and Sheikh and his party had to face it. After elections, when National 
Conference assumed power, the Sheikh Abdullah "ignoring G.M. Shah his son-
in-law and appoint Mirza Afzal Beg as Deputy Chief Minister, he made later as 
defacto head of the government during his illness and absence. But Sheikh 
seem discovered that Beg was getting too big for his boots and promptly gave 
him the boot".^ ^ Sheikh Abdullah had to remove a companion of his once for 
all. Though the dismissal of the Afzal Beg did not cause any serious law and 
order problem in his hometown Islamabad (Anantnag). During the regime of 
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National Conference, the go\ernment faced an unprecedented law and order 
situation immediately after the execution of Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, the ex-Prime 
Minister of Pakistan. The workers of the Jamat-i-Islami and Ahmadyas were 
victims of hooliganism, arson and looting. Severe criticism was leveled against 
the failure of law and order machinery. The government was discredited and 
claimed to be ineffective. In March 1980, the Road Transport Corporation 
employees put off their work. The government had a counter offensive by 
employing the private services and defeating the employees of the Road 
Transport Cor}3oration, the government returned successful in suppressing the 
striking workers. Later the students of colleges and investigator agitated on the 
plea of a publication of a book "Islam: its culture and Monuments", in which a 
pen picture of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be Upon Him) was drawn. The 
government had to quell it. 
The Sheikh's speech at Martyr's Day created uproar in the Indian press. 
The Sheikh on Martyr's Day, 13 July, 1980 had strong counter offensive 
against the Central leadership and said, "The people have firm faith and 
confidence in National Conference even now and for this reason they do not 
care for anybody be it General Zia or Mrs. Gandhi". This again deteriorated the 
relations between the Centre and the state leadership. The old animosities 
between Sheikh and Congress (I) were the main cause of his outburst at Shaeed 
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Mazar (the burial ground of Martyrs) m Srinagar. 
The law and order situation thus was rendered a matter of shuttle cock. 
The National Conference accused congress (I) for disturbing the peace and vice 
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versa. The Congress (I) labeled the National Conference having colluded with 
the Jamiat-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Tulba including Jana Sangh to further their 
designs against Congress (I). In the meantime there occurred the accident 
involving an auto- rickshaw and Army truck which snowballed into clashes 
between Army and civilians at Amirakadal, resulting into arson and looting. 
The agitated civilians, shouting pro-Pakistan and anti-India slogans were 
protesting against the torching of taxis and tempos and damaging buses by the 
troopers in sporadic clashes with civil transporters.^ ^ It was the courage of 
Sheikh Abdullah to speak to the people at Lai Chowk which saved the 
situation: "However, such trifling accidents lead to political estrangement and 
re-open among the populace the question of accession".^ ^ 
The agitations in Shopian and Kishtwar for grant of district status, 
agitation in ladakh and Jammu for imbalances from time to time, for opening 
colleges at various places, Kashmir University fire 1981 and installation of 
police permanently in the University - all posed serious law and order 
problems in the state. The fire which gutted the Legislative Assembly and 
severe threats of unemployed youths agitating at various district head quarters 
also posed a threat to law and order machinery. 
The promises of the National Conference reveal that the leadership tried 
to implement what it had promised in earnest but failed in many and touched 
success in few. It was successful in abolishing the subsidy on food in Srinagar 
and Jammu. It suppressed the unfair means and lawlessness in educafional 
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institutions and resorted confidence amongst college, University and school 
teachers. It streamlined the administration through single line administration 
trying to remove the imbalances amongst areas at district and tehsil levels. The 
operation and enforcement of the Jammu and Kashmir Agrarian Reforms Act is 
commendable as it changes the agricultural semi-feudal system in which tiller 
is superior. The National Conference government also partially nationalized 
transport. The National Highway (Srinagar to Jammu) has already been 
nationalized and forests closed for public. 
The failures of the government are also well known. The Sheikh and his 
government and his party (National Conference) failed in determining the 
relations between the state and theCentre though the Sheikh-Indira Accord tried 
to delimit it. Consequently, the crises between the Centre and state have been 
persisting since the National Conference assumed power. Further the 
government failed to absolve the hegemony of the bureaucracy and the 
corruption in the administration. Though the vigilance commissioner's office 
was given a wide rope in eradicating the evil, yet instead of giving a lesson to 
people at higher levels, the petty civil servants have been victims. Education 
has been rendered a useless trade. There was anarchy in educational institutions 
at all levels. Further, the grave problem remained neglected - the 
unemployment of educated youth. This problem was aggravated on account of 
nepotism and favoritism. The public opinion since 1975 was subjected to hopes 
and illusions. It is difficult for the National Conference to claim that their rule 
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was absolutely successful in its political and economic issues and pursuits. 
Politics is determined by the results it contrives. 
The National Conference and politics of Jammu and Kashmir since 
1974-75 was mostly vitiated by Centre-State relations. Though the Accord had 
to settle the same issue, yet in its interpretations and the political behavior, the 
National Conference and the central leadership in New Delhi were drifting 
from each other. Since the assumption of power, the National Conference and 
its leadership determined the course of politics in the state. The centre-state 
relationship had severe repercussions during the time of Indira Gandhi than 
during the Janata rule. The difference might be in the variance of the stature of 
Janata and Congress leadership. The difference might be attributed to the 
awkward behavior of the Congress (I) who in 1977 withdrew its support to the 
Sheikh Ministry.This withdrawal of support must have becu taken by the 
Sheikh as an event of betrayal and contrary to the spirit of "Accord". Just as the 
National Conference was apprehensive of the Congress (I) attitude and 
behavior so was Mrs. Indira Gandhi about the Sheikh. She sometimes talked 
against and deplored the National Conference's alleged involvement in 
encouraging communal parties like the Jamat-i-Islami and the Jana Sangh and 
sometimes his involvement in the maladministration of the state. In fairness it 
must be added that the strife between the Chief Minister of so sensitive state as 
Kashmir and New Delhi has not always been a one-way affair and if the Sheikh 
has often behaved in an unacceptable manner and severely tested the Centre's 
patience he too has been offered some provocation by the Congress (I). At once 
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Indira Gandhi not only attacked the Sheikh vehemently but also declared that 
without the Centre's tolerance and help, his government could not last even for 
half an hour. 
The politics of state-Centre relations, usually takes the forms of 
complete merger or full integration and as against it full autonomy on the part 
of Kashmir leadership. Praja Parishad and mostly non-Muslims population 
from Jammu have been demanding full integration of the state with India^ .^ 
TheNational Conference has emphasized the preservation of Article 370 or 
internal autonomy. The process of integration by Government of India 
continues, the slogan by the Jammu people still persists and the resistance to 
the complete merger of Jammu and Kashmir with India also holds out. This 
politics, naturally dominates, at least at the domestic level by National 
Conference. But the autonomy proposal is notfavored by all Kashmiri people. 
Some want complete cessation (independence) from Indian Union. Some wish 
to go with Pakistan. Where will this politics lead to is for the future to 
determine but the fact remains that the National Conference intends to fight at 
every level, whether Centre-state relation, merger, law, commerce, business 
and any other aspects of life? 
After independence it was the National Conference that ruled the state 
throughout with some breaks when it remained out of power. The state was 
virtually under its dominance. It was the main party which virtually determined 
and influenced the political discourse in the state. No other party was in a 
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position to rise up as an effective altemativeopposition to it. Rather the rise of 
any such party was intentionally discouraged. In fact the Congress government 
in New Delhi under the leadership of Pandit Nehru was against such a 
development. For Nehru, the most cogent reason in favour of National 
Conference was: 
(i) That the National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah had been sole 
political force to have secularized the state politics and also had brought 
it within the influence and ideological fold of Indian National Congress. 
(ii) That the National conference had facilitated the accession of the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir to India; 
(iii) That the National Conference had assumed the National Character of 
representing the entire population of the state both at national and 
international levels; 
(iv) That the National Conference was the only dependable political 
organization in the state to be safely exploited for India's National 
Interest and as such, was the only state's political force to fight two 
nation theory politics of Pakistan. 
This is one of the main reasons why the state could not see a free play of 
party-politics in the state. National Conference ruled the state from 1947 to 
1963. From 1965 to 1975 the Congress (I) enjoyed unchallenged monopoly 
over political power in the state. However the entrance of the Congress party 
into state politics paved the way for other national parties to establish their 
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party units in the state. It also opened opportunity for local leadership to enter 
into the political battlefield of their state. The restoration of political power to 
Sheikh in 1975 on the basis of Kashmir Accord ensured the 'one party 
dominance'. The future of other political parties seemed to be very dark. The 
Sheikh adopted authoritarian means to ensure his own security which meant the 
security of his party. The National Conference got split when the Sheikh ousted 
his trustworthy colleague Mr. Afzal Beg from the party. As a result a new 
party, namely Inquilabi National Conference came into being. The Sheikh 
could not, however felt any danger to his political life. However certain 
activities of his Government such as the reorganization of some assembly 
constituencies in 1979 on communal lines, withdrawal of cases against the 'Al-
Fateh' men, denial of state citizenship to the 1947 refugees and adoption of the 
resettlement Bill (March 1982) made serious dents in the body politics of the 
state. Resettlement Bill which provided for the permanent return of the 
erstwhile state subjects who had migrated to West Pakistan at the time of 
partition in 1947, created a serious rift between the Centre and state 
government on the one hand and the Muslim dominated Kashmir valley and 
Jammu region on the other hand. These things apart, the Sheikhs second phase 
of government (1975-1982) due to his old age, growing factionalism in the 
party increasing level of corruption and nepotism led to deterioration in the 
politics in the state. The spate of inter-regional tensions coupled with pandering 
to communal forces had further blurred the image of his government among the 
people. The National Conference which adopted the Pro-accession policy faced 
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the accusations of the Mullahs and Maulvis in the Kashmir valley. But he 
recovered his diminishing hold over the masses and during his rule, till his 
death, the role of fundamentalist and pro-Pakistani groups remained controlled 
or marginalized in the state. 
But after the death of Sheikh in 1982, the situation remained strained 
due to confrontation between the Centre and Sheikh's successor or, Farooq 
Abdullah. The factors which strained their relations were the Congress (I)'s 
maneuverings in 1983 and 1984 to destabilize and replace Dr. Farooq Abdullah 
who refused to play second fiddle to the ruling Congress (I) at the Centre, ft has 
been perceptively observed that the second Kashmir problem actually began in 
the month of June 1984. The critical decision was the unsavory sabotage of 
Farooq Abdullah's government by the Centre which seemed more concerned 
with power than democracy.^^The centre should have resisted the temptation to 
topple down the duly elected Farooq Government. People in the valley felt very 
much cheated by toppling. It was followed by confrontation which, in an 
atmosphere of growing menace of communalism in the country and the spurt of 
militant violence in Punjab which also inspired the Kashmir youth to adopt the 
path of militancy against India. 
However this confrontation was lowered with an accord between Rajiv 
Gandhi and Dr. Farooq Abdullah in October 1986. ft was the third historic 
accord as far as the relations of Kashmir and Delhi Government at that time 
was concerned. The first two were signed in 1952 and 1975. All the three 
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accords were signed by two ruling i'amilies in Srinagar and Delhi. But the 
Accord failed to prove as effective as expected. It was considered as 
opportunistic and a sellout of the state to Delhi by the fundamentalists. With 
the result situation went on sliding down and reached a position in the wake of 
the March 1987 elections which as a matter of fact is regarded as the precursor 
of the current turmoil in the Jammu and Kashmir state. This turmoil gave birth 
to various militant organizations with different manifestos. 
Of all the existing political parties in the state, the National Conference 
occupies the most important place in the politics of Jammu and Kashmir state 
and has remained central to the politics of the state ever since its inception in 
1939. Evolved as a political movement challenging the feudal and autocratic 
rule, it traversed a long period of its political existence taking on various forms. 
After entering the power politics in 1947, it occupied the hegemonic space in 
Jammu & Kashmir. However it resumed its place of dominance after it was 
resurrected in 1975. Having enjoyed a position of pre-eminence for almost a 
quarter of century it however faced a serious crisis of credibility in 1987which 
is the subject of analysis in the next chapter. 
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Chapter - 5 
J{ationa[ Conference: ^ n 
Analysis of post- 1987poCitics 
National Conference: An Analysis of Post- 1987 Politics 
Elections have proved very useful in understanding the dynamic 
relationship between the fast changing socio-economic reality and the existing 
democratic political process. Since Electoral politics is organically linked with 
a nation's political life and provides various useful insights into the different 
aspects of political system, including its basic nature and its way of 
fiinctioning, studies of this nature, particularly in the context of a state having 
distinctive ethno-cultural, linguistic, geographical and regional specificities, 
become all more important.' Indian society is "severely segmented" universe 
in which people are mostly "encapsulated" within the small world of caste, 
creed, community and region. A vast majority still suffer from poverty, 
illiteracy, social backwardness, and feudal or semi-feudal vestiges. In addition, 
in the caste and religiously impregnated areas, local groups with deep religious 
roots have also established their firm hold on the general masses. By making 
frequent appeals to the parochial feelings of the people, particularly during the 
periodic elections, they further consolidate and tighten their grip on the helpless 
masses. As a matter of fact, most political parties, including those claiming to 
be secular, progressive and nationalist, tend to harp on the emotive ties of 
people for achieving electoral victories. On occasions, such "cynical 
exploitation" of socio-psychological factors has led to disastrous consequences, 
resuhing in the fragmentation and destabilization of the entire socio-political 
life in certain pockets of the country. Communalism not only continues to 
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flourish, it has, for all practical purposes, become "an integral part of our new 
state formation and the functioning of the political system caters to formulates, 
in subtle or brazen ways, the logic of communal and caste solidarities".^ On 
this basis, it can be said that "elections may also enhance the power of 
disruptive and often reactionary social forces and tear down the entire structure 
of public authority as is evident in case of Kashmir. In other words, the 
electoral process, instead of providing stability and legitimacy to the 
democratic process may also take it in the reverse direction and strengthen the 
forces of fundamentalism, fragmentation, violence and subversion. All this 
makes it imperative to explore the problems and intricacies of electoral politics 
in Jammu and Kashmir where electoral malpractices are believed to have 
caused enormous harm to the entire political fabric in the state in general and 
National Conference in particular; especially as far as 1987 elections are 
concerned. 
A comprehensive and comparative study of the history of various 
nations and sub nations, who fought for basic human rights during this century, 
will reveal that the war fought by the people of Jammu and Kashmir to achieve 
the goal of self-respect proved a long drawn battle and has so far been fiitile. 
Kashmir and elections share a tense and confusing history. It is a history 
where some men take to opportunist politics, some are reluctant to participate. 
The Kashmir politics is a peculiar species. All this makes it imperative to 
explore the problems and intricacies of electoral politics in Jammu and 
Kashmir where electoral malpractices are believed to have caused the harm to 
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the entire political fabric in the state in general and National Conference in 
particular; especially as far as 1987 elections are concerned. In this chapter the 
1987 elections are analyzed and assessed to properly understand and locate the 
1987 elections to proper perspective. Before the 1987 assembly elections are 
analyzed it is very essential to understand the background which prepared the 
grounds for the elections and influenced its outcome. 
The political situation in state of Jammu & Kashmir remained stable for 
few years after 1977 assembly elections till the death of Sheikh Abdullah, and 
the National Conference maintaining cordial relations with the Central 
Government and furthering the ideals of democracy and secularism in the State. 
However, the Congress-I started making efforts to stage a comeback in the 
State and expand its footage. This led to a confrontation with the National 
Conference to an extent that it contributed towards Sheikh Abdullah indulging 
in anti-Centre activities. Sheikh Abdullah died in September, 1982 and his son. 
Dr. Farooq Abdullah took over the leadership of the National Conference. This 
succession led to a bitter conflict with his brother-in-law G.M. Shah emerging 
as a rival candidate. The June 1983 Assembly elections again returned National 
Conference under Dr. Farooq Abdullah to power but the internal quarrels had 
not dissipated. Defection of the G.M. Shah group from the National Conference 
led to the fall of Dr. Farooq Abdullah's government on 2 July 1984^  and G.M. 
Shah assumed power with the support of the Congress-I from outside. 
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Despite the popular mandate given to Farooq Abdullah by the electorate, 
he eventually became unacceptable to New Delhi and Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi favored Mr. G M Shah and made him the Chief Minister of the state by 
supporting his break away section the National Conference in July 1984. The 
beginning of representative government in J&K (in 1977) v^ as summarily 
destroyed in 1984. The shoddy dismissal of Farooq's government engineered 
by New Delhi's political bigwigs showed a callous disregard for the wishes and 
aspirations of the Kashmiri people, and brought political apathy in its wake.^  
Mr. G M Shah proved burden to the New Delhi than Farooq Abdullah. 
As early as August 1984, Indira Gandhi expressed her concern over Shah's 
inability to handle the increasing level of violence in the state. There were 
increasing reports of insurgency in the valley from Pakistani side and political 
groups defined explicitly on religious lines took roots in the state. These parties 
became successful in using region and religion as the basis for political 
mobilization. Moreover for the first time in its history, the State witnessed 
serious communal violence during February-March, 1986 which paved way for 
the promulgation of Governor's rule on 7 March 1986 followed by President's 
rule on 7 September 1986.CT.M. Shah's rule also saw an upsurge in the activities 
of fundamentalist and communal forces in the Kashmir Valle>' who succeeded 
in gaining wider acceptability at the cost of secular forces. The secessionist and 
subversive parties and organizations, including the J&K Jamaat-e-Islami which 
had been active in electoral politics since 1971, also exploited the weak 
administrative apparatus in intensifying anti-nafional and anti-secular 
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propaganda. The overall effect was the weakening of the State's secular fabric. 
The fundamentalist and Islamic parties continued their activities and a number 
of such outfits including Ummat-e-Islami, Muslim United Front etc. emerged 
even after the imposition of Governor's rule. Side by side, the pro-Pakistan 
subversive elements owing allegiance to J&K, IslamiJamaat-e-Tulba, J&K 
Peoples' League, Mahaz-e-Azadi,an independent front, persisted in their anti-
national propaganda and activities. There was a persistent growth in pro-
Pakistan and Muslim fundamentalist activities in the state. Meanwhile, Dr. 
Farooq Abdullah, ousted from power, had adopted a strong anti-Centre and 
anti-Congress-I posture and aligned himself with the opposition parties at the 
national level. 
However, following the death of Mrs. Indira Gandhi on 31 October 
1984, Dr. Farooq Abdullah diluted his anti-Centre and anti-Congress (I) 
utterances and moved towards reconciliation with the Congress (I) and the new 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.This change in the attitude of Dr. Farooq 
Abdullah led to an accord between Congress (I) and the National Conference in 
November 1986 and a coalition Government under Dr. Farooq Abdullah was 
reinstalled on 7 November 1986^ It was stated that the main plank of the 
accord was fighting subversive, fundamentalist and pro-Pakistan forces and to 
bring about an all-round economic development in the State. What were 
Farooq's motivations for entering into this accord with Rajiv Gandhi? After all, 
this was the same government that had orchestrated his dismissal in 1984. 
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Farooq realized that unless he made peace with the Congress (I) regime in New 
Delhi, there was little prospect of his returning to power. 
Despite the euphoria surrounding the accord, it reduced Abdullah's 
stature in Kashmir's internal politics. No longer was he seen as a Kashmiri 
standing up for the state's interests. The opposition parties in the state 
described the accord as unholy, opportunistic and sell out of the state to New 
Delhi and called Dr. Abdullah a puppet and stooge of the Centre. Even a 
section of the Congress (I) believed that any support to Dr. Farooq Abdullah in 
forming government would create instability and political chaos in Jammu and 
Kashmir. In view of this accord Farooq lost his image of a real Kashmiri 
standing for the cause of Kashmir. Writing about the accord Tavleen Singh said 
'People could not understand how a man who had been treated the way he had 
by Delhi, and especially Gandhi family, could now be crawling to them for 
accords or alliances.'° He was charged with betraying his father's fifty year 
legacy of pride, 'says M.J. Akbar. 'It created a vacuum where the National 
Conference had existed, and extremists stepped into that vacuum. Kashmiriyat 
had become vulnerable to the votaries of violence and Muslim hegemony, both 
injuring Kashmir and perverting Kashmiriyat". Moreover the dismissal of Dr. 
Farooq Abdullah and his reinstallation as Chief Minister, and dismissal of G.M. 
Shah's government, frequent changes in the form of loose and opportunist 
alliances. Governor's rule and New Delhi's interventions eroded the fragile 
foundations of democracy in Jammu & Kashmir The reinstallation of Farooq 
Abdullah was the first in a series of steps that conclude in an NC- Congress(I) 
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agreement not to oppose one another's candidates in the coming elections.'^  Dr. 
Farooq's attempt to estabHsh harmonious relationships with New Delhi 
resulted in erosion of popular support base of National Conference in the state. 
His alliance with Mr. Rajive Gandhi was seen as a tactical one to strengthen the 
Centre-state relations and to defeat anti-India forces. The aim of the alliance 
was apparently to create a political monopoly and capture majority votes in the 
elections. However Congress (I) and National Conference cooperation was 
welcomed by some section of the populace in the state simply because of the 
reason that it was expected to counter communalist and anti-nationalist 
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elements. When it became clear that National Conference and Congress (I) 
were forming an alliance, a hitherto unknown organization - the MUF (Muslim 
United Front) was formed by several Islamic political groups and other 
leaders'"*. This new and somewhat fragile political union finally became a 
reality. As closer the Congress (I) and the National Conference drew more and 
more non-mainstream, anti-establishment groups became aligned with the 
MUF to face the Congress (I)-National conference alliance in the 1987 
Assembly elections mainly pointing out that the National Conference 
capitulated before New Delhi for the sake of power and bartered away the 
special identity of the State. Efforts were made to arouse Muslim sentiments 
along communal lines. All the aforesaid developments in the post-1983 
Assembly poll greatly influenced the electoral politics in 1987. 
Few months after the assumption of power by Dr. Farooq Abdullah, 
elections for the 8th State Assembly were held on 23 March 1987 which was 
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contested by the Congress (I) and the National Conference, in coaUtion. 
Participation in this election was nearly 75 per cent participation, the highest 
ever recorded in the state, with nearly 80 per cent overall voting in the valley'^ 
The National Conference-Congress (I) combine contested all the 76 seats and 
the Muslim United Front, 43 seats. However, the National Conference-
Congress (I) alliance won 66 seats and the Muslim United Front could secure 
only 4 seats in the Valley even though it had polled 31% votes. The Times of 
India described the victory of the alliance as a heartening from a non-partisan 
point of view'^ . Allegations of rigging and misuse of power were made. This 
election in a way was a watershed in the politics of the state. 
The exact approximate extent of rigging, malpractice was difficult to 
assess but the strength of the National Conference-Congress (I) alliance made 
the autonomous state authorities reluctant to act in an independent manner. 
Instead, the machinery of justice was used to circumscribe the political freedom 
of the opposition leaders. Shortly before the election, charges were brought 
against eight Muslim United Front leaders for "rousing religious sentiments of 
the people and demanding Independence from the Indian union". The cases 
were filed under the controversial Terrorist and Disruptive Prevention Act.''' 
Various other Muslim United Front leaders were arrested lor "anti-national 
activities"'^  of which the consequences were disastrous. This election was 
harmful for the democratic and legitimate expression of dissent in the politics 
of Jammu & Kashmir. Abdul Gani Lone, former leader of the opposition and 
MUF candidate, expressed the sense of frustration of many Kashmiris: "This 
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simply deepened people's feelings against the Government of India. If people 
are not allowed to cast their votes where will their venom go except into 
expression of anti-national feelings?"'^ Mr. Lone who believed in democratic 
institutions throughout his political career later became a leading member of 
the militant separatist movement summed up his experiences of 1987 elections 
saying that it was this that motivated the young generation to say "to hell with 
the democratic process and all that this is about" and they said "let's go for the 
armed struggle'. It was the flash point. The thought was there, the motivation 
was there, the urge was there, the demand was there, and the opposition was 
there. The situation became ripe, and [the elections provided] a flash 
point, several young activists engaged in political opposition decided to join 
the armed struggle after 1987 election. Yasin Malik who was the election agent 
of Mohammad Yusuf Shah in 1987 election became a militant separatist leader 
of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). And Shah became a 
leader of the Hizbul Mujahedin. The disillusionment and frustration created by 
the progressive failure of the democratic system to genuinely represent the 
public's diverse interests was the main reason for the decision to resort to 
armed conflict. 
The idea that the events of the 1987 election increased these feelings of 
frustration finds support from another source, namely AmanuUah Khan, the 
Pakistan based chairman of the JKLF. Amanullah Khan considered launching 
an offensive in the valley in 1983 but gave up because of lack of support. Three 
years later, though Khan observed that the situation had changed radically and 
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believed the youth in the valley were now "ready". By 1986 the contempt felt 
for the alliance and the political system was enormous, and Khan argues that 
this situation was created mainly by the state and the central government. The 
revolt was nourished by frustration, corruption, and the betrayal of Kashmiriyat 
- the Kashmiri identity. Khan adds that "the psychology of the youth is very 
important here. Young people have a strong urge to do something". Discontent 
has to be channeled, he says, and if there is a "cause" to pick up, many will do 
so willingly. It was the 1987 election which made the people on the whole 
'agrees' that only gun provides the solution though from unabated 'armed' 
struggle against Indian has remained, but it never achieved popular support up 
to 1987. The politics that fallowed Rajiv-Farooq accord widened the gulf 
between Kahsmiris and Indians. Common people accepted militants as 
"Mujahideen fighting for their cause. The word azadi became the catch word. 
All government machinery came to a standstill. The state brought under 
Governor's rule in 1990. Security forces were armed with special powers by 
bringing in Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 
Public Safety Act, and other draconian laws. 
Allegations of malpractices and rigging by the coalition led to the 
disillusionment of the new generation of Kashmiris. Accompanied by rampant 
corruption, mal-administration and strains within the coalition, the government 
failed to administer the State effectively. In this environment, secessionist and 
subversive elements started claiming that they had been denied democratic 
rights illegally and began justifying recourse to unconstitutional and other 
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methods. It was in this environment that Pakistan capitalized and encouraged 
the Kashmiri youth to come across the border and receive arms training to 
begin an armed secessionist movement. 
The foregoing analysis shows that the electoral politics in the state has 
been determined by the dominance of one party ever since independence. In the 
absence of a strong opposition and inter-party competition, there has hardly 
been any check on abuse of power by the ruling party in the state. As a result, 
frequent electoral malpractices have taken place resulting in gradual erosion of 
democratic process in the state. Even the state's strategic and sensitive position 
has often been used as a cover for such malpractices. Moreover, since the party 
system is largely rooted in ethno-regional considerations, it has neither allowed 
healthy interactions among people of cross-regions, nor promoted inter-party 
electoral competition on secular and democratic basis. Ethno-regional 
cleavages have increased by leaps and bounds with each passing election. 
Moreover, the frequent suppression of democratic process at the hands of the 
ruling elite (through electoral subversions etc.) has not only perverted the entire 
fabric of public life in the state, but also helped the fundamentalist and 
subversive forces to acquire ominous proportions. 
In the Assembly poll (1987), the National Conference and Congress (I), 
both of which previously fought against each other and followed a 
confrontationist path for a couple of years, turned friendly after an accord in 
which the latter accepted the role of a junior partner at the state level. The 
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opponents called it an "opportunist alliance" for obtaining power and also 
made it one of the key issues of their propaganda against the ruling alliance. 
Since these two parties joined hands, the vacuum caused in opposition was 
filled by a combination of fundamentalist groups in Kashmir and the BJP, BSP, 
Shiv Sena etc., in the Jammu region. The election campaign, particularly in 
Kashmir, was soon converted into a battle cry. The Muslim United Front made 
it jihad against the National Conference in the valley. It went to Kashmiri 
Muslims in the name of religion in elections. Similarly, BJP concentrated 
against the Congress (I) in the Hindu majority Jammu region and accused it of 
jettisoning the nation's interest by aligning with a communal and separatist 
National Conference. 
The resuhs in 1987 showed a considerable rise in the poll in percentage 
of Muslim United Front and BJP in their respective areas of influence in 
particular, and the state as a whole in general. However, the increased poll 
percentage did not translate into seats, which in turn caused anger, particularly 
among the rank and file of the Muslim United Front. Consequently, as the 
resuh trickled in the entire valley turned into agitation politics. They alleged 
large-scale rigging by the ruling alliance. Subsequently, a dominant section of 
the Muslim United Front took recourse to the non-electoral path. Such 
developments not only made the opposition groups stay away from the 
parliamentary poll 1989 in the valley, but also swelled the ranks of the newly 
formed militant groups. 
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The history of elections held in Jammu and Kashmir points out to large 
scale state supported rigging and malpractices. The Congress Government in 
New Delhi controlled the ruling parties in the state (National ('onference from 
1953-1965) and Congress party from 1965-1975), with its handpicked 
nominees running the government. Sheikh Abdullah was installed by India as 
the Prime Minister of the state in March 1948. The first election was held in 
1951 in which as many as the seventy three of the total seventy five effective 
members of the Constituent Assembly were returned unopposed. Not only this, 
the remaining seats were also captured by the ruling National Conference 
without any contest. The opposition candidates either boycotted the elections 
[Praja Parishad] or withdre\v their candidature at the last moment [Independent 
candidates] under pressures . These elections, it was alleged, were held not 
without manipulations. The ruling party however denounced the allegations of 
manipulation. While referring to the Assembly elections of 1951, 1957, and 
1962, it has been observed: "all the three occasions, the government machinery 
was completely and unhesitatingly used in support of the ruling party, 
opponents were disqualified on flimsy and frivolous grounds; the few dauntless 
candidates who dares to stand for the contest were mercilessly beaten or 
kidnapped; "peace brigade" men were employed to intimidate voters; and 
whenever strong arm methods failed the ballot boxes were tampered to enable 
the polling officers to declare the victory of National Conference party men". 
Bakshi won the Assembly elecfions in 1962. In 1963 Bakshi resigned and was 
indicted on charges of con-uption and misuse of power. The "Plebiscite Fronf 
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which represented the increasingly assertive Kashmiri nationalism boycotted 
the path of elections.^ '* According to P.S. Verma, "All the periodic elections in 
the state have thus repeated the same story of illegal rejection of nominations, 
proxy voting, booth capturing, beating and abducting rivals, disrupted public 
meetings etc. The entire democratic process has been strangulated and trampled 
time and again by local zealots to serve their narrow political ends. These 
perversions in the long run have not only ridiculed the electoral process but 
also contributed to the spurt of fundamentalism, subversion and militant 
violence in the state".^ ^ 
Elections-universally seen as democracies in action does not mean the 
same in Jammu and Kashmir.^ ^ They have not generally been seen as just and 
fair. It is noteworthy that Mr. B.K. Nehru, former Governor of Jammu and 
Kashmir has acknowledged that elections in Jammu and Kashmir have indeed 
been rigged in the past: "From 1953 to 1975, Chief Ministers of that [state of J 
& K] had been nominees of Delhi. Their appointment to that post was 
legitimized by holding of farcical and totally rigged elections in which the 
Congress party led by Delhi's nominee was elected by huge majorities". ("B.K. 
Nehru was Governor of Kashmir from 1981 to 1984, in his memories published 
in 1997 Nice Guy Finish Second; pp. 614-50"). Prem Nath Bazaz, a prominent 
Kashmiri journalist and activist, summarized^^ the political process in Jammu 
and Kashmir as follows: "After independence, rulers of Jammu and Kashmir 
state were not the freely chosen representatives of the people as they should 
have been but were the nominees of the central Congress Government. 
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Whether they were the leaders of the National Conference as in the early years 
(1947-53) and during 1975-77, or belonged to the Congress as in the 
intervening period, their source of power was New Delhi.... "Bazaz continued 
- "the fact remained that the final decision about selection of candidates, extent 
of rigging and supply of funds rested with the Central Congress leadership. Not 
even once the elections were fair and free and a candidate holding independent 
views had slim chance to be elected. It was taken for granted that so long as the 
ruling party was in the good books of the Central Government, it was sure by 
hook or by crook to win the majority of the polls; most of its candidates were 
declared elected without contest". Allegations of electoral malpractices have 
always been made out in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The reality of the 
allegations is not verifiable. However the politics of the state points out that 
New Delhi from the very beginning tried to manage and control the course of 
development to its favor either directly ruling the state or in coalition with 
National Conference and even sometimes opposing it to the extent of dismissal. 
This nature of politics makes the allegations appear real. Each election whether 
manipulated or otherwise influences the political discourse. This happened 
fallowing the 1987 assembly elections. 
Thus, with the complefion of the 1987 elections there emerged a new 
scenario in the state in which democratic options became obscure and the peace 
loving Kashmiris were hurled into the quagmire of unending violence. The 
entire political process was paralyzed. Most political parties were rendered 
irrelevant. Most people in Kashmir seem to have lost faith in electoral process 
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and are no longer in a mood to accord legitimacy to the existing set up. The 
deeply flawed 1987 elections sharpened resentment against Delhi. 
The proximity of National Conference with the Centre led to erosion of 
its legitimacy and created a political vacuum in Kashmir that was filled in by 
religious and separatist forces. Amongst those who entered political vacuum 
were the collection of political parties which organized themselves in 1986to 
form the Muslim United Front (MUF) to contest the 1987 election^l The MUF 
staked its claim in Kashmir politics from 1986 to 1987 period, was successful 
in evoking political emotions in favor of its aggressive anti- Centre politics 
bordering at times with separatist sentiments. It was in this political 
environment that the debacle of 1986 elections, which was perceived to 
beheavily manipulated in lavor of the National Conference-Congress combine, 
took place. The onset of militancy in 1989 and the popular support that it could 
obtain in the initial period was a direct fall-out of this election. While 
weakening the authority of the Indian state and its political institutions, the 
popular disenchantment with the 1987 assembly elections caused severe 
damage to the legitimacy of National Conference ad erosion of its popular 
base. Consequently, it was forced to abandon power in early 1990. More than 
the popular resentment against the party, it was rather difficult in maintaining 
the political order that led it to withdraw not only from governance but also 
from political scene. Following the imposition of governor's rule the party 
went into hibernation. The crises that underlay the situation during the period, 
however, was extended beyond the withdrawal of National conference from the 
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political scene. It involved almost a total collapse of political process. With 
armed militancy gaining ground; normal political activities were brought to a 
halt. Meanwhile, a spontaneous popular response in favor of demand forazadi 
manifested itself in the valley^°.The popular support to militancy witnessed 
during this period was, to a great deal, a reaction to excessive intervention of 
the Centre witnessed not only in the recent past but since 1953.Given the 
context of the total erosion of the politicalprocesses, the National Conference 
was encouraged by the government of India to review its political structure and 
stake its claim in mainstream politics .From all accounts it was a difficult task 
for any political party operating from the mainstream politics as it had not only 
to face the brunt of militancy but also to compete with the separatists for 
political space. To shift the politics from the separatist to mainstream was 
intricate process given the continued lack of trust of the people in government 
of India on the one hand and skepticism against the mainstream politics on the 
other. As the insurgency in the valley gained momentum, the acts of sabotage 
increased in frequency and intensity. Farooq Abdullah was being side-lined as 
a political force by the Muslim parties; nearly all of whom developed a militant 
wing. 
While peace was breaking out after the downfall of the communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe, 1989 marked the real beginning of insurgency. 
Throughout 1989 there was sporadic violence between Muslims and Buddhists 
in Ladakh. The Buddhists, ever conscious of the dominance of valley Muslims, 
raised slogans like 'Save Ladakh, Free Ladakh from Kashmir'.^' In 1989 
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Jagmohan relinquished his position as governor. In his memories he describes 
how since 1988 he had been sending 'warning signals' to Nev*' Delhi about the 
'gathering storm'. 'All these clear and pointed warnings were, unfortunately 
ignored. Jagmohan was replaced by a retired general, K.V. Krishna Rao. A 
former chief of army stafl" had considerable expertise in counter- insurgency, 
but none in politics. Forooq Abdullah was criticized by his political opponents 
for being unable to control the situation. Part of the militants' strategy was to 
intimidate National Conference activists in order to oblige them to disassociate 
themselves from the party, uhimately leading to a complete breakdown of 
political process. Farooq Abdullah's response to the insurgency was more 'a 
sense of bravado rather than maturity'.^ '* Stringent measures were adopted 
whether the protests were because of religious sentiments, pro Pakistani 
sentiments, economic grievances or civil liberties. Abdulla also attributed the 
alienation not so much to the 'rigged' 1987 elections, but to the failure of 
government of India to fulfill its promise to give the funds which were agreed 
at the time of Farooq's accord with Rajiv Gandhi. At the beginning of 
December 1089, Rajiv Gandhi lost the general elections in India to his former 
finance minister, V.P. Singh. Although Kashmir was not an election issue, the 
new prime minister chose to try and win some support in the troubled state by 
appointing a Kashmiri Muslim, Mufti Muhammed Sayeed as India's first 
Muslim home minister, a position once held by Sardar Patel. Six days after he 
took office, his daughter Rubaiya Sayeed was kidnapped and five JKLF leaders 
were released in exchange for her release. After the kidnapping of Rubaiya 
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Sayeed, New Delhi adopted a tougher approach. Jagmohan was brought back 
to Kashmir as governor in place of Krishna Rao. He again dismissed NC rule 
and instituted governor's rule ' Farooq Abdullah immediately resigned on the 
grounds that he could not co-operate with 'a man who hates the guts 
ofMuslims.'^ ^ As a supporter of Indian union, Farooq Abdullah shared none of 
his father's pretentions towards independence, and had no sympathy with the 
demands of the militants , whom he at times referred to as 'misguided youth'. 
But the Accord with Rajiv Gandhi, the 1987 elections, alleged corruption of his 
government and subsequent inability to control the situation had all lost him 
popular support. 
Jagmohan compared the administration, of which he was once more in 
charge, to 'a sprawling but lifeless octopus... Franzied chaos and savage 
anarchy gripped the valley'. His return marked a new intensity both in New 
Delhi's dealings with kashmiris and their response. His appointment was 
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probably 'the worst mistake of the central government at that time.' His rule 
depended heavily on the extremist BJP who wanted to abrogate article 370 and 
integrate Kashmir within the Indian union. The attempt to find a political 
solution to Kashmir's problem was put aside in favour of a policy of 
repression. Driven by his own sense, of personal mission, Jagmohan saw the 
insurgency as a movement, abetted by Pakistan, which had to be brutally 
crushed, even if it meant targeting virtually the entire population. 
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The Delhi government took remedial steps to control the effects of the 
repression by appointing George Femandes as a minister for Kashmir who was 
well known both in India and worldwide for his concern for human rights. 
Jagmohan regarded Femandes's approach as impractical. According to 
Jagmohan, Femandes gave no consideration to the fact that as long as the pro-
Pakistani elements, intoxicated by past successes, had faith in their guns and 
bombs, no worthwhile political process could be initiated and those who 
responded to it, were most likely to be eliminated.'^ ^ The 1990 saw 
considerable violence in the valley. The Army was tasked with a CI role for the 
first time in Kashmir. The physical presence of security forces in the valley 
became overwhelming. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act"^ ^ (AFSPA) and 
the Disturbed Area Act were extended to the Valley of Jammu and Kashmir in 
1990. Together these Acts gave enormous powers to security forces. These 
Acts were in addition to the J&K Public Safety Act in force since 1978 and the 
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act since 1987.'*' 
During 1990-91 militancy extended from Srinagar to the countryside. 
The government in New Delhi was undergoing its own convulsions. After less 
than two years in office, V.P. Singh was replaced as prime minister following 
the elections in June 1991 by installafion of another Congress leader, P. V. 
Narasimha Rao after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. Although the BJP no 
longer wielded the same influence on Kashmiri policy, Hindu communalism 
remained a factor during this period. L.K. Advani's Rath Yatra (chariot 
procession) Of 1990 was a major marker. The year also saw the start of 
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violence against Kashmiri Pandits and their exodus from the valley''^ . The 
demoHtion of Babri Masjid in 1992 and serious communal disturbances that 
followed, especially in Mumbai, increased local support for the militants in 
Kashmir.The insurgency steadily worsened during 1990-93. In 1993 the 
concept of unified security headquarters was in place, and security forces began 
to dominate every habitation through a 'grid system'. In 1994 the Jammu and 
Kashmir government created a 3,000- strong Special Operations Group (SOG) 
to crush the militancy, that soon attained notoriety as an above the -law force. 
With the death of Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq which did even more damage to the 
government, Jagmohan was replaced within two months of his return. He was 
replaced by G. Saxena. The valley under Jagmohan was a closed war zone. 
During this period under the governorship of Jagmohan the alienation of the 
valley against the Indian government became almost total. Saxena on his 
assumption of office received a memorandum from ten senior civil servants 
including Ashoke Jaitly whom wanted to give Saxena a realistic picture of the 
alienation of the valley due to mishandling by the authorities. Although Saxena 
is generally regarded as being more benign in his approach than Jagmohan, he 
did not adopt Jagmohan's overtly repressive tactics, but he was equally 
committed to crushing the insurgency through force."*^  For Kashmiris, the 
familiar pattern of attacks by militants on specific targets, reprisals by the 
government, cordon and search operations, call for strikes, had become part of 
their daily life. Human rights organizations, although restricted in their access, 
condemned the violations of human rights. In 1991 Asia Watch stated that 
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government forces 'have also systematically violated International human 
rights law by using lethal forces against peaceful demonstrators'.'*'^  Although 
Saxena encouraged the security forces to use restraint on the grounds that 
excesses won recruits to militancy, stories of brutality by the security forces 
continued to emerge. Under Saxena, the Indian government also worked to 
improve intelligence gathering operation and counter-insurgency measures in 
the valley. 'Operation Tiger,' launched in august 1992 was the first in a series 
of security forces operation code named 'Shiva', 'Eagle', 'Cobra'. Their aim 
was to suppress the various militant groups through a 'Catch and kill' policy. 
Between 1989 and 1993 over thirty parties and organizations opposed to 
the National Conference and central government grouped together to form an 
umbrella organization known as All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) . 
The Hurriyat evolved much like the MUF had during 1986-87. But Hurriyat 
refused to take part in elections for reasons that included the electoral thwarting 
of the MUF in 1987 through malpractice. Although the various components 
differed over whether they wanted independence or unification of the state with 
Pakistan, they had one common objective: that the people should be given the 
right to choose. It was the long- standing plea for self - determination and a 
plebiscite. 
During the worst period of turmoil between 1990-96 when the political 
establishment was absent, the administration became dysfunctional, institutions 
and systems got badly shaken, and people's confidence lay shattered as they 
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remain enveloped in dark clouds of despair and hopelessness with nowhere to 
go for succor or relief, it ^^  as National Conference at that time which remained 
steadfast, initiated an era of reconstruction, the efforts for the restoration of 
autonomy, peace and stability and enormous measures to provide a better life 
and pulled the state out of the mists of gloom when it came back to power in 
1996. However, despite all the difficulties, NC resumed its political activities 
and took upon itself the task of governance after winning one of the most 
controversial assembly elections in 1996.'''Farooq Abdullah's re- election as 
chief minister was hailed as turning a page in the 'nightmarish chapter in 
Kashmir's recent history'/^ For the first time since the worst days of 1990, the 
Indian government could congratulate itself on a return to civilian government 
in Jammu and Kashmir. In a situation where mainstream politics had suffered 
and had almost become non-existent due to the violence and turmoil in the 
preceding six years, electoral contest within the valley of Kashmir was not a 
normal exercise, especially so because elections were conducted under the 
shadow of three different kinds of guns- that of the militants, of the security 
forces and of the counter- militants (Ikhv^ a^nis).'*'^  
In the given situation therefore, governance was an uphill task for the 
National Conference, not merely for the reason that the legitimacy of its 
electoral victory was challenged openly but also for the fact that the tasks that it 
was expected to perform were extended beyond the process of governance. 
Apart from reducing the level of violence that impinged upon the normalcy in 
the state since 1989, it had also to re-assert the political authority of the elected 
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government. Such authority had been eroded soon after the onset of militancy. 
It had also to contribute to the political milieu by widening the public space for 
debate, dialogue and democratic protest. With the society being besieged by the 
environment offear of gun, such a public space had been narrowed in the valley 
since the onset of militancy. It had also to curb the human rights violations and 
lessen the routine harassment of the people caught in the fight between 
militants and security forces and lastly, it had also to undertake the task of 
reconstruction of the physical infrastructure damaged during preceding 
years.Such a daunting nature of responsibilities for a party that still had to seek 
legitimacy for its own powers was bound to have impact on its performance as 
a ruling party of the state' . Operating under these abnormal conditions, the 
party could not fully reclaim its political constituency .As the responsibilities 
being multiple, the National Conference could not translate the impact of its 
accomplishments positively in its favour. Its accomplishments, in any case 
were not tangible in terms of the process of governance. Governance, in fact, 
was the weakest link in the six years of National Conference's rule. With 
allegations of rampant corruption and non-performance, the party did not have 
much to claim in this count. Yet it could claim a lot in terms of political 
reversal which it contributed through its sheer presence. The party, despite all 
the odds that it had faced, was still linked to Kashmiri society with loyalty to 
Sheikh travelling in the family from generation to generation '^. It also had the 
biggest cadre of workers spread throughout the valley. It is through this kind of 
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base that it still enjoyed, that the party could gradually extend the scope of 
mainstream politics. 
Apart from its cadre, it was its traditional ideological basethat the party 
could use for reclaiming its political base in the valley. After a period of 
withdrawal, the NC had to use its discourse of 'Autonomy' to gain entry into 
the politics. This discourse carried the value of expediency as it provided both 
an explanation for the post-1989 crises as well as a solution to the problem 
from within the mainstream politics, as an alternate to the separatist discourse 
of 'Azadi'. It located the prevalent problem of militancy and popular political 
discontent in the erosion of autonomy constitutionally guaranteed to the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir and considered its restoration as the essential condition 
for the reversal.^^ 
Hence, it was around the demand of autonomy that the National 
Conference contested the 1996 assembly election^^ and after winning the 
election, appointed a state autonomy committee (SAC) to recommend measures 
to restore autonomy of the state to the pre-1953 position. However, National 
Conference could not take political advantage of the politics of autonomy as it 
could not get the required support from the Centre in the process. A resolution 
passed by the state legislature and forwarded to the Central government 
demanding that the union and the state government take positive and effective 
steps for implementing the report was dealt with contempt and dismissed 
outrightly.^ '* Such outright rejection of autonomy resolution had serious 
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implications both for political responses in Kashmir as well as for the political 
fortunes of National Conference. While reinforcing the feeling of distrust 
towards the Centre it had also the effect of further diminishing the political 
image of the NC, more so because of its affiliation with the NDA which was 
responsible for rejecting the autonomy resolution. Despite the adverse impact 
of NC's alliance with the Congress during 1986-1990period, the NC continued 
to pursue its policy of aligning with the ruling party in the Centre. For running 
the government in difficult circumstances in which it was placed after the 1996 
assembly elections, it felt the need of the support of the Centre both in financial 
as well as political terms. Hence in 1996, it supported the United Front 
government in the Centre and joined its hands with Saif-ud-Din Soz, a senior 
member of the party representing it in the government. Ideological 
compatibility of the party Avith that of the government in Centre did not pose 
much problem for it at that time. However, after the 1998 when the government 
changed hands in the Centre, the party was faced with the prospects of aligning 
with the BJP led coalition. However, despite the alliance being problematic for 
the NC, it did not change its position and declared its position of extending its 
support to any party forming the government at the Centre. After supporting 
the coalition from outside in 1988, it took the decision to join the government 
of National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in 1999^1 
On the whole, its alliance with the BJP- led NDA did more harm to the 
NC than benefit. The association did not help the NC either in its process of 
governance or in legitimizing its politics. Further it did not translate itself to the 
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support that the party might have required for extending its poUtical base in 
Kashmir - neither was the special financial assistance forthcoming nor the 
poHtical support to the poUcies of the NC. On the contrary, the party was 
pohtically humihated by a contemptuous approach of the BJP towards the 
autonomy discourse. The association of NC with the BJP and the impact that it 
had on its image in Kashmir became one of the major reasons for the decUne of 
electoral fortunes of the NC in 2002 assembly elections. The party came to be 
perceived as far removed both from the local realities as well as aspirations of 
people. Conceding the fact, Omar Abdullah, the party president at that time 
took the decision to withdraw from the coalition in early 2002.^^Till 2002 
assembly elections, the NC has been the single dominant party of the state. In 
2002 assembly elections, NC had lost its electoral hegemony and for the first 
time the party adorned the role of an opposition party.The most significant 
political outcome of these elections was the people's verdict against the ruling 
National Conference which was voted out of power. For the first time the NC 
faced a serious challenger in the valley in the form of the People's Democratic 
Party(PDP). The PDP was formed in 1999 and comprised opposition groups 
that did not subscribe to the Hurriyat policy of electoral boycott. Out of 87 
seats the NC won 28, Congress20 and the PDP 16.^ ^A Congress-PDP coalition 
government, with the PDP leader Mufti Mohammed Sayeed as Chief Minister 
for the first three years, assumed power. There are several important factors 
that differenfiated the 2002 assembly election from earlier elections. This 
election did not suffer from the allegations of rigging and manipulation as did 
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the earlier elections. Added to it was the heightened party competition, 
especially in the valley of Kashmir. Unlike the earlier elections when the 
politics was defined by hegemony of NC with no real alternative availableto 
people, this election provided the people the choice to vote either for NC or 
PDP. The PDP enjoyed the advantage of entering the electoral arena with a 
clean slate - unlike the NC v^hich had the incumbency disadvantage associated 
with it. It could make a dent to the latter's share of votes and seats in the valley 
by offering a politics based upon the regional sentiments. The regional 
sentiments tended to be neglected by NC due to its alliance with the NDA and 
pro - Centre attitude. Moreover, it raised the crucial issues related to the 
violations of human rights and emphasized the need for entering into dialogue 
with militants and offering 'healing touch' to the people of Kashmir.^ ^ It was 
this discourse of the PDP which was translated in electoral gain of the party by 
capturing around one-fourth of the total votes polled in the valley, thereby 
making a serious inroads into the constituency hegemonised by the NC so far. 
Moreover, the 2002 assembly elections in J&K that ended the era of 
hegemonic politics of the NC has a healthy impact both on the politics of state 
as well as that of the NC. With NC as the single party dominating the political 
scene, politics did not acquire competitive character. This adversely impacted 
on the process of democratization process, especially in the valley where the 
presence of the opposition was almost negligible. In the absence of democratic 
channels, the process of articulation and expression of discontent was blocked 
and was routed through the only available space of oppositional politics, i e, the 
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separatist politics. The mainstream politics, meanwhile, lost its regional 
character as the NC, ensured of its return to power election after election, had 
tended to become complacent about the need for maintaining its linkage with 
its local constituency, the people of Kashmir. Now with the NC facing become 
more vibrant. Such transfonnation of politics is particularly beneficial for the 
NC as it has been forced by the compulsions of circumstances to find its 
bearings, once again, in the local politics. That is the reason that the party has 
been finding means to respond to local issues and reflect the sensitivity of the 
party to local sensibilities.^ *^ In 2002 National Conference was replaced by 
Peoples Democratic Party. This election is regarded as the fairest election free 
from any manipulation. This elecfion ended the hereditary rule of Nafional 
Conference in Jammu and Kashmir. Both Indian Nafional Congress and its ally 
Peoples Democrafic Party ruled the state up to 2008 when due to Amamath 
Land Row '^ Peoples Democrafic Party-Congress (I) government headed by 
Congress fell. The posifion of PDP on the issue of autonomy has been the idea 
of Self Rule. (For details see appendix-VII). This idea of autonomy will not 
lead to the resolution of the complex problem which the state has been facing 
since its accession to the Union of India. 
Before 2008 elections, it was expected that there will be a pre-poll 
alliance between the PDP and Congress and every possibility of a direct contest 
between the Nafional Conference and the PDP-Congress alliance was visible. 
The PDP was more passionate and supportive of the pre-poll alliance, as, for 
them, without the alliance it hardly stands a chance to come to power. But 
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situation took a new turn when PDP-Congress wedlock ended with a sad note 
paving way for governor's rule. 
The National Conference succeeded in creating wedge between the two, 
as the party exploited the shrine board land row to its maximum. Its leadership 
worked hard to break the PDP-Congress alliance before the elections and 
ultimately succeeded. Elections were held in November and December 2008. 
Following the election, the National Conference agreed to a coalition with 
Congress (I) and their leader Omar Abdullah became the chief Minister of this 
coalition government on January 5, 2009. After winning elections in 2008 the 
National Conference failed to fulfill its promises for which this party was voted 
by the civilians. In 2009 a fresh cycle of violence erupted in Jammu and 
Kashmir due to the incidents of the rape and murder of two young women's in 
Shopian district of the state. The valley reeled under tremendous chaos in the 
wake of a prolonged strike. As the government was ineffective in restoring 
normalcy, people blame the government for not handling the crises properly. 
People lost faith in administration and the National Conference lost its 
credibility.While Kashmir kept boiling, Central government sent an all-party 
delegation to Jammu and Kashmir to assess the ground situation in the state 
which has been in the grip of violence since June led by Home Minister P. 
Chidambaram^ .^ Its aim was to talk to all shades of opinion in Kashmir. The 
delegation was sent while Indian prime minister maintaining that there would 
be zero tolerance for human rights violation in Kashmir. The delegation arrived 
and invited all the representatives and political players in Jammu and Kashmir 
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for talks. While mainstream parties participated in the deliberations, Most of 
the mainstream parties stressed on the resolution of Kashmir issue, National 
Conference advocated autonomy as the fmal resolution of Kashmir issue, while 
PDP (People' Democratic Party) supported Self-Rule as fmal solution^^ 
Hurriyat rejected invitation for talks. However, five members of delegation 
urged Syed Ali Shah Geelani at his residence to restore normalcy in Valley he 
told delegation once New Delhi accepts his five point formula (as menfioned 
above) normalcy would be restored '^*. Though Moderate faction of Hurriyat 
also boycotted to meet the delegation, it presented a memorandum to the 
delegation. While reaching Delhi back, the delegafion gave many suggestions 
to the government, the government called a meeting of Cabinet Committee on 
security (highest decision making body on security issues). The Committee 
announced eight point plans for Jammu and Kashmir to defuse the crises in 
Kashmir. Following are the eight point plan announced by CCS*'^  
1. Appoint a group of interlocutors under the chairmanship of an Eminent 
person to begin the process of a sustained dialogue with all sections of the 
people of Jammu & Kashmir, including political parties/groups, youth and 
student organizations, civil society organizations and other stakeholders. 
2. Advise the State Go\emment to immediately release all students and 
youth detained or arrested for stone pelting or similar violadons of law 
and to withdraw the charges against such students and youth. 
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3. Advise the State Government to immediately review the cases of all PSA 
detenues and withdraw the detention orders in appropriate cases. 
4. Request the State Government to immediately convene a meeting of the 
Unified Command and to review the deployment of security forces in the 
Kashmir Valley, especially Srinagar, with particular reference to de-
scaling the number of bunkers, check-points etc. in Srinagar and other 
towns, and to review the notification of areas as 'disturbed areas'. 
5. Grant ex-gratia relief to the families of the deceased persons at Rs. 5 lakhs 
per person killed in the civil disturbances since June 11, 2010. 
6. Appoint two Special Task Forces, one each for Jammu region and Ladakh 
region, to examine the developmental needs of the two regions, with 
particular reference to deficiencies in infrastructure and make suitable 
recommendations. 
Besides these political initiatives the central government appointed an 
expert committee under the chairmanship of C Rangarajan, who is the 
Chairman of Economic Advisory Panel, to the Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan 
Singh, after the summer unrest 2010 in Kashmir, to formulate a job plan for 
Jammu and Kashmir. The expert committee suggested several flagship 
schemes, which were aimed to address the problem of unemployment^ .^ 
However, the most important development in the aftermath of unrest was the 
appointment of the interlocutors as part of New Delhi's eight point package to 
cool the tempers and "workout a political settlement of the Kashmir issue." The 
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team comprising journalist Dileep Padgaonkar, academician Radha Kumar and 
former Central Information Commissioner MM Ansari , have been visiting the 
state frequently to prepare roadmap for the resolution of the issue. The Group 
of Interlocutors held extensive deliberations with the Government of J&K, 
political parties and civil society and other stake-holders at the state and 
national levels. They submitted the report on October 12, 2011, proposing a 
"New Compact" with the people of Jammu and Kashmir, the report focuses on 
three components — political, economic and social and cultural. Under the 
political component, the report deals with Centre-State relations and internal 
devolution of powers, and suggests a road map listing confidence-building 
measures. It favours amendment of the Public Safety Act, review of Disturbed 
Areas Act, and re-appraisal of application of controversial Armed Forces 
Special Powers Act (AFSPA). It recommended deletion of the word 
"temporary" from the heading of Article 370, and from the title of Part XXI of 
the Constitution, and suggested replacing it with the word "Special" as it has 
been used for rest of the States under Article 37Lit recommended the setting 
up of a Constitutional Committee (CC), to review all Central Acts and Articles 
of the Constitution of India, extended to the State after the signing of the 1952 
Agreement. The report favoured resumption of the dialogue process between 
the Centre and Hurriyat Conference "at the earliest opportunity". It expressed 
the hope that such a dialogue "should yield visible outcomes and be made 
uninterruptible. Some other recommendations include speedy implementation 
of the recommendations of the Prime Minister's working group on CBMs, in 
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particular, making tiie return of all Kashmiris, mainly Pandits, a part of State 
policy; facilitating the return of Kashmiris stranded across the LoC; 
establishing a judicial commission to look into unmarked graves, speeding up 
human rights and the rule of law reforms . 
The interlocutors have advocated drawing a fresh financial arrangement 
between the Centre and the state to achieve J&K's economic self-reliance. In 
this regard, the report propounds that a special setup be created for hilly, 
backward and remote areas and also for socially disadvantaged groups. Also, it 
has asked for institutionalized cooperation between the two parts of erstwhile 
princely state of J&K to ensure "hassle-free" movement of people, goods and 
services across the LoC and on International Border^ .^ 
The report also listed several recommendations to harmonize relations 
between people on both the sides of Line of Control including a hassle-free 
movement of people and goods across the LoC and a consultative mechanism 
where elected representatives from both sides can deliberate on issues of 
common interests like water, economy, tourism and trade. 
This would be especially effective if democratic institutions of self-
governance are established in areas of princely state under the de-facto control 
of Pakistan. 
The mainstream parties hailed these initiatives of central government to 
defuse the crises in Kashmir and to find a solution for the Kashmir issue. The 
separatist camp rejected these initiatives. According to chairman of moderate 
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faction of Hurriyat conference, Mirwaiz Omer Farooq, Recommendations, 
committees, sub-committees are waste of time. It is not a matter of 
recommendations, there is need of political will for solving Kashmir dispute," 
Mirwaiz further said, "Some CBMs can create a situation for political 
dialogue, but not solution. AFSPA, demilitarization, trade, economic incentives 
can only be CBMs not the solution, we believe that state in totality existed in 
1947, not 1953 and 1975." 
Mirwaiz also reiterated the stand of the amalgam that Kashmir issue has to 
be resolved through tripartite dialogue or through United Nations resolutions^". 
According to chairman of hardliner faction of Hurriyat conference, Syed Ali 
Shah Geelani, "This is mere time-buying tactics adopted by India. We will not 
bow down to the economic packages by the New Delhi. Our youth did not 
sacrifice their lives for the economic packages," commenting on the report of 
interlocutors he said the report has ignored the aspirations and historical aspect 
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of Kashmir issue . 
Thus, we see, of late. All Parties Hurriyat Conference have emerged as an 
important political force in Jammu and Kashmir. It has increased its influence 
considerably and spearheaded all agitations in the Valley. While some of its 
member parties like Sajad Tone's People's Teague have fought elections, some 
have softened its stand on the issue of Azadi, Tike Mirwaiz Umar Farooq's 
faction accepted Parwiz Mushraf s four point formula. But some continue to 
hold on to extreme demands like Syed Ali Shah's faction still demands right to 
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self-determination. In all, the changed political scenario has empowered the 
common people in Kashmir as seen in the recent Panchayati elections where a 
huge number of people participated. The introduction of grass root democracy 
has enlarged the scope of mainstream political parties like NC.The issue of 
autonomy which began with the accession of the state of Jamniu and Kashmir 
continued even after 2008 elections is discussed in next chapter. 
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Chapter - 6 
JiationaC Conference and Its 
OperationaCStrategy of 
Autonomy 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE AND ITS OPERATIONAL 
STRATEGY OF AUTONOMY 
The concept of autonomy is as old as the Greek Hterature accord to 
which 'autonomy' means hving under one's own laws. In this perspective, the 
concept autonomy would mean self-Govemment. The term 'autonomy' may be 
used in a unity of contexts, viz. state autonomy, regional autonomy, autonomy 
of groups, autonomy of minority communities, institutional autonomy etc. Here 
we are concerned with the study of regional autonomy and inter-regional 
autonomy in the Indian context in general and to the study of the problem of 
autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir State in particular. 
Before we proceed it seems to be essential to define the terms 'state 
autonomy' and 'regional autonomy'. State autonomy would mean the freedom 
enjoyed by a full-fledged state. In other words, state's autonomy is "partly a 
matter of power (whether it has the external and internal strength to make and 
enforce its own laws) and partly a matter of recognized authority (whether it is 
regarded by other states as the legitimate Government in pa particular 
territory)".' Thus an independent sovereign state free from any influence or 
control from within or without is nothing but an autonomous state. However, 
autonomy of a state may depend upon the degree of authority enjoyed by the 
State itself Taken as such, the power of a "satellite" country or a protectorate 




State autonomy in the context of Indian politics may be understood to 
mean regional autonomy. It has been said that "the idea of autonomy has 
recently been extended to discuss the politics of fragmentation .^ By granting or 
recognizing a power to make laws to local bodies (e.g., councils, regional 
assemblies), a state confers or recognizes regional autonomy. All such grant of 
recognition is on sufferance, since a law making power that control be 
overridden by the central Government tends to produce a separate state 
(perhaps united by Federation) rather than a regional Government.^  Hence 
complicated examples of regional autonomy often present an appearance of 
federation. India, which cannot claim to be a purely federal polity, presents an 
appearance of a federation especially under occasions when forces in favour of 
more and more autonomy for states do raise their heads up and demand 
autonomous status for states with a view to reconstruct the Indian political 
structure on a complete federal basis, rather than be satisfied with the existing 
arrangement of quasi-federal pattern. 
Under the federal structure, it is argued; the cultural entity and linguistic 
entity of each unit of India heterogeneous society will not only be protected but 
will have full opportunity of growth and development. The reconstruction of 
Indian political structure on federal grounds can be justified in the plea that 
"unitary form of constitution... has everywhere posed one of the greatest 
threats to the unity of any multi-cultural state or nation under democracy..." 
The idea of autonomy for states in Indian policies came prominently into 
limelight during post-independent era, especially after the fourth general 
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elections held in 1967. Till then Indian political system had been enjoying one-
party dominance. The results of 1967 elections changed the entire picture when 
in nine of the states non-Congress Government came into the power. For the 
first time, there appeared a vibration in the stagnant oceanic waters of Indian 
politics. The regional parties in the states like Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, 
West Bengal, Tripura and Jammu and Kashmir came to power and became 
more active in their respective areas. This process led the regional governments 
to demand more and more power for the states, with the result that relations 
between centre and states could not have a smooth sailing. 
Main causes of tensions between the Centre and states :^ 
(i) The partition role of the Governor in appointing and dismissing the state 
Ministers and in summoning, proroguing and dissolving the State 
Assemblies; 
(ii) The issues of ordinances and reserving large number of Bills for the 
consideration of the President under Article 201; 
(iii) Misuse of Article 356 of the Indian Constitution under which Ministers 
having majority in the State Legislative Assemblies are dismissed n 
untenable grounds; 
(iv) The discriminatory attitude of the centre towards the Stale Governments 
in matters of appointment of Inquiry Commissions against the Chief 
Ministers belonging to opposition parties and also, in the matters of 
financial allocation of liinds, loans and grants-in-aid; 
(v) Use of the Central Reserve Police by the Centre without the consent and 
permission of the State concerned; and 
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(vi) Use of Planning Commission by the Centre to undermine the position of 
the state. 
India is a parliamentary democracy. The Indian people belong to a 
multi-class and multinational society. The heterogeneous character of such a 
society naturally requires a federal political structure so that "different parties 
come to power in the various states and in centre. Multiparty parliamentary 
democracy has become the basis of our life and centre-state relations have to be 
framed accordingly... Ours is a federation of nationalities and national groups 
inhabiting this vast country. It should be a federation governed by the 
principles of autonomy and multi-parliamentary democracy....^ 
The bitter experience in the working of parliamentary democracy in 
India has been, however, the ever increasing tensions and coiistraints in the 
relationship between the Centre and States. This has necessitated the need for 
more and more autonomy for the States. When the individual eflbrts on the part 
of states failed to achieve the objective, a new device and strategy was evolved 
by the opposition parties for purpose of creating a consensus in favour of 
recasting centre-state relationship. Thus, the opposition parties started a sort of 
movement with a view to meet at certain places for the deliberation over the 
issues facing the states. These meets of the opposition parties came to be 
known as "conclaves". Several conclaves were held at different places. The 
Srinagar conclave which has a great importance in this regard was held on 
October 5, 1983, attended by sixteen opposition parties and five chief 
Ministers. The Consensus at the conclave meeting was in favour of reducing 
the political and economic power of the centre. 
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Speaking on the importance of the Conclave, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, and 
the former Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir said that a new era which 
demanded an effective autonomy for states and the desire for setting up of a 
real federation in India, had dawned on the country's political scene. Dr. 
Farooq Abdullah believed that the emergence of different political parties in 
the state had created a situation in which the Centre was bound to agree the 
performance of a greater role by the State Government to fulfill their mandate. 
The states were to perform a role which would ensure rapid economic 
development and national integration.^  Hence the need for the state autonomy 
the States, he added should be left free so that they function independently and 
without any interference. The main hindrance in the way of cordial relations 
between Centre and states was the unsatisfactory administrative and legislative 
division of power. In a sarcastic remark Dr. Farooq Abdullah said :^ 
"Three decades of working of the Constitution has sho\vn how vitally 
enriched we are in our experience of the role of the Governor...."' 
The Srinagar Conclave recommendations'": 
(i) To delete Articles 2001, 201, 249, 250 and 360 from the Constitution of 
India; 
(ii) To amend Articles 356 and 357 in such a way as to prevent their misuse; 
(iii) To give residuary powers to the states; 
(iv) To give statutory recognition to the institutions of Planning Commission 
and the National Development Council; 
(v) To deploy Central Reserve police in the states with the consent of the 
State Governments; 
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(vi) To appoint the Governor from a penal forwarded by the concerned State 
Government; 
(vii) To make the All India services while serving in the state subjected to the 
supervision and disciplinary control of the state Government; 
(viii) To establish an Inter-State Council under Article 263 as a point of 
reference for all centre-state relations; 
(ix) To create a central communication council for preventing of the misuse 
of mass media. 
(x) To extend the membership of the election Commission to three 
members; and 
(xi) To create a judicial council consisting of Supreme Court judges for 
making recommendations regarding the appointments of the judges of 
Supreme Court and the appointment and transfers of the judges of the 
High Courts. For this state Governments should be consulted before 
recommendations are made to that effect. The advice of the Judicial 
Council should be binding on the president. 
With the above discussion certain questions may arise; e.g., 
1. What are the reasons for states to rise against the Centre? 
2. Why do the states feel dissatisfied with the existing Constitutional 
arrangement? 
3. Why do they itch for more and more powers? 
4. Why do they struggle for securing to themselves the autonomy under a 
reconstructed structure? 
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The answer to these questions what once the Chief Minister of Jammu and 
Kashmir, Sheikli Mohammad Abdullah, said''; 
The centre had toppled State Governments so many times that it had 
become a general pattern in Indian politics. Whatever New Delhi feels that a 
particular state is not toeing its line, the Government is dislodged". These 
remarks of the Sheikh Abdullah were the realities which he himself had 
experienced in his own state where the leadership was divided and politicians 
were persuaded to sell the autonomy for political power with the help of centre. 
The Politics of Autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir 
The desire of the people of Jammu and Kashmir for an autonomous 
State had figured in politics of Kashmir long before the state acceded to India 
in 1947 that is why the 'Hari Singh' the then ruler of Kashmir had surrendered 
only defence, foreign Affairs and Communications to the Government of India. 
This accession made by Maharaja was in consonance with the desire of the 
people it was endorsed by them through their recognized leadership. Also the 
ideological marriage of Kashmir National Conference with Indian National 
Congress had prepared the masses in general and Kashmiris in particular to live 
in a secular and nationalist India on the condition that the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir must have fullest autonomy "so that the Muslim majority in the state 
may feel assured that Hindu dominated India was not going to interfere in their 
internal affairs".'^ It may be noted here that Jawaharlal Nehru had committed to 
the world and to his own nation in a broadcast on November 2, 1947 that the 
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fate of Kashmir was ultimately to be decided by the people of the State. This 
commitment was never fulfilled by India... and on contrary, India went back 
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on her promise. A new twist was given to the issue of accession. Thus when the 
Kashmir Constituent Assembly ratified the state's accession to India, the 
Government of India declared that the people had exercised their right to self 
determination through their constituent Assembly, who were to finally 
determine the Constitution of the state and jurisdiction of the Union of India 
over the state. All these promises and declarations made by (jovemment of 
India were a clear-cut commitment to the fact that the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir was going to be treated in accordance with the federal principles in its 
relationship with the Government of India. That is why Sheikii Mohammad 
Abdullah had made it clear to the members of the Constituent Assembly that 
they should translate the vision of New Kashmir in reality through the exercise 
of the right to self determination. The concept of an autonomous Jammu and 
Kashmir, state had become an integral part of Kashmir politics and the 
nationalist leaders had taken it for granted that "any question of having this 
special position to use for a temporary period does not arise".'^ The state of 
Jammu and Kashmir, it was said, "will be an autonomous republic within 
Indian union. And so far as the Indian Constitution is concerned, we aim at 
making its framework such that the state will be an autonomous unit within the 
said union.' This is how Kashmir's relationship with India was understood to 
take the form after the accession and this version was tactfully recognized by 
India. And when the Indian leadership was sure that Kashmir would not go 
back, it began to show its true colour and nature. Right from the time of 
convening the Constituent Assembly, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Mirza 
Mohammad Afzal Beg had been seriously engaged to see that the autonomous 
character of the State was translated into the provisions of the Constitution of 
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the state. But the Government of India wanted otherwise. The government of 
India was extremely anxious to see that the Constituent Assembly ratified the 
accession. The Sheikh knew that it was impolitic and, therefore, inexpedient to 
accord "confirmation to the instruction of Accession without getting a prior 
reciprocal approval for the State's special status within the union which he (the 
Sheikh Abdullah) felt was necessary to ensure the safety and security of its 
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Muslim majority. The internal autonomy for Jammu and Kashmir was 
essential because the existence of Communalism and communal spirit in India 
made Kashmir Muslims apprehensive of losing their identity under such 
prevailing conditions; the Muslim's fear could not be mitigated on the ground 
that resurgence of communalism was intended to swallow up Kashmir.'^  Forces 
against autonomous Kashmir had been gaining popularity among non-Muslim 
population of Jammu province. The Sheikh was vigilant enough to counter 
them. He openly declared'^ : 
"If there is no special status for Kashmir in Indian 
constitution, how can we go to Muslims in Kashmir and 
convince them that India does not interfere in the internal 
affairs of Kashmir? .... We have acceded to India in regard 
to defence, foreign affairs and communications, and not in 
respect of other subjects because we wanted one kind of 
autonomy for ourselves in internal matters". 
The Kashmir politics immediately after the state's accession to India 
began to experience a new dimension. This dimension was the politics of 
autonomy versus complete integration. The politics of closer integration was, 
however, very tactfully and gradually adopted under a well planned programme 
of action. "The Sheikh Abdullah led National Conference was against the fiill 
application of the Indian Constitution and Hindus favoured ardently its total 
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application.^ *^  This was the beginning of the poHtics of autonomy versus 
politics of full integration of the state with India. Soon voices of separation of 
Jammu from the valley and its merge into East Punjab and demand of Ladakh 
for its one-third representation in the Constituent Assembly together with the 
demand of autonomous region of Kargil and Ladakh were raised both in 
Jammu and Ladakh. These sub-regional demands for the purpose of 
recognition of their identity were sufficient indicators to Kashmir leadership to 
remain within the expected limits and the orbit of Indian political system. 
Sheikh Abdullah as an ardent supporter of autonomy could not let himself be 
daunted by the pressure that began to be brought indirectly upon him by the 
Government of India. He declared at a public meeting held in Srinagar on April 
26, 1952 that the Constituent Assembly "would decide whether to aced to India 
or remain independent or join Pakistan". '^ 
Set-backs to the autonomous Status of Jammu and Kashmir 
Notwithstanding the Indian government's understandable anxiety when 
it comes to the contemporary international push for ethnic minority rights, the 
application to Kashmir of the idea of ethnic autonomy inevitably arouse 
interests in some quarters of India as a potentially viable ahemative to 
continued separatist violence. This should not surprise us. After all, the State of 
Jammu and Kashmir - or, to be precise, that part of it remaining in Indian 
hands when a cease fire between Indian and Pakistani forces was declared in 
January 1949 - is no stranger to formal autonomy, ft began its life under Indian 
rule, in fact, with substantial, even radical, autonomy. The foundation for its 
autonomous status was readily apparent in Indian government's explicit and 
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repeated acknowledgement in the early days of its dispute with Pakistan over 
Kashmir of the conditional nature of the state's accession to India as well as in 
the unique status granted to the state in article 370 of the 1950 Indian 
22 
Constitution . Those Initial Concessions to autonomy were curbed somewhat 
by the terms of the so-called Delhi Agreement reached in July 1952 between 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the Charismatic Kashmiri nationalist 
leader, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. In that agreement, residual powers, in 
contrast with all other states of the Indian union, were said to vest in the state 
of Jammu and Kashmir. The Delhi Agreement was, however, acceptance on the 
part of Government of India to treat Jammu and Kashmir State on federal basis. 
Sheikh had to submit before the central pressure to accept what he had hitherto 
been refusing, that is, the application of the provisions of the Constitution of 
India to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
The State's autonomy suffered on other counts, however, as in extension 
to the state of the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court. The Delhi 
Agreement was rendered moot, in any event, in August 1953, when New Delhi 
ordered Abdulla's arrest and incarceration. That event set the stage for the 
massive reversal of the earlier concessions. This was a major setback to the 
autonomous character of the Jammu and Kashmir state. And her stroke in 1954 
when by the Presidential order issued under Article 370, the Preamble and 
various other provisions relating of the Indian Constitution such as relating to 
the union and its territory, citizenship, fundamental Rights, part suits and part 
XI and part XII relating to finance, property, contracts and suits and part XIII 
dealing with trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of India were 
extended to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 
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Another setback to the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir was 
experienced in 1958 when the President order issued in February in that year 
extended the jurisdiction of comptroller and auditor-General of India to state. 
Part XIV of the Indian Constitution relating to the services under the union and, 
also, authority and jurisdiction of the Election Commission, the special leave 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court were made applicable to the State. 
During the Prime minister- ship of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, the 
State autonomy was not, however, permitted to be very frequently eroded by 
the Centre. As he was a true defender of the cause of special status of 
Kashmir", it has been rightly observed that he "steadfastly declined to the 
countenance or surrender any of the powers and privileges of the Jammu and 
Kahsmir state guaranteed under Article 370 of the Constitution.^ ^ But the 
Bakhshi was not an anti-integrationist too. In fact the 'closer ties of the state 
with India became a reality due to his stand in 1953". He did not submit to any 
kind of pressure in this regard and his resistance to the further erosion of 
Kashmir's autonomous status paid him ultimately in terms of his fall. 
But G.M. Sadiq being one of the archrivals of Bakhshi Ghulam 
Mohammad was out to undo what the National Conference leadership had done 
in their own way to defend the autonomy of Kashmir. He was the only 
outspoken Kashmiri leader who was in favour of fullest integration of the state 
with India and wanted the abrogation of Article 370 as it was the main barrier 
between the State with test of India. According to Sadiq, emotional integration 
with India was a necessity. 
In his keen desire to seek an early erosion of the Article 370, Mr. Sadiq 
was honoured when a non-official Bill seeking the abrogation of the Article 
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was introduced in the Lok Sabha in 1964 but the same was defeated by 157 to 
23 votes. The most important contribution of Mr. GM Sadiq to the politics of 
closer integration and erosion of autonomous status of the state was his 
advocacy of early extension of Articles 456 and 357 of the Indian Constitution 
and various other progressive measures like the Advocates Act and the 
Companies Act to the Jammu and Kashmir state on the ground that: 
"The state has been a victim of aggression by Pakistan and 
China. In Bengal, Bombay, Kerala or Madras there are no 
abnormal conditions but the Articles 356 and 357 are still in 
force there, we, therefore, fell that extensions of these 
Articles to this state, in view of its abnormal conditions, is 
all the more necessary".^ ^ 
The other constitutional changes struck by the sixth Constitutional 
Amendment Act 1965 related to the change of the "Sadar-i-Riyasat" to 
"Governor"; of the "Prime Minister" to the "Chief Minister" and bring the 
Judges of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at par with the judges of High 
Courts in other states of India. 
But on the other side Sheiidi Abdullah with his charismatic leadership, 
remained firm on maintaining the autonomous character of Kashmir and this 
virtually opened the eyes of Indian leadership, making it realize that the 
possibility of a dialogue between the Government of India and Sheikh 
Abdullah was much needed for. This need was given practice picture by then 
Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi. 
Road towards 1975 Accord (Kashmir Accord) 
The first meeting in this regard took place on January 8 and 9, 1974 
between Sardar Swaran Singh and National Conference Patron Sheikh 
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Abdullah. The Sheikh demanded the restoration of the original position and the 
condition according to which only Defence, Foreign Affairs and 
Communications were surrendered to the Union Government of India by the 
Maharaja Hari Singh in 1947. He also demanded the dissolution of the State's 
Legislative Assembly so that the newly re-constituted legislative Assembly 
would reconsider whether to retain or repeal all those provisions of the 
Constitution of India and other Central laws and Presidential orders which had 
been extended to the state since 1953. He also demanded to centre to replace 
the designations "Governor" and "Chief Minister" by "Sadar-i-Riyasat" and 
"Prime Minister" as was originally provided for by the state's own constitution. 
The Swaran Sheikh talks were then followed by a series of negotiations 
between the representatives of Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Sheikh Mohammad 
Abdullah, viz. the Parthasarthy and Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg talks resulted 
into an agreement which was confirmed by the political Affairs Committee of 
the Central Cabinet on January 18, 1975 and by the Executive Committee on 
January 22, 1975. 
The Agreement, now popularly known as "Kashmir Accord" was 
announced on February 24, 1975 and was later on approved b> the Parliament 
(Details of Kashmir Accord are shown in the appendices). 
Soon after the Kashmir accord was made public. Sheikh Abdullah was 
inducted into the office of Chief Minister -ship. The Sheikh, thus, came back to 
the seat of authority and power which position he enjoyed till his death in 
September, 1982. 
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Failure of Kashmir Accord to restore autonomy: 
The Sheikh Indira Accord of 1975 (Kashmir Accord) had no attraction 
except that the further erosion in the special status 'shall' be arrested and the 
erosion already made might, to a great extent, be reversed.^ ^ At first it was 
expected that the Kashmir Accord will be beneficial for the restoration of 
relations of State of Jammu and Kashmir with the Central Government. But 
irrespective of Sheikh Abdullah's repeatedly assurance to his cadres that Pre-
August 1953 political position would be restored. But the Accord failed to 
prove its validity in this regard. It did not and could not even help the 
eradication of the issue of "autonomy" from the state politics. People were 
conscious that on borrowed legislative support he could not do much, but the 
1977 elections, which gave him two thirds majority created genuine 
expectations that he would annual all post-1953 constitutional amendments 
particularly the most controversial Sixth constitutional Amendment Act of 10 
April 1965. Instead, taking a cue form the 42"^ ^ Amendment Act of the Indian 
Constitufion, through Sixteenth Amendment Act of 17 February 1977, Sheikh 
Abdulla amended Sec. 52 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution raising the 
life term of Jammu and Kashmir Assembly from 5 to 6 years. The Janata Party 
Government greatly did undo the 42"'^  amendment to Indian Constitution, but 
Sheikh Abdulla or his successor soon did not undo the mischief perpetuated 
under the 16* Amendment Act. Had Sheikh Abdullah or his son taken such a 
step it would have dispelled the common impression that the Sheikh dynasty 
was interested in safeguarding its rule rather than in the restoration of States 
special status. So after 1975 fill his death in 1982 Sheikh did not consider it 
worthwhile even to nominate an expert committee (even on organizational 
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level) which could have examined all such constitutional amendments made 
after August 1953 under sec. 147 of the J & K Constitution which could be 
annulled, modified, amended or retained. 
Farooq Abdullah on restoration of autonomy of J & K State: 
The issue of autonomy's contemporary relevance to Kashmir has, in 
fact, in recent years achieved a fairly noisy reemergence in India. The 
immediate stimulus of its re-emergence was the electoral victory in legislative 
elections in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in September 1996 of the National 
Conference (NC) party. The vehicle of Sheikh Abdullah's rise to power in 
1940s, this is the party that ruled the state in the early and still relatively 
autonomous days immediately after independence. It is the party that has been 
led in recent years by Sheikh Abdullah's son the former Chief Minister and 
now by Farooq's son Omar Abdullah as the State's Chief Minister. 
Farooq Abdullah had made restoration of the state's autonomy the 
centerpiece of his party's 1996 campaign for office. It is said that the election 
manifesto of the National Conference issued for 1996 Elections was either just 
to confuse its own cadre or to have a distinctive character against other All 
India Parties in fray so, it stressed for restoration of regional autonomy. People 
had since dismissed this political gimmick of the Sheikh dynasty as they had 
been disappointed by their duplicity when both the father and son enjoyed two-
third majority, but instead of reversing the process of erosion in internal 
autonomy they accelerated it. Besides, the people had no charm in Phraseology, 
but in the real exercise of power by the institutions fairly and fearlessly. They 
found no attraction in words Wazir-i-Azam, nor had any aversion for the 
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phrase 'Chief Minister'. To them you might call head of the state executive or 
head of the state by any name, but in their view, they would always remain 
sandwiched in the Indian power game. 
However on the political, Farooq Abdullah was attempting to make 
good of his pledge to restore the state to its pre-195.3 autonomy,^ ^ One of his 
first acts upon taking over as the State's Chief Minister was to appoint two 
state level committees to examine the issue of Kashmir's autonomy - one on 
the state autonomy committee (SAC), entrusted with the issue's interstate or 
"external" aspect (the relationship between the Central government and the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir), the other, the Regional Autononiy Committee 
(RAC), responsible for its intrastate or "internal" aspect (the relationship 
among the state's three ethno-religious polyglot regions - Jammu, Ladakh and 
Kashmir valley). Little was heard from either of these committees until mid-
April 1999, over two years later, when their reports - the Report of Regional 
Autonomy committee and the Report of the State Autonomy committee - were 
finally submitted to the Jammu and Kashmir assembly. Following their 
submission, nearly another year passed, however, before they gained much 
public notice. Two events drew attention to them. One was the state cabinet's 
sudden decision on 19 January 2000 - over three years after the two 
committees were appointed and prior to any formal action by the assembly 
itself- to endorse flatly the SAC report's recommendations. The exclusively 
NC composed Cabinet's peremptory acfion caused an immediate uproar in the 
national media and drew bitter condemnation from (BJP) Kashmir unit, the 
NC's partner in the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) coalition government 
at the Centre.^ ° The second and more explosive event was the state assembly's 
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passage on 26 June 2000 of a resolution regarding its approval of the SAC 
report's recommendations and demanding positive and effective steps for their 
implementation. 
According to SAC Recommendations New Delhi's authority should be 
once more restricted to defence, foreign policy and communications, as was the 
case before 1953. The report also suggested that the State should have its own 
Prime Minister and Supreme Court. The central Government have considered 
the 'Resolution' passed by the J & K Legislative Assembly and have not 
accepted the same as the acceptance of the 'Resolution' would set the clock 
back and reverse the natural process of harmonizing the aspirations of the 
people of Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of the Nation.'^ ' At this juncture 
Farooq led National conference (NC) was opposed not only by the government 
in New Delhi, but also by the BJP members in the state assembly, accusing 
National Conference of being pro-Pakistan. Although the Congress (I) 
opposition members opposed autonomy during the debate, stating that the 
government should instead fight poverty and the militants, they abstained from 
voting. The Buddhist and Hindu communities also opposed autonomy plan, 
criticizing it as a first step towards secession. 
In New Delhi, the Government indicated that it was not opposed to 
giving the state some measure of autonomy, although granting the Pre-1953 
status would weaken India's national integrity. The Hurriyat rejected autonomy 
as a solution to the Kashmir dispute. Syed Ali Shah Gilani, Chairman of the 
APHC, said that the struggle for the right to Self-determination and for a 
permanent solution to the problem would continue. 
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The Autonomy Committee's Reports: 
A closer examination of these two reports, in particular the 
recommendations of State autonomy committee focusing on extremely 
sensitive areas of centre-state relationships, will make clear the reasons for the 
uproar. 
1. Regional Autonomy Committee Report (RAC): Since it was focused 
fairly narrowly on group autonomy within Kashmir, initially attracted less 
attention (and drew less criticism) elsewhere in India. Like the SAC report, 
however, the RAC reports' central proposals, spelled out in a fairly brief 
document of about thirty pages, were highly controversial. That why were 
likely sooner or later to meet stiff resistance, at least from some segments of 
the state's population, became apparent, in fact, in January 1999 with the 
backing of the Committee's Jammu based Hindu chairman Balraj Puri, and his 
replacement by Mohammad Shafi, the finance Minister. Balrajpuri, a well 
known and outspokenly liberal figure in India's civil rights movement (and the 
only member of RAC not also a member of Farooq's National Conference), 
had long since made known his opposition to any autonomy scheme that sought 
to redraw the map of the state along more sharply communal lines and, thus to 
deepen communal identities. His own draft of the committee report, rejecfion 
of which by Farooq Abdullah had precipitated his removal as chairman only 
months before its scheduled submission, was privately published in book form 
soon after his departure. In this book, he called for the state's administrative 
and polifical devolution in a manner that would preserve the state's unity and 
leave the present three (communally more or less heterogeneous) regions of 
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Jammu, Kashmir valley, and Ladakh essentially intact. Local autonomy was to 
be achieved by bolstering local (village, block and district) self-government 
along the lines of India's well-established Panchayati raj system. The object 
was to achieve decentralization of State's power and enhanced institutional 
representation of ethno-linguistic minorities (the State's Gujjars, Dogras, 
Paharis, Ladakhis, and Kashmiri speakers, for instance) without at the same 
time further entrenching the communal (again, meaning religious) identities of 
the three regions. 
In sharp contrast with Balraj Puri's patently secular and religion averse 
plan, the RAC report calls for a major reorganization of the state's internal 
boundaries, with religious identity as the obvious, albeit strictly implicit, 
criterion for the exercise. It affirms the virtues of the ethnic accommodation 
and "people's sovereignty over their own affairs", and it candidly proclaims in 
prefatory remarks that "the homogeneity of an identity in a geographical 
location should remain the basic criterion of the formation of the regions 
classified as autonomous". 
The RAC Report is painstakingly (and, in critics' eyes, disingenuously) 
draft to define the project of redrawing internal boundaries entirely in terms of 
"ethnic diversity" and what is calls "ethno-cultural linguistic groups". While it 
acknowledges that Jammu and Kashmir "is a pluri-culture, pluri-lingual and 
pluri-religious state of India".^ "^  It denies that religious identity either motivates 
the demand for restructuring the state's boundaries or seriously figures in the 
restructuring plan. The report manages somehow to discuss Kashmir's 
ethnography for thirty odd pages, in fact while only once employing the word 
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Muslim and not even once the word Hindu and Buddhist. Nevertheless, these 
words could not have been far from the author's mind as they prepared the 
report. 
When it comes to the specifics of boundary revision, the report urges 
that the existing three divisions of the state be broken into eight new reigons or 
provinces, and that these new entities be endowed with elected and suitably 
empowered councils. The jurisdictional end product of the report's 
recommendations clearly favours the state's Muslims, especially its sunni 
Muslims. Whereas under the Current jurisdictional dispensation each of the 
State's three main religious communities (Muslims, Hindus and Buddhist) 
enjoys at least nominal intergroup equity by virtue of possessing majority 
standing in one of the state's three divisions, the Proposed revision of 
boundaries would allot Sunni Muslims (without naming them, of course) five 
of the new regions or provinces, with the remaining three going one each to 
Shia Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus. Since the state's sole Shia-majority 
district Kargil would be awarded full regional or provincial status, wholly 
separated from the Buddhist majority district of Leh, the Shia community 
might be among those supportive of the plan. Kargil's Shias have a long history 
of antagonistic political factionalism, however, and at least one section of the 
Shia political elite would likely favour an arrangement - a separate ladakh 
province or union territory, for example with separate regional or district hill 
councils for Leh and Kargil that retained Ladakh's unity as a counterbalance to 
perceived Sunni Muslim Jammu Hindu domination. 
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The state's Hindus in contrast, would almost certainly be 
overwhelmingly opposed the plan. The Pandits who migrated from Kashmir 
valley to Jammu are not even mentioned in report. The demand of some of 
them for their own territorial homeland (named Panun Kashmir) carved from 
the valley is conspicuous by its absence. 
As for the predominantly Hindu Jammu division, more than three of its 
present six districts (those predominantly Muslim, in other words) would be 
shaved off to form two new regions in the reconfiguring exercise in order to 
secure the RAC report putative "ethnic" homogeneity. Since the RAC report is 
careful to emphasize that the new regions or provinces are intended as a 
supplement to the existing central institutions of state government, not as its 
replacement, it is clear that the report's version of autonomy, if implemented in 
accord with the report's design, would not represent a significant departure 
from the centralized manner in which power has been structured and wielded in 
the state during the past half century. 
In the event of the RAC report's main proposal is deemed unacceptable 
by the State Government; its authors offer a second model for contemplation -
one that would create elected councils at the level of the already existing 
fourteen districts. The numerical rankings of the state's religious communities 
in these districts today would ensure roughly the same political outcome as that 
of the first model - in other words, one favouring the state's Muslims, in 
particular its Sunni Muslims. 
In a state where, whether fairly or unfairly, Muslim, domination has 
been routinely targeted for criticism by the non-Muslim minorities, neither of 
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RAC report's recommended models would appear likely to find much favour 
outside the Muslim community. Both models, from the standpoint of the state's 
religious minorities, would result not in their enhanced group autonomy but in 
the further entrenchment of the state's prevailing Sunni Muslim domination.^ ^ 
While in principle the notion of breaking the state down into smaller units is 
unobjectionable, one is forced to agree with Navnita Chadha Behera that the 
RAC report "presented a distorted picture of this principle, designed to serve 
the narrow political ends of the ruling elites and the larger interests of the 
majority community". 
2. State Autonomy Committee Report (SAC) 
The Report of SAC is much lengthier (184 pages) than the RAC report 
and more explicitly at odds with New Delhi in its recommendations. It narrates 
the history of the Centre's relationship with Kashmir from partition in 1947 
onwards. This history, it asserts in unusually blunt language, was one of nearly 
unremitting and remorseless assault by the Centre on the genuinely 
autonomous status with which the state of Jammu and Kashmir began its career 
within the Indian union. In an early Chapter addressing the SAC's terms of 
reference, it commits itself unambiguously to "full enforcement of the historic 
Delhi Agreement concluded in July 1952 between the Prime Minister of India 
Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Prime Minister (as he was then called) of the 
State, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the two foremost architects of the State's 
accession to the Union of India".-^ ^ This objective - the State's return to the 
substantial autonomy (The "special status") promised in that agreement and 
aheady largely embodied in Article 370 of the Constitution - Pervades and 
178 
guides the arguments made throughout the report. When it comes to 
highlighting the Centre's allegedly underhanded, undemocratic, and 
unconstitutional methods for subverting what it claims was the original intent 
of Article 370, the report pulls on punches. "It was abundantly clear", its 
authors observe at one point, that from 1953 onwards, especially in [the] 
sixties, the erosion of the State autonomy was so rapid and on such a massive 
scale that [The] entire Article 370 of the Constitution of India which was 
supposed to guarantee and preserve the special status of the stale in the Indian 
Union was emptied of its substantive content with the result that the State's 
Jurisdiction over the matters as envisaged by the instrument of Accession of 
October 1947 and the Delhi Agreement of 1952 was gradually diminished and 
systematically transferred to the union. 
Far from enjoining a special status, or Article 370 envisaged, the state 
was put in a status inferior to that of other states. 
The SAC report's recommendations are numerous, highly specific, and broad 
in coverage. In distilled form, they urge maximum autonomy - that the centre's 
writ in the state be confined to the three subjects of defence, foreign affairs, and 
communications, in other words, to what prevailed according to the report's 
authors, in the period of prior to 1953. "The best course", it concludes, "is for 
the President [of India] to repeal all orders which are not in conformity with 
constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1950 and the terms of 
Delhi Agreement of 1952".^ *^  It identifies forty two Constitution orders needing 
review in these terms. 
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The SAC report founds its arguments on premises fundamentally at odds 
with those underlying the RAC report. While the RAC report, as we saw, hails 
the centrality of cultural identity and urges reorganization of Kashmir 
(implicitly, I have said) along ethno-religious or communal lines, the SAC 
report plants its arguments firmly in the secular grounds of law and 
constitutionality - in the undoing in other words, of the State's integration in its 
entirety into the Indian union. The former Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah, as 
Aifaz Ahmad commented in Frontline, in forming the two committees seems to 
have armed himself with two reports [catering] to two different constituencies. 
There is the State Autonomy Committee (SAC) report which offers the 
maximalist version of the secular demand for autonomy for Jammu and 
Kashmir as a whole... and then there is the Regional Autonomy committee 
(RAC) report advocating the reorganization of the State into eight new 
'provinces' whose boundaries are defined on ethno-religious lines. In an effort 
to safeguard his eroding political position, Ahmad suggests, Farooq had sought 
"to play the Secular card (maximum autonomy of the state as a unit) as well as 
the Communal Card (division of the state into diverse religiously defined units) 
all at once". This corresponded "to the new political face of the National 
Conference which acts as a guardian of the secular legacy in its operations in 
the valley but as a party of Muslims in Jammu and Ladakh, having developed 
far too limited ties of representation with non-Muslims there". 
Dr. Karan Singh, the son of the erstwhile Maharaja of Jammu and 
Kashmir and the first chairman of the SAC, had resigned on 31 July 1997, 
signaling that is regard to this Committee's report; too, there was likely going 
to be dissent. And indeed, the state assembly's emphatic endorsement of the 
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report in June 2000 generated a minor political firestorm. Spokespersons of the 
Hindu and Buddhist minorities, judged that the Status of Jammu and Ladakh 
would likely be placed in jeopardy in the new order, naturally pressed for the 
report's rejection. 
At this juncture with the passage of SAC report by state assembly, 
certain questions do emerge. 
Firstly, why did the assembly by pass section 147 of Jammu and 
Kashmir Constitution? Secondly, why the House did not choose to reverse the 
erosion it had itself made of the State Autonomy and why did it go with a 
begging bowl to patrons in New Delhi who bluntly refused. It is a fact that 
certain erosions were made through Presidential orders applying provisions of 
the Indian constitution to Jammu and Kashmir. Such applications cannot be 
undone by the State Assembly, but had National Conference completed the part 
which it had to perform then the question about abrogation of such provisions 
would arise. An explanation of this background is necessary to convince that 
Autonomy proposal passed by the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in June 2000 
and immediately rejected summarily by the Indian cabinet was just eyewash. 
Saghir Autonomy Report 2009: 
However in continuance with the restoration of autonomy debate, 
recently the present Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh had constituted five 
working groups on Jammu and Kahsmir"*' to resolve the issues confronting the 
state on the eve of the Second round table conference on Kashmir. Four 
working groups had already submitted their reports, but the fifth, which had the 
most important job for determining New Delhi's relations with Srinagar, was 
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submitted to Chief Minister Omar Abdullah today after a long delay because of 
differences among the political parties."*^  
The fifth working group headed by Retired Justice Saghir Ahmad which 
had sensitive agenda NC's autonomy, self rule, Article 370, issues of reftigees 
and problems of backward areas etc. The working group had last met on 
September 3, 2007 but could not come up with any report till Dec. 2009. The 
working group, in other significant recommendations, has given the people of 
Jammu and Kashmir the right to determine the fate of Article 370, which grants 
a special status, "ft is for the people of J & K to decide how long to continue 
Article 370 in its present form and when to make it permanent or abrogate. The 
matter being 60 years old should be settled once and for all", the report said, 
rejecting the demand of the BJP to scrap the provision. 
The report though accepting the demand of autonomy, has left the 
opfions open on the People's Democratic Party's self rule proposal. The report 
has come as a disappointment for several political organizations in Jammu and 
Ladakh. The working group has rejected the demand for union territory status 
for Ladakh. "It is not recommended that the unity and integrity of the state be 
compromised and the Union territory status for Ladakh is not recommended". 
The demand for delimitation of Assembly seats raised by Jammu based 
parties, which could have allowed more seats for Jammu, has not been 
accepted. "Since there is a constitutional constraint to make any changes till the 
year 2026, as a new Delimitation Commission can be set up only thereafter, the 
present position may continue", 
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On the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which gives unbridled 
powers to forces in arresting or killing people, the working group has said that 
a group of central and state officials and people's representatives may be 
Constituted which will review the application of the Act to various parts of the 
state regularly to explore the possibility whether the act can be withdrawn from 
any part of the state. 
But whatever may be the quality of the report, whatever may be the 
reaction of different groups to presentation of the report, one thing is sure that 
the presentation of the report and reactions to report has brought in some 
political benefits to good will of NC amongst some segments in Kashmir 
valley. Signals have gone that NC has succeeded in securing recommendations 
in favour of its greater autonomy. Whereas the contents do not appear to be like 
that. No any clear recommendations have been made even regarding Autonomy 
Resolution of J & K Assembly/National Conference as well as PDP's Self 
Rule. It appears that the "working group" was caught in confusions and a way 
has been found to just get rid of the noose. So what to talk of successfully 
working for tackling the separatists, the report would not even pull National 
Conference out of the sludge. The political war of the words would continue 
between NC and PDP. The contents of the justice Saghir Ahmed report and the 
manner in which report has been submitted would not do any thing good to 
settle the conliisions may grow further. The report would not even settle PDP 
Flares, what to talk of separatist flares. 
How fiinny as per the report no concept paper was provided by JK PDP 
to Justice Saghir Ahmed on its self Rule. The report further recommends that 
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PDP proposal requires to be considered by the central Government if and when 
approached with documents containing specific proposals of the "self rule". 
This style of report also confirms that chapters on 5^ ^ working Group references 
have been forcedly closed.'*'' It is also said that the working group has not 
recommended or mentioned "parameters" of autonomy. In this report a 
reference to the demand for Autonomy has been made, but no parameters have 
been proposed for the same.''^  
The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh while giving a shape to the 
autonomy proposal at a meeting of representatives of various political parties in 
New Delhi, he said, "if there is consensus among political parties on autonomy 
for the State, then it can be considered within the ambit of the Constitution. 
BJP Criticism of J&K autonomy panel report: 
The Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) rejected the report of the Prime 
Minister's Working Group, which has recommended autonomy for Jammu and 
Kashmir, saying it was an "improperly prepared" document intended to convey 
the government's willingness to "dilute" its position on the State. In a letter to 
Prime Minister Mahmohan Singh, senior BJP leader and Leader of Opposition 
in the Rajya Sabah Arun Jaitley, who was a member of the Working Group, 
said the Centre should not act on the report on the "sensitive political issue" 
having bearing on national sovereignty as it was not based on consensus but 
"unilaterally authored". 
He said the last meeting of the 21-member Working Group, headed by 
former Supreme Court Judge Justice Saghir Ahmed and including leaders of 
political parties, was held on September 3, 2007 and the Group was virtually 
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abandoned since then. "What was the compulsion to bypass the Working 
Group and produce the report? It is surprising that this Group has come out 
with the report on various important and sensitive issues. 
He contended that it was "improper for a retired judge to have drafted a 
report on sensitive political subjects impinging on national sovereignty, that too 
two years after the last meeting of the Group without bothering to discuss it 
with any member" of the committee. "I have an uneasy feeling that the 
government wants to show to some sections of the international community 
that it is willing to dilute the Indian position on Jammu and Kashmir. It this 
report showcased for that purpose?" 
Arguing that a "judge by training is not competent" to comment on 
sensitive political issues, he said a judge "can only adjudicate issues that are 
judicially determinable" and that "it is an improper practice to drag judges into 
the political thicket". In the Group comprising representatives of the Congress, 
the BJP, the National Conference, t5he PDP, the Panthers Party and groups of 
various Kashmiri Pandits, no consensus could ever be possible, Mr. Jaitley 
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said. 
Arguments for and Against the State Autonomy: 
The state autonomy generally is supported in the following grounds: 
First, autonomy is not independence of the state and it is demanded 
under the Indian Federal structure and therefore there is no danger for 
disintegration. 
185 
Secondly, the functions of the state as such are increasing day-by-day. It 
is not proper to make them financially dependent on the centre while they are 
performing the functions of rural development and implementation of five 
years plan. If they are assigned separate resources of finance then it will be 
convenient for them to perform developmental functions speedily. 
Thirdly, state autonomy is essential for the establishment of a true and 
genuine federal policy. At present the status of the states as such is like 
municipalities and they are always afraid from central intervention. The centre 
controls the states by issuing directives and even exercises control over the 
exclusively state sphere like education and health. 
Fourthly, the autonomy will inculcate the responsibilities among the 
states. They will seek additional revenue resources and will not depend on the 
Centre. The concept of a federal polity could materialize in our country only by 
allowing full freedom of development to every linguistic cultural state. 
Panun Kashmir (Organization of Kashmiri Pandits): 
While opposing the greater autonomy to Kashmir accused the country's 
leadership of being ignorant about the political and constitutional history of 
Jammu and Kashmir and warned that patronizing concepts of self-rule or 
autonomy for the state was detrimental to its accession with India. "We 
emphatically warn that concepts of self-rule or greater autonomy, Porous 
borders, shared sovereignty, which the centre has patronized, actually 
undermine the accession and act as cardinal insuh to the unity of India". 
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Describing the instrument of Accession executed by Hari Singh as a 
poHtical tool, the constitutional expert, said it was irreversible £ind irreducible, 
irrespective of the circumstances and events in which it was accomplished. 
BJP's Stand on autonomy: 
Reacting to the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Jammu and 
Kashmir's autonomy offer, senior Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leader M 
Venkaya Naidu said all political parties must first discuss the proposal 
thoroughly. "The Prime Minister must first table a proposal on Jammu and 
Kashmir. We are for a total integration of Jammu and Kashmir. 
According to BJP the Prime Minister's offer to consider autonomy for 
Jammu and Kashmir within the almost of constitution was "unacceptable" to it 
if it reverses the state's integration with the country. There cannot be 
"autonomy" within the country but there can be "more powers" to the state, 
stating that BJP was also opposed to Article 370 providing special status to the 
state. The views of people of Jammu and Ladakh also have to be kept in mind 
while analyzing the issue. 
True to form, political India appears to be dividing sharply on a crucial 
issue. In this case, the autonomy demand raised by National Conference, at one 
extreme stands the Hindu Right which regards the autonomy demand as 
something close to treason, bordering on separatism and threatening to bring 
about the disintegration of India. 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sang (RSS) has publically denounced the State 
Assembly's resolution as but "a step short of actual Secession" and demanded 
that the central Government should keep all options open, including dismissal 
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of the State Government, in dealing with the challenge. RSS publically 
criticized the then Vajpayee government for "compromising" on the issue of 
abrogating Article 370 for the sake of staying in power, and even suggested 
that this spineless stand had led to the near secessionist autonomy resolution. 
The BJP has declared that it is "totally againsf the Jammu and Kahsmir 
autonomy demand, which needed to be "rejected outright". It has warned that 
any return to a Pre-1953 status for Kashmir would lead to disintegration and 
instability because, in addition to Jammu and Kashmir, various states were 
bound to seek autonomy. 
Not surprisingly, the Congress (I), which had much to do while in power 
at the Centre for decades - with making mockery of Article 370 in practice, has 
announced its opposition to the Jammu and Kashmir autonomy resolution. It is 
only the left parties and some of the Constituents of the former United Front 
who are in sympathy with the autonomy demand, even if they differentiate 
themselves soberly from National Conference Party with respect to the scope 
and extent of autonomy.^ " 
On the other hand the All Parties Hurriyat Conference rejected the 
autonomy as a solution to the Kashmir dispute. As stated earlier, that the 
chairman of APHC Mr. Syed Ali Shah Gilani said, that the struggle for self 
determination and for a permanent solution to the problem would continue. 
According to him that freedom from India's forcible occupation is our major 
aim. Our demand is the implementation of United Nations (UN) Resolutions. 
Other factions also out-rightly rejected the autonomy plan and advocated 
independence.^ ' 
188 
In the same way the ruling National Conference as the Chief advocate of 
Autonomy demand left no stone unturned to impress upon the Kashmiri people 
as well as the people of India that Autonomy of Kashmir leads to a viable 
solution to the Kashmir dispute. National Conference strengthened this view 
with different arguments. 
Dr. Farooq Abdullah turned autonomy as NC's life line. "According to 
him there is no question of compromise on it. NC will continue to strive for its 
Implementation. National Conference rejects the demand for union territory 
status to Ladkah, and statehood for Jammu. Senior NC leader and Rural 
Development Minister Ali Mohammad Sagar asserted that National Conference 
will never allow the division of the state. 
Reterating the NC's demand for greater autonomy, he said that BJP-led 
NDA (National Democratic Alliance) government committed a mistake by 
rejecting the proposal. "What is the difference now? The same thing has been 
recommended by a working Group set up by none other than the Prime 
Minister. Its recommendations have made some people uncomfortable but that 
will not change the reality". "We believe autonomy is the best solution to the 
vexed Kashmir issue. It should be granted so that peace could prevail in all 
three reigns of the state". Further the NC did not give up the autonomy 
demand. Dr. Farooq Abdullah, reacting to the LK Advani's observations that 
NC surrendered autonomy demand to continue in the NDA government. 
According to Farooq Abdullah National conference neither gave up the 
autonomy demand nor made any compromise for power. He said "our demand 
for autonomy irked them. BJP was not sincere on Jammu and Kashmir issue. 
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They simply wanted complete merger of Kashmir into the Indian union with no 
flag or constitution of our own, which is not acceptable to our party".^ "* 
In an another statement the finance Minister and senior leader of the 
ruling National Conference (NC) Abdul Rahim Rather, who led the party 
delegation in its talks with the all party delegation told the visiting 
Parliamentarians that restoration of autonomy to the state would help to resolve 
the issue. 
"We have proposed autonomy (restoration of autonomy) as the solution 
of Kashmir issue. It is nothing new as it is contained in the instrument of 
accession". He said that over the years autonomy of J & K was eroded 
unconstitutionally; which has led to the present disconent.^ ^ 
The issue of autonomy in the state is complex in nature. It not only involves the 
question of evolving the fair principles of Centre-state relations but also the 
question of internal devolution of power and inter-regional relations. The two 
issues of state autonomy and the regional autonomy are, in fact, logically 
interconnected. It is not possible to achieve the one without aiming at the other. 
The politics of autonomy, of the regional or of the state level, somehow has 
failed to carry this logic forward. Those who demand regional autonomy 
oppose the demand of autonomy for the state and those demand state's 
autonomy hesitate to talk about the regional autonomy. 
Yet, it is difficuh to dismiss the discourse on autonomy as of no significance 
for the people of Kashmir especially when it addresses the question of 
alienation. Alienation in Kashmir is a deep-rooted political response of the 
common Kashmiris to the distortion that has taken in the politics of Kashmir in 
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the last 50 years. Much of the distortion was a consequence of the central 
intervention in the politics of the state that started with the dismissal of Sheikh 
from power in 1953. Successive central governments were directly or indirectly 
responsible for encouraging political vandalism that took place in the state after 
1953. 
The autonomy discourse had the potential of changing the terms of political 
discourse in Kashmir. The autonomy has substantial appeal to end alienation in 
Kashmir. According to Farooq Abdullah, 'autonomy is essential for healthy 
Centre-state relationship, he also maintained that autonomy is the only possible 
option to fulfill the aspirations of people and only mechanism to resolve the 
tangle and end alienation in Kashmir. According to Sumit Cmnguly, 'at the 
national level, New Delhi must move towards restoring Kashmir's 
compromised autonomy'. Most of the grievances of Kashmiri people have 
emanated because they have not been treated properly by the state authorities, 
primarily those belonging to New Delhi. With minimal central control in the 
affairs of J&K, a positive change could be brought in the region. 
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A modest attempt has been made in the thesis to examine the mode of 
Kashmir politics, especially the role of National Conference (NC) in Kashmir 
politics in its historical and contemporary perspective and its impact on the 
building of Kashmir politics. 
At first it tries to trace out roots of the present crises and its 
contemporary trends. A brief history of Kashmir shows that in the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir diverse cultural traditions and religious groups in the past 
could grow and develop without much difficulty. Many rulers and saintly 
figures had made rich contributions to promote the cause of social amity and 
tolerance, their impact on the minds of the people remained almost intact even 
in the communal holocaust of 1947. The basic cause of a people's unrest 
throughout the world has been socio-economic and political. Ihe natural urge 
of a human being is freedom in totality. Man loves his environment and his 
own way of life. When this equilibrium is disturbed he feels suffocated and it is 
the logical corollary that he tries to free himself from the fetters may be even 
the imposition of an alien way of life. 
The people of Jammu and Kashmir also followed those very lines and 
were their struggle was the outcome of economic exploitation, social 
maladjustment and political domination of an autocratic rule whose foundation 
was laid by Gulab Singh who brought it for a cash payment of 75 lacs of rupees 
by the British. The Dogras who ruled over Jammu and Kashmir for more than 
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one hundred years had failed to generate among the millions of their subjects 
any sense of identity of interests with ruling class. Their basic structure of 
political system remained feudalistic in character. The Muslim subjects, who 
formed the bulk of the population, bore the heaviest brunt of the Dogra 
autocracy. The economic miseries of the masses increased due to Jagirdhari 
system, exploitative revenue system, forced labour and above all a corrupt 
administration. The first fifty years of the Dogra rule characterized by 
repression was responsible for disseminating the seeds of resentment in the 
minds of its subjects against its very existence. Politically suppressed and 
economically exploited, the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir also suffered 
educational backwardness. The anti-Muslim attitude of the Dogra Raj alienated 
the community from the so called mainstream. 
In 1931-33 anti-feudal rising broke out in Indian states. The events in 
Jammu and Kashmir assumed most menacing proportions. A mass movement 
against the colonial rulers and their puppets, the Maharaja, a Dogra by race and 
Hindu by religion had been in progress since 1931.... They cruelly exploited 
all sections of the population. The largest of whom were Kashmiris by race and 
Muslims by religion....This movement was organized with a definite objective 
and purpose. Its main purpose was to secure justice for downtrodden and 
subdued humanity. 
It is a matter of day to day experience and common knowledge that when 
a country or a people fight national struggles, their slogans, their use of 
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political symbols, their approach and even their mode of agitation are based on 
their beliefs and institutions, practices and practicability of the situation. 
Therefore the Islamic touch and Muslim colour of the struggle for freedom in 
Jammu and Kashmir State from 1932 to 1939 was but natural. This did not, 
however, make the moment in any sense communal. 
It goes to the credit of the Muslim population of the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir in general and the father of the Kashmir freedom movement, 
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in particular, that when they realized the dividing 
game of the Dogra ruler, they squeezed out and threw away religion and 
communal touches from the movement and adopted the banner of the All 
Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (Blood red with plough in the 
middle) and not the usual Islamic banner (green with crescent in the centre) 
under which the movement had initially been organized. The conversion of All 
Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, into the National Conference, a 
changeover on broader basis symbolizing the secularization of politics in 
Kashmir, became an inevitable necessity owing to certain developments within 
and with out the Muslim Conference Organization. These developments were 
the appearance of factious politics among the leaders, the inimical role played 
by Hindu communities and the Government against the freedom struggle 
conducted solely by the Muslims and the consequent emergence of radical 
forces and their role in redirecting the movement which ultimately threw its 
doors open to non-Muslims. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was the pivotal 
figure amidst these developments and it was he who played the most notable 
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role in providing a more broadbased secular and nationalistic bias to the 
moment. 
With the transfer of power and partition which was as much crucial to 
Kashmir as it was to the subcontinent, new problems cropped up on national 
and state levels. 
Firstly, all the princely states were supposed either to join India or 
Pakistan. The states were supposed either to join India or Pakistan. The state of 
Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh neither joined India nor 
Pakistan. Kashmir being the Muslim populated state keeping in view its 
strategic importance for the state of Pakistan; it sent armed infiltrators with a 
view to grab it. The Maharaja feeling helpless to deal with the situation, force 
him to sign the instrument of Accession. Even the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, 
while signing the instrument of accession added a provision that the wishes of 
the people should be ascertained after normalcy is restored in the valley. 
Meanwhile India lodged a complaint in the UN which also recommended for a 
plebiscite in Kashmir but nothing concrete emerged and tension between the 
two countries further escalated. The wars thereafter, created further bitterness 
and Kashmir became an irritant for all times to come between India and 
Pakistan and they find too difficult to grow out of that even today. 
Secondly on the state level the travesty was that inifially a section of 
articulate and enlightened class of Hindus from Jammu region in the event of 
transfer of authority from a feudal order to a democratic system in 1948-49 
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mounted a struggle against the new ruling elite i.e. Sheikh Mohammad 
Abdullah and his associates. Their resistance gave an impression that the Dogra 
Maharaja's replacement by a popular Kashmiri Muslim leadership was not 
acceptable to this class comprising mainly landlords and other beneficiaries of 
the erstwhile princely system. The new Muslim elite representing the 
enlightened sections, artisans (crafts, embroidery), impoverished peasantry etc. 
who demanded land reforms, removal of feudal relations and greater state 
autonomy did not suit the socio-economic and regional aspirations of this class. 
This movement accentuated communal consciousness and contributed to the 
scenario of ambivalence and confrontationist politics resulting in an anti-India 
movement for plebiscite, self determination and secession. The beleaguered 
state, as a result, failed to concentrate on development activities for ever two 
decades. Moreover, whatsoever development projects were launched failed to 
achieve any balanced growth which would have lessened chances of 
intermittent ethno-regional tensions. 
Secondly it reveals that political parties in the state have been largely 
influenced by local conditions and primordial factors of religion, ethnicity, 
region, family and personality of leaders. Most parties have been either based 
on religio-regional considerations or represented "coalitions of elites", i.e. 
vested interests in the socio-economic and political sphere. They channeled the 
people's problems and frustrations along ethno-communal and regional lines. 
There is hardly any political party which is worth to be considered a cohesive 
body based on distinct ideological lines, excluding National Conference, they 
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appears ideologically amorphous (having no definite structure) groups. They 
frequently change their manifestoes in accordance with the political needs. 
Political power is used as license to achieve personal goals. Party system is 
more bureaucratic and corrupt. That is the reason, that in the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir there is instability in the political scenario, and with that the 
common masses have lost faith on their own political society, which they show 
at the time of elections by refraining from participation. 
Political parties have no composite character; some parlies have strong 
footing in certain areas but have no support elsewhere. Most of them have 
remained factionalised and are held together by considerations of power 
patronage. It becomes difficult to distinguish between a devout religio-regional 
group and those claiming to be secular, progressive and nationalist 
organizations. Party politics in the state have contributed to the growth of 
fissiparous tendencies rather than promoting the cause of nation-building. Had 
the state continued the spirit of 1939-47 and adhered to the policy of toleration, 
the situation, perhaps, would have never come to such a pass now. Factors such 
as personalized politics focus on individuals rather than on institutions, ethno-
regional chauvinism etc. have caused an irreparable loss to this sensitive state 
where communal amity was a traditional hallmark. The developments in the 
state during the last about six decades have moved it from a secular-nationalist 
orientation to a confrontationist, communal, anti-nationalist phase culminating 
in the current spate of violence which seems impossible task to control for the 
authorities. 
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As far as the National Conference is concerned, besides its important 
and historic achievements, such as, removal of Dogra Raj and passing of 
Agrarian Reforms Act, and besides its Secular and nationalistic ideology failed 
in determining the centre state relations. After independence National 
conference also failed to normalize the relations between the people of different 
religions and regions of Jammu and Kashmir. Its famous slogan remains a 
myth! 
SHER-[-KASHMIR KA KYA IRSHAD-HINDU- MUSLIM SIKH 
ITHAD.National conference also proves futile in preserving the autonomy 
guaranteed under article 370. 
It also failed to absolve the hegemony of the bureaucracy and corruption 
in the administration. Further the grave problem remains neglected the 
unemployment of the educated youth. Presently the credibility of the National 
Conference is totally damaged especially under the leadership of Farooq 
Abdulla. Because this party fails to full fill the promises they have made to the 
people. Party act opposite to their promises and the situation in Kashmir is so 
deteriorated that entire valley is facing a war like situation, war between people 
and state government and central government. It is difficult for the National 
conference to claim that their rule was absolutely successful in its political and 
economic issues and pursuits. Politics is determined by the results it contrives. 
Lopsided politics and politics of convenience and manipulation on the 
part of New Delhi and National Conference towards Kashmir and repeated 
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rigging of elections coupled with unprincipled compromise created a dismal 
mosaic of national and secular life in the state. The electoral politics in the state 
has been determined by the dominance of the party ever since independence. In 
the absence of a strong opposition and inter-party competition, there has hardly 
been any check on abuse of power by the ruling party in the state. As a result 
frequent electoral malpractices have taken place resulting in gradual erosion of 
democratic process in the state. Even the state's strategic and sensitive position 
has often been used as a cover for such malpractices. Moreover, since the party 
system is largely rooted in ethno-regional consideration, it has neither allowed 
healthy interactions among people of cross-religion, nor promoted inter-party 
electoral competition on secular and democratic basis. Ethno-regional 
cleavages have increased by leafs and bounds with each passing election. 
Moreover, the frequent suppression of democratic process at the hands 
of the ruling elite (through electoral subversions etc.) has not only perverted the 
entire fabric of public life in the state, but also helped the fundamentalist forces 
and subversive forces to acquire ominous proportions. As a result, the seeds of 
militancy were sown in the state, but these seeds remained dormant until the 
State Assembly elections of 1987 ... which were allegedly rigged on a massive 
scale providing favourable climate for the seeds of militancy to sprout. The 
resuhs in 1987 elections showed a considerable rise in poll percentage of MUF 
and BJP in their respective areas of influence in particular, and the state as a 
whole in general. However, the increased poll percentage did not translate into 
seats, which in turn caused anger, particularly among the rank and file of the 
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MUF. Consequently, as the result trickled in the entire valley turned into 
agitational politics. They alleged large-scale rigging by the ruling alliance. 
Subsequently, a dominant section of the MUF took recourse to the non-
electoral path. Such developments not only made the opposition groups stay 
away from the parliamentary poll 1989 in the valley, but also swelled the ranks 
of the newly formed militant groups. Thus, with the completion of the 1987 
elections there emerged a new scenario in the state in which all democratic 
options became obscure and peace loving Kashmiris were hurled into the 
quagmire of unending violence. The Kashmiri youth which have actively 
participated in these elections as the activists of MUF and where looking at it 
as the final democratic resort to get their grievances redressed, got highly 
alienated....Finding no other ahemative but to wage war against authority 
whom they thought had no legitimacy to rule over them, they crossed over 
border to get training in the use of arms. This scenario gives the birth of 
different militant organizations with different ideologies. Had the National 
Conference not played this type of dirty politics, the situation will be entirely 
different. Pakistan taking advantage of the situation added a new dimension to 
the crises by providing arms to disgruntled elements. Kashmir which was a 
heaven on earth was soon converted into a living hell with the sword of fear 
and terror hanging over the heads of one and all. The entire political process 
was paralyzed. Most political parties were rendered irrelevant. 
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Militancy whatever is its form or manifestation is bound to produce 
harmful effects. With the militancy hovering over the valley since 1989, the 
Government had to deploy the Security forces on a massive scale causing huge 
expenditure which could have been spent on the eradication of poverty and 
unemployment. The frequent strikes, imposition of curfew paralyzed the 
economic and commercial activities in the state. The frequent disruption of law 
and order punctuated by violent incidents had a demoralizing impact on the 
administration. The state was reduced to almost bankruptcy. The rot lies at the 
root. The policy of injustice and discrimination pursued over decades and lack 
of timely action to redress the grievances of the people, made them suspect the 
bonafides of the state machinery. Suppression of rights and exploitation of 
people over years is bound to cause repercussions, which took the form of 
militancy. Adhocism, political cliches and empty promises have done 
irreparable damage to the state. 
No one in Kashmir, including NC (National Conference) government 
could revive politics until people are dissatisfied with the administrative 
policies which always go against the people's interests. People are fed up with 
violence and alienated from the militants but it would not necessarily mitigate 
their anger against the existing politico-administrative system. Had the 
democratic norms not been frequently subverted, local administration made 
accountable and responsive and some efficiency achieved, the people's 
alienation would have not reached such a sorry pass. 
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Thirdly it is revealed that the desire of the people of Jammu and 
Kashmir for an autonomous state had figured in politics of Kashmir long before 
the state acceded to India in 1947, that is why 'Hari Singh' had surrendered 
only defence, foreign affairs and communications to the Government of India. 
The accession was followed by Delhi Agreement between Sheikh Abdullah and 
Nehru whereby autonomy was guaranteed to the State by providing that, the 
Indian Parliament could legislate only on the three subjects of defence, foreign 
affairs, and communications, and vest residuary powers in the state, conferred 
special citizenship rights for the 'state subjects', and abolished hereditary ruler 
ship. But ironically both the instrument of accession and Delhi Agreement were 
fragrantly violated and laws were passed by the union infringing the autonomy 
of the state. The Article 370 of the Constitution, which Guarantees autonomy to 
the State, over the years, has become a dead letter. The frequent talk about its 
deletion has created further misgivings and fears among people about the real 
intensions of the Union government. 
The National conference which makes autonomy to Kashmir as its life 
line proves otherwise to different sections of Jammu and Kashmir. The 
National Conference led by Sheikh was not prepared to concede to Jammu and 
Ladakh those very rights and privileges which he demanded from the Indian 
state. While iinsisting upon an autonomous status for Kashmir, within its 
boundaries he created a unitary state with a clear concentration of powers in the 
valley that is the reason there exists the question of separate statehood for 
Jammu and Ladakh as union territory. The reluctance of the politicians to 
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countenance autonomy as promised by Article 370 was indeed why Kashmir is 
today perceived as a problem. At the same time, there can be no forgetting that 
the same lofty principle embedded in the article - providing autonomy to sub-
identities - was not followed by the Muslim leadership of the Kashmir valley 
with regard to the Hindu and Buddhist minorities of the state. Much as the 
Indian state has sought to impose its worldwide on Kashmir, so, did the valley 
leadership try to force its idea among the sub-identities of the state? This had a 
crucial role to play in ensuring that the problem remained unresolved. All the 
measures taken by National Conference failed to restore the provision of 
autonomy for Kashmir. Its manipulated policies angered the entire citizenry of 
Jammu and Kashmir. 
The Sheikh-Indira Accord of 1975 had no attraction except that the 
further erosion in the special status 'shall' be arrested and the erosion already 
made might, to a great extent, be reserved. At first it was expected that the 
Kashmir Accord will be beneficial for the restoration of relations of State of 
Jammu and Kashmir with the Central Government. But irrespective of Sheikh 
Abdullah's repeatedly assurance to his cadres that Pre-August 1953 political 
position would be restored. But the Accord failed to prove its validity in this 
regard. It did not and could not even help the eradication of the issue of 
"autonomy" from the state politics. People were conscious that on borrowed 
legislative support he could not do much, but the 1977 elections, which gave 
him two thirds majority created genuine expectations that he would annual all 
post-1953 constitutional amendments particularly the most controversial Sixth 
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constitutional Amendment Act of 10 April 1965. Instead taking a cue form the 
42" Amendment Act of the Indian Constitution, through Sixteenth Amendment 
Act of 17 February 1977, Sheikh Abdulla amended Sec. 52 of the Jammu and 
Kashmir Constitution raising the life term of Jammu and Kashmir Assembly 
from 5 to 6 years. The Janata Party Government greatly did undo the 42"^ ^ 
amendment to Indian Constitution, but Sheikh Abdulla or his successor son did 
not undo the mischief perpetuated under the 16* Amendment Act. Had Sheikh 
Abdullah or his son taken such a step it would have dispelled the common 
impression that the Sheikh dynasty was interested in safeguarding its rule 
rather than in the restoration of States special status. So after 1975 till his death 
in 1982 Sheikh did not consider it worthwhile even to nominate an expert 
committee (even on organizational level) which could have examined all such 
constitutional amendments made after August 1953 under sec. 147 of the J & K 
Constitution which could be annulled, modified, amended or retained. 
The election manifesto of the National Conference issued for 1996 
elections was either to just to confuse its own cadre or to have a distinctive 
character against other All India parties in the fray so, it stressed for restoration 
of autonomy. People had since dismissed this political gimmick of the sheikh 
dynasty as they had been disappointed by their duplicity when both the father 
and son enjoyed two-third majority, but instead of reversing the process of 
erosion in internal autonomy, they accelerated it. However as a Gimmick 
immediately on his reinstallation as Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah's 
appointment of two committees to discuss autonomy issue, the Regional 
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Autonomy Committee RAC and State Autonomy Committee SAC, whose 
recommendations were bluntly rejected by union government, was just an 
eyewash. 
This politics of state-centre relations proves beyond doubt that Sheikh 
and his National conference are determined to play a game for the retention of 
power. To what extent this organization would be able to retain its power is for 
the future to determine. But at the present time due to on going crises in 
Kashmir, it looks like that the future of National Conference is faded. It has lost 
its credibility. Presently it seems that total public opinion is against the politics 
of National conference. It is also true that till the Sheikh was the patron of the 
National Conference, the public opinion was to some extent with the party. But 
after his death Farooq is considered as the unsuccessfiil leaders due to his 
untoward attitudes and anti-people policies and their inability to redress the 
grievances of the people and their indifferent approach of poUtics and policies 
made them unpopular among public opinion. His political tactics guided by his 
political insecurity, which he experienced right in the beginning of his political 
career, alienated the people from the party. This also had the impact of 
hallowing the party of its ideological contention on the one hand and making it 
more dependent upon the personality of leader, on the other hand. Driven by 
contingencies of real politics, Farooq Abdullah often took politically 
inconsistent positions leading to diminution of the very ideological stance of 
the party. That explains as to why the discourse of autonomy, though being the 
most relevant one for Kashmir, did not attract much popular attention. 
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However, notwithstanding the ideological decline, the NC remains one of the 
few parties still having an ideological direction of politics. The 2002 assembly 
election that ended the era of hegemonic politics of NC has a healthy impact 
both on the politics of the state as well as that of the National Conference. With 
NC as the single party dominating the political scene, politics did not acquire 
competitive character. This adversely impacted on the process of 
democratization process, especially in the valley where the presence of the 
opposition was almost negligible. In the absence of the democratic channels, 
the process of articulation expression of discontent was blocked and was routed 
through the only available space of oppositional politics. The mainstream 
politics, meanwhile lost its regional character as the National Conference, 
ensured of its return to power election after election, had tended to become 
complacent about the need for maintaining its linkage with its local 
constituency, the people of Kashmir. Now with the National Conference facing 
competition from PDP and other political parties, the Kashmiri mainstream 
politics has become more vibrant. Such transformation of politics is 
particularly beneficial for the National Conference as it has been forced by the 
compulsions circumstances to find its bearings, once again, in the local politics. 
That is the reason that the party has been finding means to respond to local 
issues and reflect the sensitivity of the party to local sensibilifies. 
The polifics of state-centre relafions, usually takes the form of complete 
merger or full integration and as against it full autonomy on the part of 
Kashmir leadership. BJP and mostly, non-Muslim population from Jammu 
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have been demanding full integration of the state with India the position with 
regard to the National conference politics has emphasized the preservation of 
Article 370 or internal autonomy. The process of integration by government of 
India continues, the slogan by Jammu people still persists and the resistance to 
complete merger of Jammu and Kashmir with India also holds out. This 
politics, naturally dominates, at least at the domestic level by National 
Conference - the National Conference continues to attract the Indian Press and 
leadership to focus on the personality of Sheikh and its organization. This also 
reveals the failure of National conference to bring back the promised status of 
Jammu and Kashmir by India, the politics of central laws and the state laws are 
also now fought between Delhi and Srinagar. 
What is therefore required is a sober approach, free from political 
overtones, to the problems. The problems and grievances of the people have to 
be identified. The lapses on the part of the Government in addressing to these 
problems ought to be examined in the right perspective. Mobilization of public 
opinion in favour of Government's policies, through persuasion rather than 
coercion will go a long way in building up confidence among people. 
Administration should be made accountable for their actions. Removal of 
widespread feelings of deprivations and politico-economic discrimination in all 
the three regions will be significant. Violence and militancy has crippled the 
state economy. The need of the hour is to reconstruct the economy and generate 
employment opportunities to liberate the masses from the shackles of poverty. 
It is necessary to keep the people busy to prevent revolutions. Once the people 
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are engaged in the economic pursuits, they will not be carried away by the 
religious rhetoric. Funds should be made available for the establishment of 
small scale and cottage scale industries. 
A consensus among various political parties and groups on the basic 
problems of the Kashmir crises is called. The politics of convenience and 
manipulation must go. There should be a free-play of party politics. Political 
parties should promote the cause of nation-building and social reconstruction. 
Principle of toleration on the part of political parties and other socio-religious 
organizations leads to a significant way. Religion should not be used to gain 
political ends. The old guards have failed miserably to provide the lead. 
Personalised politics have no value now. A new leadership with a band of 
sincere and dedicated workers seems to be an imperative. This calls for free 
and fair elections as far as possible. The reports on the past elections in the 
valley are a pathetic commentary on the democracy in India. It is therefore, 
necessary to hold elections under the supervision of National Human Rights 
Commission, NGO, intellectuals and the press. There is also need to improve 
the human rights situation. Reports of misuse and abuse of power by Security 
forces are not totally unfolded. A restraint on part of these forces, respecting 
these elementary rights to life, is of paramount importance. State terrorism is 
no answer to terrorism. A group of central and state officials and people's 
representatives may be constituted which will review the application of AFSA, 
to various parts of the state regularly to explore the possibility whether the act 
can be withdrawn frorn any part of the state. 
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It is a fact that autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir is not a permanent 
solution, but if autonomy is given to the Jammu and Kashmir, situation will 
improve to a large extent. It also will remain a fact that till the most important 
three powers viz. Defence, Telecommunication and Currency is vested in union 
government, how is it possible that if internal autonomy is granted to Kashmir, 
it will secede from India. How is it possible for a state like poor Kashmir to 
manage its affairs with out the main sources? So there is nothing wrong in 
restoring the principles of article 370. It is necessary for both the central and 
state Governments to give up their rigid stand towards Kashmir which makes 
the problem very complex. Further, restoring autonomy in Kashmir does not 
require elaborate reports or references to agreements and accords. These 
obfuscate rather than classify the issue of meaningful self governance. Firstly, 
the terms Sader-i-Riyasat and Wazir-e-Azam, in place of the Governor and 
Chief Minister which was the practice till 1965 to be restored .In substance, 
this change will neither enlarge nor diminish the powers of the governor or 
Chief Minister. Secondly give the state a role in selecting the governor. Or 
alternatively, the state government could submit a panel of names and the 
president could appoint a suitable person who would govern his pleasure. .It 
will be the responsibility of the Union government to devise such a plan by 
involving the people of all the three regions which would lead towards an 
effective solution. The issue of autonomy in the state is complex in nature. It 
not only involves the question of evolving the fair principles of Centre-state 
relations but also the question of internal devolution of power and inter-
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regional relations. The two issues of state autonomy and the regional autonomy 
are, in fact, logically interconnected. It is not possible to achieve the one 
without aiming at the other. The politics of autonomy, of the regional or of the 
state level, somehow has failed to carry this logic forward. Those who demand 
regional autonomy oppose the demand of autonomy for the state and those 
demand state's autonomy hesitate to talk about the regional autonomy. 
Yet, it is difficult to dismiss the discourse on autonomy as of no 
significance for the people of Kashmir especially when it addresses the 
question of alienation. Alienation in Kashmir is a deep-rooted political 
response of the common Kashmiris to the distortion that has taken in the 
politics of Kashmir in the last 50 years. Much of the distortion was a 
consequence of the central intervention in the politics of the slate that started 
with the dismissal of Sheikh from power in 1953. Successive central 
governments v^ ere directly or indirectly responsible for encouraging political 
vandalism that took place in the state after 1953.The civil and economic rights 
of Jammu and Kashmir Muslims have never been threatened in a direct 
manner. But the territorial challenge posed by Pakistan has forced India to 
curtail political rights (through the misuse of Article 370 and unfree elections), 
which gradually led to civil rights and economic opportunities getting squeezed 
as well. Yet, despite these, the Kashmiris realize the benefits of staying in 
democratic India. What most of them want is an acceptance of the fact that 
Jammu and Kashmir joined India under special circumstances, and the state 
must be given greater freedom of governance. In specific terms, they want a 
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substantial reduction in the presence of security forces, to make the 
bureaucracy and the poUce at senior levels conform to the state's demographic 
profile, to make elections genuinely fair, and to make sure that elected 
governments are not at the mercy of Delhi. None of this poses serious difficulty 
to India provided India's requirements to ensure external and internal security 
are taken care of. Providing additional powers to state does not call for any 
amendment to the Indian constitution. Existing constitutional provisions are 
flexible enough to explore a wide range of arrangements, both with respect to 
Jammu and Kashmir as a whole and to the relationship between its parts. By 
changing some central and state laws it is possible to steer the legal base of 
autonomy in any politically desired direction. The principle of autonomy-
(which literally means being the master of one's own affairs) defined as 
substantial self- rule short of sovereignty- must form a pillar of any serious 
peace process and any durable settlement. 
The autonomy has substantial appeal to end alienation in Kashmir. 
Autonomy is essential for healthy Centre-state relationship and the only 
possible option to fulfill the aspirations of people and only mechanism to 
resolve the tangle. At the national level. New Delhi must move towards 
restoring Kashmir's compromised autonomy'. Most of the grievances of 
Kashmiri people have emanated because they have not been treated properly by 
the state authorifies, primarily those belonging to New Delhi. With minimal 
central control in the affairs of J&K, a positive change could be brought in the 
region. The Kashmir people need a solution that responds to the polifico-socio 
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aspects and is acceptable in all the three regions of Jammu and Kashmir. New 
Delhi's interlocutor's mission in this regard is a significant move. Triflircation 
of the state is not possible at the present moment. It will lead towards the 
serious consequences, such as social disruptions, polarize community, 
irretrievably destroy the state's culture and social fabric, and unleash perilous 
consequences for communal relations in whole India. Most important, remove 
wide spread feeling of deprivations and politico-economic discrimination 
within Jammu and leh. At the local level it is now the responsibility of ruling 
National Conference as a major political party of Kashmir, to review its 
political policies in Kashmir, by taking into confidence all national, and local 
organizations, including, kashmiri pandits, APHC etc. to bring back the lost 
paradise on earth. 
Kashmir known for its long traditions of religious tolerance and 
pluralism right form the times of Syed Ali Hamdani and Sheikh Noor-ud-din in 
14* century, presents a totally different picture today. Gone are the days when 
W. Lawrence referred to the 'delightful tolerance' which existed between 
Muslims and Hindus, today secularism lies in tatters. Militancy and terrorism 
have made a sizeable population of the valley to abandon their homes. It is 
important for the militant groups and also to state government to bring them 
back to their homeland, for the moral legitimacy of their movement depends on 
pluralism in Kashmir. The problem can be solved only through meaningful 
dialogue. It is often suggested that a change in the demographic profile of the 
state, meaning thereby that more and more Hindus should be persuaded to 
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move into the valley to restore back the secular culture. But much water has 
been flowed since 1947 and the chasm between the two communities has 
become more and more wide. Only a Herculean task can bring back the pristine 
glory to the valley, which judging form the performance of the government 
seems to be a distant dream. It would be more proper if this move is initiated 
by the National Conference (jovemment with the help of prominent Muslim 
leaders, who still retain credibility in the public. Such a step would surely 
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Appendix - 1 
THE TREATY OF AMRITSAR, 1846 
TREATY BETWEEN THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT on the one part and 
MAHARAJA GULAB SINGH OF JAMMU on the other concluded on the part 
of the BRITISH GOVERNMENT by FREDERICK CURRIE, Esquire, and 
BREVET-MAJOR HENRY MONTGOMERY LAWRENCE, acting under the 
orders of the RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR HENRY HARDINGE, G.C.B., one 
of HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S MOST HONOUJ^BLE PRIVY 
COUNCIL, GOVERNOR-GENERAL of the possessions of the EAST INDIA 
COMPANY, to direct and control all their affairs in the EAST INDIES and by 
MAHARAJA GULAB SINGH in person 1846. 
Article 1 
The British Government transfers and makes over for ever in 
independent possession to Maharaja Gulab Singh and the. heirs male of his 
body all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the 
eastward of the River Indus and the westward of the River Ravi including 
Chamba and excluding Lahul, being part of the territories ceded to the British 
Government by the Lahore State according to the provisions of Article IV of 
the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846. 
Article 2 
The eastern boundary of the tract transferred by the foregoing article to 
Maharaja Gulab Singh shall be laid down by the Commissioners appointed by 
the British Government and Maharaja Gulab Singh respectively for that 
purpose and shall be defined in a separate engagement after survey. 
Article 3 
In consideration of the transfer made to him and his heirs by the 
provisions of the foregoing article Maharaja Gulab Singh will pay to the British 
233 
Government the sum of seventy-five lakhs of Rupees (Nanukshahee), fifty 
lakhs to be paid on ratification of this Treaty and twenty-five lakhs on or before 
the 1st October of the current year, A.D. 1846. 
Article 4 
The limits of the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh shall not be at any 
time changed without concurrence of the British Government. 
Article 5 
Maharaja Gulab Singh will refer to the arbitration of the British 
Government any disputes or questions that may arise between himself and the 
Government of Lahore or any other neighbouring State, and will abide by the 
decision of the British Government. 
Article 6 
Maharaja Gulab Singh engages for himself and heirs to join, with the 
whole of his Military Forces, the British troops, when employed within the hills 
or in the territories adjoining his possessions. 
Article 7 
Maharaja Gulab Singh engages never to take or retain in his service any 
British subject nor the subject of any European or American State without the 
consent of the British Government. 
Article 8 
Maharaja Gulab Singh engages to respect in regard to the territory 
transferred to him, the provisions of Articles V, VI, and VII, of the separate 
Engagement between the British Government and the Lahore Durbar, dated 
11* March, 1846. 
Article 9 
The British Government will give its aid to Maharaja Gulab Singh in 
protecting his territories from external enemies. 
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Article 10 
Maharaja Gulab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the British 
Government and will in token of such supremacy present annually to the 
British Government one horse, twelve shawl goats of approved breed (six male 
and six female) and three pairs of Cashmere shawls. 
This Treaty of ten articles has been this day settled by Frederick Currie, 
Esquire, and Brevet-Major Henry Montgomery Lawrence, acting under 
direction of The Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor-
General, on the part of the British Government and by Maharaja Gulab Singh 
in person, and the said Treaty has been this day ratified by the seal of The 
Right Honourable Sir Henry Hardinge, G.C.B., Governor General. 
(Done at Amritsar the sixteenth day of March, in the year of our Lord 
one thousand eight hundred and forty-six, corresponding with the seventeenth 
day of Rubee-ul-Awal 1262 Hijree). 
(Signed) H. HARDINGE (SEAL) 
(Signed) F. CLIRRIE 
(Signed) H.M. LAWRENCE 
By Order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India. 
(Signed) F. CURRIE 
Secretary to the Government of India, 
With the Governor-General 
1. Referring to jagirdas, arrears to revenue, and the property in the forts that 
are to be transferred. 
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Appendix - II 
INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR 
STATE 
Whereas the Indian Independence Act, 1947, provides that as from the 
fifteenth day of August, 1947, there shall be set up un Independent Dominion 
known as INDIA, and that the Government of India Act, 1935, shall with such 
omissions, additions, adaptation- and modifications as the Governor-General 
may by order specify, De applicable to the Dominion of India. 
And whereas the Government of India Act, 1935, as so adapted by the 
Governor-General, provides that an Indian State may accede to the Dominion 
of India by an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof 
Now, therefore, I, Shriman Indar Mahandar Rajrajeshwar 
Maharajadhiraj Shri Hari Singhji, Jammu Kashmir Naresh Tatha Tibbet adi 
Deshadhipathi, Ruler of JAMMU AND KASHMIR State, in the exercise of my 
sovereignty in and over my said State, do hereby execute this my Instrument of 
Accession and 
1. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the intent that 
the Governor-General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal 
Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of 
the Dominion shall by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession, but 
subject always to the terms thereof and for the purposes only of the 
Dominion, exercise in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir 
(hereinafter referred to as "this State"), such functions as may be vested in 
them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the 
Dominion of India on the 15th day of August 1947 (which Act as so in 
force is hereinafter referred to as "the Acf )• 
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2. I hereby assume the obUgation of ensuring that due effect is given to the 
provisions of the Act within this State, so far as they are appUcable therein 
by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession. 
3. I accept the matters specified in the Schedule hereto as the matters with 
respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for this State. 
4. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India on the assurance 
that, if an agreement is made between the Governor-General and the Ruler 
of this state whereby any function in relation to the administration in this 
State of any law of the Dominion Legislature shall be exercised by the 
Ruler of this State, then any such agreement shall be deemed to form part 
of this Instrument and shall be construed and have effect accordingly. 
5. The terms of this my Instrument of Accession shall not be varied by any 
amendment of the Act or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, unless 
such amendment is accepted by me by an Instrument supplementary to 
this Instrument. 
6. Nothing in this Instrument shall empower the Dominion Legislature to 
make any law for this State authorizing the compulsory acquisition of land 
for any purpose, but I hereby undertake that should the Dominion for the 
purposes of a Dominion law, which applies in this State, deem it 
necessary to acquire any land, I will, at their request, acquire the land at 
their expense, or if the land belongs to me, transfer it to them on such 
terms as may be agreed, or, in default of agreement, determined by an 
arbitrator to be appointed by the Chief Justice of India. 
7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to 
acceptance of any future Constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to 
enter into arrangements with the Government of India under any such 
future Constitution. 
8. Nothing in this Instrument affects the continuance of my sovereignty in 
and over this State, or, save as provided by or under this Instrument, the 
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exercise of any powers, authority and rigiits now enjoyed by me as Ruler 
of this State, or the validity of any law at present in force in this State. 
I hereby declare that I execute this Instrument on behalf of this State, and 
that any reference in this Instrument to me or to the Ruler of the State, is 
to be construed as including a reference to my heirs and successors. 
Given under my hand this 26 day of October nineteen hundred and forty 
seven. 
(Sd.) HARI SINGH 
Maharaja dhiraj of Jammu and Kashmir State 
I do hereby accept this Instrument of Accession. 
Dated this twenty seventh day of October nineteen hundred and forty seven. 
(Sd.) MOUNTBATTEN OF BURMA 
(Governor-General of India) 
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Appendix - III 
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 
PART-XXI 
[TEMPORARY, TRANSITIONAL AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS] 
ARTICLE 370 
[370. Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu & 
Kashmir (1) notwithstanding anything in this Constitution. 
(a) the provisions of article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of 
Jammu & Kashmir. 
(b) the power of Padiament to make laws for the said State shall be limited 
to; 
(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List, which, in 
consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the 
President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of 
Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India 
as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make 
laws for that State; and 
(ij) such other matters in the said Lists, as, with the concurrence of the 
Government of the State, the President may by .order specify. 
Explanation - For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State 
means the person for the time being recognized by the President as .the 
Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir, acting on the ad vice of the Council of 
Ministers for the time being in office, under the Maharaja's Proclamation 
dated the fifth day of March, 1948 . 
(c) the provisions of article 1 and of this article shall apply in relation to that 
State; 
(d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to 
that State, subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President 
239 
may by order specify: 
Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the 
Instrument of Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-
clause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of 
the State: 
Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than 
those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with 
the concurrence of that Government. 
2. If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in 
paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (1) or in the second proviso to 
sub-clause (d), of that clause be given before the Consthuent Assembly 
for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it 
shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take 
there on. 
3. Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this article, the 
President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease 
to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and 
modifications and from such date as he may specify: 
Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the 
State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President 
issues such a notification. 
Notes: 
1. Subs, by the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1962.2. For 
TEMPORARY AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS (w.e.f 
1.12.1963). 
2. In exercise of the powers conferred by this article, the President, on the 
recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu & 
Kashmir, declared that, as from the 17th day of November, 1952, the 
said art. 370, shall be operative with the modification that for the 
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Explanation in cl. (I) thereof the following Explanation is substituted, 
namely: 
Explanation - For the purposes of this article, the Government Of the State 
means the person for the time being recognized by the President on the 
recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the *Sadar-
i-Riyasat of Jammu & Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of 
Ministers of the State for the time being in office". 
*Now "Governor" (Ministry of Law Order No. CO. 44. dated the 15th 
November, 1952). 
3. See the Constitution (Application to Jammu & Kashmir) Order, 1954. 
(CO. 48), as amended from time to time. 
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Appendix - IV 
THE DELHI AGREEMENT, 1952 
Main features of the agreement: 
(i) in view of the uniform and consistent stand taken up by the Jammu & 
Kashmir Constituent Assembly that sovereignty in all members other 
than those specified in the Instrument of Accession continues to reside 
in the State, the Government of India agreed that, while the residuary 
powers of legislature is vested in the Centre in respect of all States other 
than Jammu & Kashmir, in the case of the latter they are vested in the 
State itself; 
(ii) it was agreed between the two governments, that in accordance with 
Article 5 of the Indian Constitution, persons who have! their domicile in 
Jammu & Kashmir, shall be regarded as citizens of India, but the State 
Legislature was given power to make laws for conferring special rights 
and privileges on the 'state subjects' in view of the 'state subject 
notifications of 1927 and 1932: the State Legislature was also 
empowered to make laws for the 'State subjects' who had gone to 
Pakistan on account of the communal disturbances of 1947, in the event 
of their return to Kashmir; 
(iii) as the President of India commands the same respect in the State as he 
does in the other units of India, Articles 52 to 62 of the Constitution 
relating whim should be applicable to the State. It was further agreed 
that the power to grant pardons and remission of sentence, etc., would 
also be vested in the President of India. 
(iv) the Union Government agreed that the State should have its own flag in 
addition to the Union flag, but it was agreed by the State Government 
that the State flag would not be a rival of the Union flag; it was also 
recognized that the Union flag should have the same status and position 
in Jammu & Kashmir as in the rest of India, but for historical reasons 
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connected with the freedom struggle in the State, the need for 
continuance of the State flag was recognised; 
(v) there was complete agreement with regard to the position of the Sadar-i-
Riyasat, though the Sadar-i-Riyasat was to be elected by the State 
Legislature, he had to he recognized by the President of India before his 
installation as such; in other Indian States the Head of the State was 
appointed by the President and was as such his nominee; the person to 
be appointed as the Head, had to be a person acceptable to the 
Government of that State; no person who is not acceptable to the State 
Government can be thrust on the State as the Head. The difference in the 
case of Kashmir lies only in the fact that Sadar-i-Riyasat will, in the first 
place, be elected by the State Legislature itself Instead of being a 
nominee of the Government and the President of India. With regard to 
the powers and functions of the Sadar-i-Riyasat, the following argument 
was mutually agreed upon: 
(a) the Head of the State shall be a person recognized by the President 
of the Union on the recommendations of the Legislature of the 
State; 
(b) he shall hold office during the pleasure of the President; 
(c) he may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, 
resign his office; 
(d) subject to the foregoing provisions, the Head of the State shall hold 
office for a terni of five years from the date he enters upon his 
office; 
(e) provided that he shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, 
confinue to hold the office until his successor enter upon his office; 
(vi) with regard to the fundamental rights, some basic principles agreed 
between the parties were enunciated; it was accepted that the people of 
the State were to have fundamental rights. But in view or the peculiar 
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position in which the Stale was placed, the whole chapter relating to the 
'Fundamental Rights' of the Indian Constitution could not be made 
applicable to the State. The question which remained to be determined 
was whether the chapter of fundamental rights should form a part of the 
State Constitution or of the Constitution of India, as applicable to the 
State; 
(vii) with regard to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of India, it was 
accepted that for the time being, owing to the existence of the Board of 
Judicial Advisers in the State , which was the highest judicial authority 
in the State, the Supreme Court should have only appellate jurisdiction; 
(viii) there was a great deal of discussion with regard to the 'Emergency 
Powers'; the Government of India insisted on the application of Article 
352, empowering the President to proclaim a general Emergency in the 
State; the State Government argued that in exercise of its powers over 
defence (Item 1 on the Union List), in the event of v^ ar or external 
aggression, the Government of India would have full authority to take 
steps and proclaim Emergency, but the State delegation was, however. 
Averse to the President exercising the power to proclaim a general 
Emergency on account of internal disturbance. 
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Appendix-V 
DELHI ACCORD, 1975 
The following is the text of the agreement reached on November 13, 1974: 
1. The State of Jammu & Kashmir, which is a constituent unit of the Union 
of India, shall in its relations with the Union, continue to be governed by 
Article 370 of the Constitution of India. 
2. The residuary powers of legislation shall remain with the State; however. 
Parliament will continue to have power to make laws relating to the 
prevention of activities directed towards declaring, questioning or 
disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India, or bringing 
about cession of a part of the territory of India, or secession of a part of 
the territory of India from the Union, or causing insult to the Indian 
national flag, the Indian national anthem and the Constitution. 
3. Where any provision of the Constitution of India had been applied to the 
State of Jammu & Kashmir with adaptations and modifications, such 
adaptations and modifications can be altered or repealed by an Order of 
the President under Article 370, each individual one proposed in this 
behalf being considered on its merits; but provisions of the Constitution of 
India already applied to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, without 
adaptation or modification, are unalterable. 
4. With a view to assuring freedom in the State of Jammu & Kashmir, to 
have its own legislation on matters like welfare measures, personal law 
and procedural laws in a manner suited to the special conditions in the 
State, it is agreed that the State Government can review the laws made by 
Parliament or extended to the State after 1953, on any matter relatable to 
the Concurrent List, and may decide which of them, in its opinion, needs 
amendment or repeal. Thereafter, appropriate steps may be taken under 
Article 254 of the Constitution of India. The grant of President's assent to 
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such legislation would be sympathetically considered. The same approach 
would be adopted in regard to the laws to be made by the Parliament in 
future under the proviso to clause 2 of that Article: the State Government 
shall be consulted regarding the application of any such la w to the State 
and the views of the State Government shall receive the fullest 
consideration. 
5. As an agreement reciprocal to what has been provided under Article 363. 
a suitable modification of that Article as applied to the State should be 
made by a Presidential Order to the effect that no law made by the 
Legislature of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, seeking to make any 
change in or in the effect of any provision of the Constitution of the State 
of Jammu & Kashmir relating to any of the undermentioned matters, shall 
take effect unless the Bill having been reserved for the consideration of 
the President, receives his assent. The matters are: 
(a) the appointment, powers, functions, duties, privileges and 
immunities of the Governor; and 
(b) the following matters relating to elections, namely, the 
superintendence, direction and control of elections by the Election 
Commission of India, eligibility for inclusion in the electoral rolls 
without discrimination, aduU suffrage, and composition of the 
Legislative Council, being matters specified in Sections 138, 140 and 
50 of the Constitution of the State of Jammu & Kashmir. 
This agreement is called the Kashmir Accord. 
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Appendix -VI 
The recommendations of Srinagar Conclave held on October 5,1983 
To delete Articles 200, 201, 249, 250 and 360 from the Constitution of India; 
To amend Articles 356 and 357 in such a way as to prevent their misuse; 
To give residuary powers to the states; 
To give statutory recognition to the institutions of Planning Commission and the 
National Development Council; 
To deploy Central Reserve police in the states with the consent of the State 
Governments; 
To appoint the Governor from a penal forwarded by the concerned State Government; 
To make the All India services while serving in the state subjected to the supervision 
and disciplinary control of the state Government; 
To establish an Inter-State Council under Article 263 as a point of reference for all 
centre-state relations; 
To create a central communication council for preventing of the misuse of mass 
media. 
To extend the membership of the election Commission to three members; and 
To create a judicial council consisting of Supreme Court judges for making 
recommendations regarding the appointments of the judges of Supreme Court and the 
appointment and transfers of the judges of the High Courts. For this state 
Governments should be consulted before recommendations are made to that effect. 
The advice of the Judicial Council should be binding on the president. 
With the above discussion certain questions may arise; e.g., 
What are the reasons for states to rise against the Centre? 
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Why do the states feel dissatisfied with the existing Constitutional arrangement? 
Why do they itch for more and more powers? 




DOCUMENT OF PDP (Peoples Democratic Party) SELF RULE IN 
KASHMIR 
The Peoples Democratic Party prepares and offers this working paper on J&K 
as an act of hope. The hope lays in the behef that if the decision- makers and 
responsible political parties discern the categorical imperatives that have impelled this 
formulation, realize its intent and motive and examine its contents on merits, 
objectively and realistically, and not on partisan considerations or with chauvinistic 
mind-set, it will be possible to forge a consensus on the way forward. 
The Peoples Democratic Party is not presenting a solution; nor does it pretend 
to have one. Indeed, it is our belief that roadmaps prejudge the issue; readymade 
solutions make the problem a distorted image of what it actually is; and models make 
a mockery of specificity of the issue. As such, what we have attempted in this 
document is an internally consistent framework and indicative direction for 
resolution. We have tried to contextualize the issue at various levels and drawn the 
contours of a process for building sustainable peace in the State and the region. The 
essence of this document lies in trying to suggest a creative framework for resolution 
of the issue without compromising the sovereignty of the two nation states involved. 
We are convinced that various proposals and measures, as fleshed out in this 
document, address both the internal and the external dimensions of the problem in, 
and about Jammu and Kashmir, in a manner that is realistic and practical. Our effort 
has been to root these in the ideals of justice and empowerment for all the people of 
the State. We see our recommendations, as catalysts for change and instruments for 
fulfilling the aspirations of all the peoples of J&K, and regions and sub-regions of the 
State. 
We have not looked for solutions in the past, but we have made an effort find 
a way in the future. A return to the past may not be possible - indeed, if may not even 
be desirable. The past offers no hope. Our party recognizes that we are living through 
a period where definitions of cultures, societies, sovereignty, and nationality are 
changing very rapidly and radically. All these issues have gone through a large 
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number of transformations and sometimes, dramatic shifts. The world has undergone 
a change and we have to be a part of that changed system. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. The J&K issue cannot be resolved on the basis of exclusively intrastate level 
initiatives. It requires a combination of intra-state measures with inter-state and 
supra-state measures. This approach, which is underlying the concept of self-
rule, is a practical way that would eliminate the sources of ethno-territorial 
conflicts, entrenched in the traditional notions of sovereignty, self-
determination, national and ethnic borders. 
2. Self-rule is a formulation that will integrate the region without disturbing the 
extant sovereign authority over delimited territorial space. It doesn't impair the 
significance of the line of control as territorial divisions but negates its acquired 
and imputed manifestations of state competition for power, prestige, or an 
imagined historical identity. It is a way of "sharing sovereignty", without need 
or commitment to political merging. It is based on the creation of irmovative 
international institutional arrangements that have a political, economic and 
security character. Self-rule encompasses the society, the state, and the 
economy. Self-rule, being a trans-border concept, has a pan-Kashmir dimension 
but at the same time seeks to regionalise power across J&K. 
3. Self rule as a political philosophy is being articulated around the conception of 
federalism and confederation that allow for sharing of power between two levels 
of government, for the sharing of sovereignty in a coordinated but not 
subordinated to one another, each exercising supreme sovereignty in its 
constitutional prerogatives. The comprehensive formulation of self-rule has three 
subcomponents: 
i. A nev^  political superstructure that integrates the region and empowers sub-
regions 
ii. A phased economic integration that transcends borders 
iii. Constitutional restructuring that ensures sharing of sovereignty without 
comprising political sovereignty of either nation state. 
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New political superstructure: 
4. The centerpiece of the governance structure under self-rule is the cross border 
institution of Regional Council of Greater Jammu and Kashmir. The Regional 
Council of Greater Jammu and Kashmir will replace the existing Upper House 
of state assembly, and will be a kind of a regional senate. Members of the 
Regional Council will be from J&K as well as from Pakistan administered 
Kashmir. At present the state assembly of J&K holds 20 seats for 
representatives from across the line of control. These will be given up and 
replaced by the same number of seats in the Regional Council of Greater 
Jammu and Kashmir. This will serve as a major cross-border institution, which 
will ensure long-term coordination of matters and interest relating to the state. 
5. Moreover, such an institutional structure will provide a framework within 
which certain matters between the two parts of the State and their respective 
mainland, that need to be sorted out to infuse in people a sense of 
empowerment and a feeling of belonging. This will require devising an 
improved constitutional, political and economic relationship between the two 
parts of the State and their respective main lands. 
6. In order to empower various sub-regions within the J&K state, a tier of sub-
regional councils, will be added to the domestic legislative structure. While 
the national Parliament will have representations to the sovereign, the state 
assembly will continue to be a sub-national institution, the sub-regional 
councils will complete representative character of governance by bringing in 
the territorial representation in the state. 
Economic Integration: 
7. A critical element of self-rule is the economic integration across the line of 
control. This integration can be pursued in different degrees, deepening the 
process as we go along and as the system and society adapts to change. The 
process can be started by declaring the intention to establish common 
economic space and sign an agreement with a roadmap which envisages: 
i. Establishing a common economic space; 
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ii. Instituting a dual currency system 
iii. Coordinating economic policy, harmonization economic legislation and 
synergising regulations 
8. The process of economic integration of the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir 
can start with the easiest form of economic integration, a Preferential Trade 
Agreement. In the PTA the two countries, India and Pakistan would offer tariff 
reductions, or eliminations confined to the geographical boundaries of 
"Greater Jammu and Kashmir" and restrict it to some product categories. Stage 
II would be to make GJAK a regional free trade airea, with no tariffs or barriers 
between with GJAK, while maintaining their ovm external tariff on imports 
from the rest of the world, including India and Pakistan. GJAK will set a 
common external tariff on imports from India and Pakistan. 
9. Further, instead of looking for a monetary union, a new system of "Dual 
Currency" will be created, where the Indian and Pakistani rupees are both 
made legitimate legal tenders in the geographical areas of GJAK. Abetter 
description of this system is a "co-circulation of two currencies" in J&K. It is 
being proposed that Indian and Pakistani rupees should be the medium of 
exchange in J&K. To be more precise, it means, allowing circulation of the 
Pakistani rupee in the Indian part of J&K currency and circulation of Indian 
rupee in the Pakistan administered Kashmir. This has to be done if we want 
cross the Line of control trade to flourish. 
10. Our vision is to move towards an economic union, which will maintain free 
trade in goods, and services, set common external tariffs, allow the free 
mobility of capital and labour, and will also relegate some fiscal 
responsibilities to a supra-national agency. 11. Consistent with our legislative 
design, the economic integration will be deepened through sub-regional 
integration; that is formation of different sub-regional groups. Appearance of 
different sub-regional projects can generate multi-speed integration. It needs to 
be understood that GJAK is being proposed as a regional organisation to 
facilitate political cooperation as well as promote cooperation between India 
and Pakistan, and regaining Kashmir's place at the heart of Central Asia. 
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Constitutional Restructuring: 
12. Self-rule cannot exist without adequate constitutional safeguards. As the 
Constitutional position stands today, Article 356, undemiines the core of Self-
rule and has to be made non-applicable to J&K. In a similar vein, Article 249, 
applied to the State in amended form, should be rolled back so that the 
Parliament cannot exercise legislative jurisdiction over a matter that, 
otherwise, falls under the State jurisdiction. 
13. Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the State that undennines its original 
scheme of a comprehensive and accountable executive (inclusive of the Head 
of the State) a critical component of Self-rule, will have to be repealed. Prior 
to this amendment, the State Legislature elected Sadar-e-Riyasat, the head of 
the State. 
14. The proviso, limiting the powers of State Legislature, has been added to 
Article 368, which deals with the powers of the Parliament to amend the 
Constitution of India and not the power of State Legislature to amend its own 
Constitution. The proviso is, therefore, totally and grossly out of place and 
ultra vires the constitutional scheme. The State Legislature's constitutional 
power of amendment is the core of empowerment or Self-rule of the State and 
this cannot be destroyed by an order passed under Article 370. All India 
Service Act, 1951 and Article 312 be rolled back and the local human 
resources are provided clear and unhindered opportunity to develop their full 
potential and it is trusted to manage the affairs of the State. 
15. It is a part of the design of self-rule that Head of the State be elected from the 
regions of Jammu and Kashmir by rotation. This shall give to the people of all 
the regions an equal and equitable sense and feeling of empowerment and 
shall strengthen their bonds. 
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